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ABSTRACT
CONTEXTUALIZING AQUINAS'S ONTOLOGY OF SOUL: AN ANALYSIS 
OF HIS ARABIC AND NEOPLATONIC SOURCES
Nathan M. Blackerby
Marquette University, 2017
Contemporary scholarship has generally focused on two major influences that have
shaped Thomas Aquinas’ account of the soul. The first set of scholarship focuses on how
doctrinal concerns and the Augustinian and Scholastic traditions defined the central issue
that Aquinas faced, viz., explaining how the soul can be treated as an individual substance
that has an essential relationship to a body. The second set of scholarship focuses on
Aquinas’s employment of Aristotle’s works in his attempt to resolve the issue.
Contemporary assessments of Aquinas’s theory of the soul-body relation therefore take
Aquinas to be offering a solution that follows directly from Aristotle’s hylomorphism and
Aristotle’s remarks about human psychology. However, this provides an incomplete
picture of Aquinas’s ontology of soul and its relationship with the body. Aristotle’s
remarks about form, the form-matter relationship, the role of intellection in human
psychology, and the status of the soul as form in light of its intellectual activity require
significant interpretation on the part of the reader. Aquinas often turns to the works of
Avicenna and Averroes for guidance in how to read Aristotle. Moreover, Avicenna’s own
understanding of Aristotle’s view of the soul is heavily influenced by important
conceptual changes to the notion of form in the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle.
Aquinas selectively follows interpretations or adopts principles found in the works of
Avicenna and Averroes when presenting his own account of the soul. This is important,
because these principles differ in important ways from Aristotle’s own views or from
alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s remarks. Consideration of Aquinas’s
Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources is therefore indispensable for a complete account
of Aquinas’s conception of the soul as both a subsistent substance and substantial form.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS OF
AQUINAS ON HUMAN CONSTITUTION
In this dissertation I consider Thomas Aquinas's philosophical anthropology from 
the vantage-point of his Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources. I will argue that 
familiarity with these sources are necessary for a complete understanding of Aquinas's 
conception of the human soul and his conception of the soul's relation to the body simply 
because Aquinas draws from these sources certain metaphysical principles that are 
indispensable for his account of human nature. Recent scholarship has generally given 
little consideration to the role these sources play in shaping Aquinas's philosophical 
anthropology. This can be seen as the result of having taken approaches to Aquinas's 
philosophical anthropology that place emphasis on other influences of Aquinans's thought
and in some cases preclude sustained treatment of the Arabic and Neoplatonic 
background of Aquinas's thought. One approach takes Aquinas's conception of human 
nature as primarily driven by his concern a) to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with 
Catholic articles of faith and b) to resolve many of the Scholastic philosophical issues of 
his day. Consequently, this approach looks to the Latin tradition that preceded Aquinas as 
formative of his view. I shall call this the “Latin Christian Interpretive” approach (LCI). 
Another approach takes for granted that the interpretive context of Aquinas's thought is 
founded on Aristotle's hylomorphism. It then proceeds to reconstruct Aquinas's 
philosophical anthropology via argument analysis, usually with the aim of providing an 
assessment of its usefulness in addressing contemporary philosophical issues. I shall call 
this the “Aquinas as Aristotelian” approach (AAA). As a consequence of neglecting to 
2consider the formative role of Aquinas's Arabic and Neoplatonic sources, LCI and AAA 
have at times led to incomplete and in some cases mistaken accounts of Aquinas's 
philosophical anthropology. While Aristotle and early Scholasticism are undoubtedly 
integral to Aquinas's philosophical anthropology,  an approach that also accounts for the 
contribution of Aquinas's Arabic and Neoplatonic sources to his interpretive context (I 
call this approach “Source-Based Contextualism,” SBC) provides a more complete 
depiction of Aquinas's view. Studies focusing on the Arabic and Neoplatonic influence on
Aquinas's thought should therefore complement some of the LCI and AAA focused 
scholarship and also correct some oversights. This should improve comparisons of 
Aquinas's thought with the philosophical anthropologies of prior and later thinkers, bring 
greater clarity to the meaning and import of his arguments, and, consequently, better 
position one to assess the truth-value of Aquinas's theses.
In later chapters I show that one must draw on Aquinas's Arabic and Neoplatonic 
sources to provide a complete exposition of Aquinas's reasoning on human constitution. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a brief sketch of representative 
scholars of LCI and AAA and the topics dealt with in the later chapters of the 
dissertation.
1.1 Two Recent Approaches to Aquinas's Philosophical Anthropology
Two recent approaches to interpreting Aquinas's philosophical anthropology,  LCI 
and AAA, neglect the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic background of Aquinas's thought. 
However, this background provided Aquinas with metaphysical principles indispensable 
3to his conception of human nature. Consequently, LCI and AAA have led to incomplete 
and/or erroneous interpretations of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. This section 
provides a brief exposition of each approach by summarizing the work of representative 
scholars.
1.2 The “Latin Christian Interpretive” Approach
The LCI, taken by scholars such as Anton Pegis, Richard Dales, and Carlos 
Bazan, presents Aquinas's conception of human nature as having been shaped by 
Augustine and the Augustinian tradition, the Scholastic philosophical issue of how the 
soul can be both substantial form and a subsistent substance, and the Latin Averroist 
controversy. This scholarship has focused disproportionately on the contribution of the 
Latin tradition to Aquinas's conception of human nature, with insufficient attention given 
to the Arabic/Islamic sources that Aquinas employed and often explicitly cited in the 
course of developing the metaphysical framework for his conception of human nature.
1.2.1 Anton Pegis
Anton Pegis maintains that the historical origin of Aquinas's theory of human 
nature ultimately rests in the Augustinian Christian tradition that preceded him. Pegis 
presents his clearest statement of this thesis in his 1962 St. Augustine Lecture, “At the 
Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man” (Pegis 1963).1 In this work, Pegis claims that 
although the Augustinian vision of human personhood treats the human soul as a simple, 
1 An expression of this thesis can also be found in several of Pegis's other 
works. See: Pegis (1976) and Pegis (1974).
4immaterial, and immortal substance in its own right such that it is capable of ruling over 
the body, its early Medieval expositors were not concerned with espousing an ontology of
the human person; rather, they were motivated by moral and spiritual questions (Pegis 
1963, p. 16-17). As such, their concern instead was to express something of the spiritual 
journey of human persons in their discovery of God through exploration of the rich “inner
life” of their souls2 and to express “the superiority of the soul over the body” (Pegis 1963,
p. 16). 
The Augustinianism of the early Medieval period stands in contrast to the 
theological context of the 13th century, the milieu in which Aquinas was active. It was 
during this century that the surviving Aristotelian corpus other than works from the 
Organon became available to Latin Europe, which availability brought a fresh 
metaphysical vocabulary and, consequently, a sea change in reasoning about human 
nature from primarily moral and spiritual perspectives to a primarily ontological 
perspective (Pegis 1963, p. 8). As Pegis sees it, “the theologians of the thirteenth century 
were . . . called upon to explain in metaphysical terms” the Augustinian vision of human 
personhood that developed during the early Medieval period (Pegis 1963, p. 17-18).  
However, Aristotle's notion of human nature, viz. that the unity of a singular human being
consists in a hylomorphic composition and, consequently, that the soul-body relation is a 
2 For instance, Pegis writes of Augustine's view: “To know himself, St. 
Augustine had to find God; which is another way of saying that the Augustinian effort
to know man is, even when expressed in abstract definition, a journey to God, a 
journey of unification in the love of God” (Pegis 1963, p. 17). For Pegis's discussion 
of Augustinians prior to Aquinas who, according to Pegis, presented non-
metaphysical expressions of Augustine's Platonic view of human nature, see (Pegis 
1963, p. 12-15). 
5form-matter relation, appeared to rival the Augustinian view of the soul as a hoc aliquid, 
a substance per se (Pegis 1963, p. 19-20). Thus according to Pegis, the 13th century issue
of human nature was defined by “whether [one] can say at one and the same time that the 
human soul is a spiritual substance in its own right, having therefore its own existence, 
and the substantial form of the body” (Pegis 1963, p. 12). As a 13th century theologian 
committed to an Augustinian view of human personhood, Thomas Aquinas was therefore 
faced with the difficulty of providing a metaphysical account of this view in Aristotelian 
terms, a view that would have been foreign to Aristotle himself.
The above historical narrative indicates to Pegis that it could not be that “St. 
Thomas simply created [his] philosophical doctrine” (Pegis 1963, p. 7). Nor could it be 
that Aquinas's theory of human nature resulted from “a simple matter of expounding in a 
straightforward way a straightforward Aristotelian philosophical text” (Pegis 1963, p. 7). 
Rather, Aquinas's conception of human nature has its origins in his commitment to the 
spiritual vision of human personhood espoused by his predecessors, even while Aquinas 
expressed his theory using the Aristotelian philosophical language of his day:
Such an approach to St. Thomas Aquinas supposes that the Aristotelianism
of St. Thomas Aquinas was not his “philosophy,” but the technical language
and instrument through which he expressed his personal philosophical ideas
which he then went on to use in his theology (Pegis 1963, p. 17-18).
Yet Pegis maintains that Aquinas was deliberate in his choosing the Aristotelian technical 
language because “it grounded and made possible the notion of an individual substance 
having an individual essence” (Pegis 1963, p. 21). In contrast, the Platonic technical 
6language treated substances and essences as “a cluster of participations, intelligible and 
ordered, but constituting a hierarchical system of forms rather than a unitary substance,” 
therefore making it incapable of fully expressing the sort of unity envisioned in the 
Augustinian conception of human personhood (Pegis 1963, p. 20-21). Pegis thus 
concludes that Aquinas used Aristotelianism, first, to “oppose on metaphysical grounds 
the various Platonic psychologies that seemingly did not know how to maintain the unity 
of man's essence” (Pegis 1963, p. 23), and, second, to “correct the Platonism of St. 
Augustine . . . and still leave the core of Augustinian doctrine intact” (Pegis 1963, p. 26). 
According to Pegis's account, then, it is Aristotle and Augustine who define 
Aquinas's philosophical anthropology; while the principle source of Aquinas's reflection 
on human nature rests in Augustine's spiritual conception of human personhood, 
Aristotle's metaphysics of substance provides Aquinas the opportunity to reimagine that 
Augustinian vision in a philosophically precise way, as well as provide a vantage point to 
oppose positions that would compromise its notion of the unity of human nature.  As 
such, the Augustinian core of Aquinas's conception of human nature necessitates that it 
appear altogether unique in comparison with the philosophical anthropologies of 
Aristotelian commentators who preceded him, since, Pegis claims,  “none of the great 
commentators before St. Thomas – not Alexander, not Avicenna, not Averroes – had 
visualized that an intellectual substance could be in its very essence the substantial form 
of matter” (Pegis 1963, p. 5).3 In other words, the question of whether the soul could be 
3 Also see (Pegis 1963, p. 34): “The Aristotelian commentators had not been 
able to see how any substantial form of matter could be other than material, or how 
any separate and subsistent form could be other than entirely separate from matter. 
From this it followed that a form joined to matter was corruptible and that an 
incorruptible form was, and could be only, separate from matter. That there could be 
7both a subsistent substance and a substantial form is an issue that would not have 
occurred to the Aristotelian commentators simply because it was a problem peculiar to 
those who were attempting to express an Augustinian anthropology in Aristotle's 
ontological verbiage. Since an Augustinian worldview was foreign to Avicenna, Averroes,
and others, how could they serve as essential sources in determining Aquinas's solution to
the problem he faced? 
If the positions of the Arabic thinkers and other Aristotelian commentators were to
play any role in Aquinas's solution, it would be that they outlined the opposition, offering 
a point of contrast to the unified view of human personhood that Aquinas presented. For 
instance, one finds Pegis's discussion of Avicenna's “occasionalism” as an insufficient 
source for explaining the Augustinian notion of the unity of the human person in 
Aristotelian terms (Pegis 1963, p. 28-29). One sees this attitude expressed in Pegis's other
works as well. For instance, in the conclusion of St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul 
in the Thirteenth Century, Pegis explicitly characterizes Avicenna as representative of the 
Platonism that Aquinas was at pains to refute. Pegis writes, “Behind Avicenna rises the 
figure of Plato, and in Plato St. Thomas sees the parent of all doctrines incompatible with 
Aristotelianism” (Pegis 1976, p. 188), and, later, the “difficulty within the Avicennian 
system was really the product of an attempt to graft Aristotelian ideas onto a 
fundamentally Platonic psychology” (Pegis 1976, 201). Similarly, Pegis argues that 
Aquinas found in Averroes and earlier Aristotelian commentators, 
an intellectual form that was, at one and the same time, a substance within itself and 
the substantial form of matter was not only a novelty within Aristotelianism but an 
impossible novelty as well.”
8a conception of the soul which he [i.e. Aquinas] considers to be essentially 
Platonic, but which is defended by appeal to the authority of Aristotle . . . St. 
Thomas, therefore, must turn historian and begin that long exposition of Aristotle,
directed against his Greek and Arabian commentators, not to mention their Latin 
followers, in which an essentially Platonic separatism is attacked on all points and
the unity of man defended (Pegis 1976, p. 162-163).
Since Pegis's Aquinas sees all vestiges of Platonic metaphysics as the polar opposite to 
Aquinas's own view, and that the Arabic philosophers and Aristotelian commentators 
espoused doctrines that matched up with Plato's, it is unsurprising that the Arabic 
philosophers and Aristotelian commentators would be overlooked as constructive 
influences on Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. 
As shown above, Pegis's historical narrative provides reason to treat the Arabic 
thinkers and the Aristotelian commentators as having no formidable impact on Aquinas's 
philosophical anthropology, because the narrative leads one to presuppose that Aquinas 
had already found in the spiritual vision of Augustine and the technical metaphysical 
language of Aristotle what he needed to present a conception of the human person that 
treats him as a unity. Moreover, Pegis presents the Arabic thinkers and the Aristotelian 
commentary tradition as presenting a Platonism to which Aquinas was diametrically 
opposed. Such an approach would preclude the possibility of providing sustained 
consideration of the influence that Aquinas's Arabic and Neoplatonic sources might have 
had on Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. 
1.2.2 Richard Dales
In The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century, Richard Dales 
treats Aquinas's philosophical anthropology as a response to the Scholastic philosophical 
9issues of his day. Like Pegis, Dales sees Aquinas as the first among the Scholastics to 
argue that the human person constitutes a unity, because the soul and body “have a 
common principle of existence given to the substance 'man' by the soul, as form” (Dales 
1995, p. 108). However, Dales sees Aquinas's doctrine as a way for Aquinas to address at 
once a handful of questions that had occupied his contemporaries and his 13th century 
predecessors: “is the soul an individual substance in its own right, a hoc aliquid;” is the 
soul simple or composed; is the soul “passed along by the parents to the child by 
biological means” and if not, how is “the rational soul related to the vegetative and 
sensitive souls” (Dales 1995, p. 10-11)? These questions emerged as Aristotle's 
psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical works were gradually received into the 
Latin West. As Dales sees it, the attempted solutions to these questions by Aquinas's 
predecessors resulted in a “stage of confusion.” For instance, concerning the “central 
problem” of how to “reconcile the notion of the soul as a form with that of the soul as a 
complete substance,” Dales writes of pre-Thomistic 13th century Scholastics:
Some authors – Alexander Nequam, Alexander of Hales, William of Auvergne, 
and Albert the Great – denied in one way or other that it [i.e. the human soul] was 
a form; and those who did concede the use of this term for it always had to re-
define 'form' in order to save the soul's substantiality and immortality (Dales 
1995, p. 107).
The reason for hesitation in categorizing the human soul as a form, Dales claims, is 
because it leads to problems with the categorization of humans as rational beings, the 
origin of its rational capacity from biological processes, and the relationship between the 
rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers.
If it [i.e. the human soul] was the form of the body in any sense, the relation of the
rational soul, which placed man in his species, to the vegetative and sensitive, 
10
became a major problem. If the rational soul itself was the only substantial form 
of a living human being and was the source of all the vital functions, then one had
to account for the development of the embryo (which certainly had some kind of 
life) before the infusion of the rational soul (Dales 1995, p. 107).
Among those Scholastics who did treat the rational soul as a form, they presented a 
handful of solutions that, Dales claims, shared the same shortcoming, viz. “that the whole 
soul was not immortal; only its rational constituent was” (Dales 1995, p. 107). As such, 
their solutions were incapable of providing a theory of human nature that treated the 
human person as a unity. On the other hand, treating the soul as a form-matter composite 
“guaranteed the soul's substantiality but made it virtually impossible to consider it the 
form of the body, since . . . if it were already a complete substance it would be unable to 
enter into a further relationship with matter” (Dales 1995, p. 107). Finally, the intellectual
act that made the soul rational required that it not be conditioned by matter. Nevertheless, 
as Dales notes, “it also had to have some sort of contact with matter in order to function 
as a soul,” and, therefore, be “a form of matter without being a material form” (Dales 
1995, p. 108). 
By treating the human soul and body as having a common existence that the soul 
gives to the composition in its capacity as form, Dales takes Aquinas to have overcome 
the weaknesses of his predecessors, since Aquinas could use his position to consistently 
address each of the aforementioned questions without compromising either the unity of 
the human person as a psychosomatic entity or the immortality of the soul. First, as a 
being capable of intellectual activity, it is a spiritual substance, and, therefore, a hoc 
aliquid, having its own existence. However, it is unlike other spiritual substances insofar 
as it is by nature a form of matter, and so cannot be considered complete in its species 
11
unless it informs matter.  The human soul having its own existence guarantees the 
survival of the soul when apart from the body; the soul's being a form of matter, “the 
principle through which the soul exists and is living” (Dales 1995, p. 110) guarantees that
the body is an essential element in any human person. Finally, Aquinas accounted for the 
advent of the intellectual soul as a form by positing a succession of embryonic forms 
during fetal development. These forms come to be and are corrupted, each carrying with 
it a greater perfection than the last, until the intellectual soul is infused by divine action at
the final stage of human generation, carrying with it the vegetative and sensitive 
perfections found in the previous forms, solving “the vexing problem of how the rational 
soul was related to the vegetative and sensitive soul” (Dales 1995, p. 111). 
As the above summary illustrates, Dales sees Aquinas's philosophical 
anthropology as the product of his clearing up the confusion that resulted from the 
unsuccessful attempts of previous 13th century Scholatics to resolve the problems 
bequeathed to them in Aristotle's works. Dales's presentation of Aquinas thus gives the 
impression that the sole sources of Aquinas's theory of human nature are Aristotle and his 
fellow Scholastics. Although Dales acknowledges that the work of Avicenna contributed 
to the background of 13th century Scholastic discussions of human nature (Dales 1995, p.
7-9), Avicenna is not mentioned as a factor in his treatment of Aquinas. Dales also 
dedicates a chapter to discussing Aquinas's reaction to Averroes's doctrine of intellect, 
which Aquinas presented in his De Unitate Intellectus. However, there is no mention of 
Averroes having constructive influence on Aquinas's own position.  
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1.2.3 B. Carlos Bazan
B. Carlos Bazan maintains that early in Aquinas's career, Aquinas interpreted the 
Scholastic doctrine of soul as substantial form and subsistent substance in a dualistic 
manner that emphasized the human soul as a separate intellectual substance. In his essay, 
“13th Century Commentaries on De Anima: From Peter of Spain To Thomas Aquinas,” 
Bazan argues that two central tasks of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology are to avoid,
first, the anthropological dualism of Scholastic thinkers who, motivated by the religious 
concerns of immortality, took the human soul and body to be two distinct things, and, 
second, the metaphysical dualism of Averroes and his followers, who maintained that 
intellect lay outside the human soul.4 Aquinas attempted to fulfill these tasks by 
promoting a “conception of the human soul as a subsistent-substantial-form, a notion that 
secures both the unity of the human composite and the incorruptibility of the intellectual 
soul, and that evolves from the Aristotelian notion of form as actuality ” (Bazan 2002, p. 
122). However, Aquinas would come to this position only after holding in his earlier 
works a position that resembles anthropological dualism. For instance, Bazan notes in his
essay “The Human Soul: Form and Substance?” that Aquinas maintains in no uncertain 
terms at the beginning of his career that the human soul is a hoc aliquid in a manner akin 
to the “ecletic Aristotelians” who envision the human soul both as a substance in its own 
right and as a form, insofar as it is a perfection of the body:
4 For Bazan's discussions of anthropological vs. metaphysical dualism, see 
(Bazan 2002, p. 121-122, 178) and (Bazan 2005). In the former work, Bazan argues 
favorably that Aquinas managed to avoid both dualisms (see: Bazan 2002, 182-184) 
and harmonize Aristotelian philosophy with the Christian worldview.
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 At the beginning of his career, Thomas also held [with the eclectic Aristotelians] 
that the human soul was form and substance: “anima rationalis praeter alias 
formas dicitur esse substantia, et hoc aliquid, secundum quod habet esse 
absolutum, et quod distinguitur; quia anima potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet 
secundum quod est substantia, et secundum quod est forma” (In Sent. II, d. 19, q. 
1, a. 1 ad 4m)  The notion of hoc aliquid in this text is still imprecise and when 
Thomas discusses its meaning he points out other theoretical implications of the 
notion (universal hylomorphism and individuation). At this stage of development 
of his philosophical anthropology, Thomas has not yet reached the level of 
precision that will be found later in his Questions on the Soul (Bazan 1997, p. 12).
Similarly, Bazan remarks in his “Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts,” that 
Aquinas's use of hoc aliquid is indication that early in Aquinas's career, he envisioned the
soul to be a spiritual substance in a similar vein to the Christian anthropological dualists 
that preceded him and who used that very term in characterizing their conception of the 
ontological status of the soul (Bazan 2005, p. 597)5 Moreover, Bazan notes in the same 
essay that, like Aquinas, the Latin Aristotelian eclectics employed two metaphysical 
principles within their treatment of the soul as a spiritual substance, namely, the form-
matter distinction of Aristotle and the quo est-quod est distinction of Boethius, to 
maintain that  “a substance, itself composed of matter and form performs also the role of 
form or perfection of the body” (Bazan 2005, p. 598). It should be noted that the Latin 
Eclectic doctrine of soul as form and substance cannot serve as the sole source for 
Aquinas’s position, since Aquinas in fact rejects the notion that the soul is a form-matter 
composition, and instead argues that the human soul and all intellectual substances are 
simple in comparison with hylomorphic composites. Nevertheless, Bazan’s work 
indicates that something like Aquinas's view of the human soul as an intellectual 
5 Here Bazan mentions William of Auvergne, Philip the Chancellor, Alexander 
of Hales, John of La Rochelle and Bonaventure as promoting the notion that the soul 
is a hoc aliquid.
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substance was an acceptable view of the soul-body relation, an acceptable interpretation 
of Aristotle during his time, and that the principles of Aquinas's solution were already 
being actively used by his predecessors and contemporaries. 
 Bazan maintains that  encountering Averroes's doctrine of a shared intellect for all
human beings, led Aquinas to make a decisive break away from the dualistic-leaning 
doctrines of his earlier writings and towards a theory that emphasized the human soul as a
subsistent-substantial form. Bazan writes:
It is in the course of his refutation of Averroes's doctrine that Thomas fully 
realizes that in order to justify how a particular human being, who is a composite 
of body and soul, is the subject of an intellectual operation, he has to consider him
or her the subject of an intellectual being, for second acts (operations) depend 
upon first act (being). But the principle of being in composite substances is their 
substantial form; consequently, if human beings think, it is because their 
substantial form is intellectual in nature. The essence of the human soul is then to 
be a substantial form. It is in his confrontation with Averroes that Thomas realizes
that the conception of the soul as a complete intellectual substance is 
fundamentally flawed and leads to an inconsistent view of human nature. It is in 
this confrontation that he also realizes that being essentially "intellectual" is not 
necessarily synonymous with being a complete intellectual substance, because a 
co-principle of a substance, like the human soul, or even an accident of a 
substance, like the intellectual power (potentia intellectiva), can also be 
intellectual by nature. Thomas's critique of Averroes in the Summa contra 
Gentiles is the catalyst of his new conception of the soul and sets the framework 
for the important series of psychological works that he later writes in Italy before 
returning to Paris in 1269 (Bazan 2012, p. 163-164). 
 Although Bazan acknowledges that Aquinas's position is shaped in reaction to Averroes's
view on the nature of intellect, Bazan focuses disproportionately on the historical 
narrative of Latin eclecticism as the framework for Aquinas's theorizing, with little 
consideration of how certain principles in the works of Avicenna and Averroes may have 
constructively contributed to the formation of Aquinas's theories. 
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1.2.4  Summary Remarks on the “Latin Christian Interpretive” Approach
We have seen that Pegis, Dales, and Bazan offer distinctive analyses of the 
genesis, development, and intent of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. Nevertheless, 
they share in common, tacitly or otherwise, the view that Aquinas was influenced in his 
thinking mostly by his Latin Scholastic and Augustinian predecessors, and by the 
doctrines of the Church. Since Aquinas was a theologian of the Roman Catholic tradition,
it is of course natural to treat that tradition as perhaps the principle source of his thought. 
I acknowledge that Aquinas’s concern with constructing a philosophically defensible 
conception of human nature that purported both to demonstrate certain aspects of Roman 
Catholic anthropology (e.g. immortality of the soul) and to make belief in other aspects of
Roman Catholic anthropology intellectually possible (e.g. bodily resurrection) accords 
with Aquinas’s overarching view that the doctrines of Roman Catholicism are not 
contrary to philosophical understanding.6 To this extent, the religious and intellectual 
tradition of the Latin West can be said to have shaped the issues that Aquinas faced, and 
therefore must be factored into a complete account of Aquinas’s philosophical 
anthropology. However, the coming chapters shall illustrate that Aquinas utilized certain 
philosophical principles available to him in the Arabic/Islamic philosophical tradition to 
devise solutions to those issues. Consequently, an accurate historical account of Aquinas's
theory of human nature also requires consideration of how and to what extent Aquinas's 
Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources contributed to the statement of his solutions.
6 See Summa Contra Gentiles I.7; Summa Theologiae I Q1, A1, ad. 2; Summa 
Theologiae I Q1 A8. 
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1.3 The “Aquinas as Aristotelian” Approach
The AAA approach, taken by scholars such as Robert Pasnau, Eleonore Stump, 
and Anthony Kenny, have attempted to construct various aspects of Aquinas's conception 
of human nature through argument analysis and, consequently, to provide an assessment 
of its usefulness in addressing contemporary philosophical issues in areas such as 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, and ethics. The approach taken by these 
scholars tends to be ahistorical in the sense that they employ contemporary devices 
directly to the text of Aquinas with little or no consideration of his direct sources besides 
Aristotle. Moreover, Aquinas is seen as working out a theory of human nature from the 
vantage-point of an unadulterated Aristotelian hylomorphism. This comes with the peril 
of ignoring the more than millenium long commentary tradition on Aristotle that shaped 
Aquinas's interpretive context of Aristotle's works. Treating Aquinas as a direct 
interpreter of Aristotle and engaging Aquinas's ideas as contemporary leads to an 
anachronistic depiction of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. Consideration of 
Aquinas's Arabic and Neoplatonic sources can prove a corrective to this anachronism, 
which would serve to provide a more accurate rendition of Aquinas's arguments and, 
consequently, clearer assessment of their relevance for addressing contemporary 
philosophical issues.
1.3.1 Robert Pasnau
In Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Robert Pasnau argues that the 
metaphysical scheme underlying Aquinas's philosophical anthropology treats actuality as 
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the fundamental constituent of reality, such that matter does not appear as something 
additional to actuality in making up the reality of hylomorphic substance, but is seen as 
“no more than a particular manifestation of actuality: complex actuality in motion, 
subject to alteration, generation, and corruption” (Pasnau 2002, p. 131). On this view, 
hylomorphic substances are not caused to be complete by separate formal and material 
principles (Pasnau 2002, 133), since this would compromise the unity of substance 
(Pasnau 2002, 80-84). Rather, hylomorphic substances are understood to be “bundles of 
actuality unified by organization around a substantial form” (Pasnau 2002, p. 131).
Though Pasnau admits that his reading of Aquinas's metaphysics of substance as a
sort of reductive actualism goes beyond the letter of the Thomistic corpus (Pasnau 2002, 
p. 138), Pasnau nevertheless sees evidence of it insofar one can use it to make sense of  
certain otherwise peculiar features of Aquinas's philosophy, such as his doctrine of the 
human soul as a subsistent immortal substance. Pasnau writes,
It often strikes readers as incoherent for Aquinas to argue that the soul, the form
of a body, could exist without the body. But that is because we are so accustomed
to thinking of bodies as the ultimate reality, the stuff on which everything rests.
We have, in other words, accepted the ancients’ theory of matter. Aquinas believes
that  we  have  the  story  backward,  and  that  it  is  forms  or  actuality  on  which
everything rests (Pasnau 2002, p. 138).
This gestalt switch from reductive materialism or from metaphysical dualism to a 
reductive “actualistic” metaphysics leads Pasnau to proclaim that Aquinas's hylomorphic 
account of the human person shares an allegiance to certain 'non-reductive' theories in 
contemporary philosophy and that “Aquinas gives us a theory of the soul that actually 
solves the mind-body problem, and does so in a thoroughly satisfying way” (Pasnau 
2002, p. 140). 
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In the introduction to Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Pasnau notes that he 
intended to provide an extensive study that would have placed Aquinas's philosophy in 
the context of the various intellectual traditions that influenced him, but never managed 
to complete the study due to its “overwhelming” nature (Pasnau 2002, p. 2). Pasnau 
nevertheless sees Aristotle as an indispensable source for Aquinas's thought. As a result, 
Pasnau interfaces Aquinas's arguments directly with Aristotle's works. It is my contention
that Aquinas's arguments were not the result of Aquinas directly engaging Aristotle's 
works. Rather, his reading of the Aristotelian corpus was significantly impacted by the 
Arabic philosophers and the commentary tradition. As such, they are as indispensable as 
Aristotle's works for gaining a correct understanding of the meaning of Aquinas's 
positions. I will show that once Aquinas's doctrines are read in light of the broader 
interpretive context that Pasnau did not consider in his study, one cannot maintain with 
Pasnau that Aquinas's doctrines rest on “reductive actualism.” 
1.3.2 Eleonore Stump
In Aquinas, Eleonore Stump argues that although one might be tempted to 
categorize Aquinas's philosophical anthropology as dualist, “since he thinks that there is 
an immaterial and subsistent constituent of the subject of cognitive function,” viz., the 
intellectual soul, it would be mistaken to do so. Drawing on the fact that Aquinas holds 
the following two propositions in tandem,
a) Human beings are composites of form and matter.
b) The subject of mental activity belongs to the whole human being.
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Stump argues that Aquinas's position entails two further propositions:
c) The subject of mental activity is a material substance,
d) Mental activity can be an object of study for the natural sciences.
Both (c) and (d) clash with dualism, which according to its contemporary 
characterization, maintains that “the mind is not composed of matter and that scientific 
investigation of the brain cannot teach us anything about the mind” (Stump 2003, p. 212).
Moreover, Stump argues that since Aquinas maintains the “intellectual soul is the form 
constituting the human body as a whole” (Stump 2003, p. 123; emphasis mine), Aquinas's
position shares with contemporary physicalism the view that “mental states will be 
implemented in the matter of the body” (Stump 2003, p. 123) as configurations of neural 
stuff, including intellectual activity (Stump 2003, p. 210). Stump sees in Aquinas's 
position a philosophy of mind that overcomes the contemporary division between 
dualism and materialism:
The real lesson . . . of Aquinas's account of the soul is to show how misleading the
dichotomy between materialism and dualism is. What Aquinas's account of the 
soul shows us is that a certain kind of (restricted rather than global) materialism – 
one that takes mental states to be bodily states – is compatible with a certain sort 
of dualism – one that is non-Cartesian in character (Stump 2003, p. 215).
And later, Stump claims that Aquinas's hybrid dualist/physicalist approach will help in 
developing a comprehensive theory of mind: 
Aquinas's account of the soul . . . suggests that to make progress on a 
philosophical understanding of the nature of the mind (as distinct from a 
biological understanding of the mechanisms by which the mind operates), it 
would be good to break down the dichotomy between materialism and dualism 
that takes them to be incompatible positions (Stump 2003. p. 216).
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Stump's treatment of Aquinas's “philosophy of mind” as a  middle way between 
materialism and dualism ignores Aquinas's remarks about intellect as an actuality without
being an actuality of a body or a bodily organ, thus having its own existence (per se esse) 
unconditioned by the body. Moreover, since, according to Aquinas, the intellectual power 
belongs to the human soul, Aquinas argues that the human soul has esse per se, which 
esse the soul communicates to the body (ST Ia 75 a. 2). As a consequence of the expanded
role of the human soul in Aquinas's conception of human nature, this conception goes 
beyond Aristotle's hylomorphism in a way that Stump does not address, and which 
required Aquinas to draw on the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic tradition.
1.3.3 Anthony Kenny
Anthony Kenny argues that certain elements of Aquinas's theory of human nature 
seem to contradict the fundamentally Aristotelian framework that Aquinas uses to 
develop his theory of human nature. For instance, Kenny notes that if the soul is 
supposed to be the form for a body (or, more properly, as Kenny claims, form for a 
subject or supposit), then it cannot also itself be a supposit. For instance, in Aquinas on 
Mind, Kenny states:
There are serious philosophical difficulties in the identification of soul with form; 
or, to put the point in another way, it is not clear that the Aristotelian notion of 
'form', even if coherent in itself, can be used to render intelligible the notion of 
'soul' as used by Aquinas . . . Aquinas believed that the human soul was immortal 
and could survive the death of the body, to be reunited with it at final resurrection.
Hence, by identifying the soul with the human substantial form he was committed
that the form of a material object could continue to exist when that object had 
ceased to be. (Kenny 1993, p. 28).
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As Kenny sees it, the central problem Aquinas faces in his attempt to construct an 
Aristotelian philosophical anthropology that allows for the soul to survive bodily death is 
that he mistakenly treats the soul as a concrete entity, i.e. a subsistent substance, while at 
the same time supposing that the soul can be the form of the body, which is an abstract 
relation between abstract principles of concrete entities.  Kenny argues that in doing so, 
Aquinas's position contradicts itself:
The first two articles of question seventy-five in a manner cancel each other out. 
The first argues to the conclusion that the soul is incorporeal in the sense that it is 
abstract and not concrete: it is not a body but an actuality of a body. The second 
argues to the conclusion that the soul is incorporeal in the sense that it is a non-
physical part of a human being: it is an agent with no bodily organ. But an agent 
cannot be an abstraction, and what is abstract cannot be a part of what is concrete 
(Kenny 1993, p. 145).
Although Kenny takes Aquinas's purported confusion between the abstract and concrete 
to illustrate a deep-seated deficiency in Aquinas's theory of human nature, I will contend 
that Aquinas's controversial remarks illustrate that the framework for Aquinas's theory of 
human nature is not drawn fundamentally from Aristotle. What distinguishes Aquinas's 
framework from other hylomorphic accounts of human nature is the principles he inherits
from Avicenna and Averroes, which principles make it possible for Aquinas to maintain 
that the soul is a substantial form and a substance.
1.3.4 Summary Remarks on the “Aquinas as Aristotelian” Approach
Taken in isolation from Scholastic, Arabic, and Neoplatonic influences, the AAA 
approach leads to anachronistic depictions of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. 
While Aquinas worked within a framework of an Aristotelian hylomorphism in 
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developing his theory of human nature, it was not Aristotle's hylomorphism. If Aquinas's 
arguments are to be analyzed and assessed properly, Aquinas's philosophical 
anthropology must be accurately presented, which requires consideration of how the 
principles Aquinas derived and developed from Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources 
informed his arguments.
1.4 “Source-Based Contextualism”
The central thesis in this dissertation is that a SBC approach to Aquinas’s 
philosophical anthropology includes what the LCI and AAA accounts sketched above 
have misssed: the formative role that Aquinas's Neoplatonic and Arabic sources had on 
his philosophical anthropology. Whereas the LCI or AAA scholarship has focused on 
Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas's spiritual tradition, or the problems of prior Scholastics as 
formative sources for Aquinas's theory of human nature, a SBC approach adds to this a 
concern for considering the principles Aquinas uses to devise solutions to the issues of his
day in their proper historical context. 
The issue that Aquinas faces with respect to the human soul is that he must 
explain how the following statements can all be maintained to be true:
1. The soul is  a first  act  of an organic body having life  potentially. The soul is
related to the body as form is related to matter (Aristotle, De Anima 412b5-6).
2. The  actuality  of  intellect  is  not  the  actuality  of  a  body  or  a  bodily  organ
(Aristotle, De Anima 3.4).
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3. The intellect is a power (i.e. a first act) of the human soul (Summa Theologia I 
Q76. A1).
A combination of (1) and (2) would at first encounter seem to commit an Aristotelian to 
the view that intellect and human soul are separate from one another, since (1) requires 
that the human soul is a principle of a hylomorphic composition and (2) denies that 
intellect has such a relation to body/matter. This leaves one with the task of explaining 
how are soul and intellect related – an issue of fundamental importance to the Aristotelian
commentators. On the other hand, a combination of (2) and (3) taken together would 
seem to require that the human soul is a separate substance or something like a separate 
substance.7 This leaves one with the task of explaining how the soul and body are related.
Finally, a combination of (1) and (3) would seem to require that intellect is an act of an 
organic body, which leaves one with the task of having to explain how this combination 
does not contradict an Aristotelian account of intellect as a non-bodily act. Taking all 
three statements together renders the view that the human soul is a first act of a body, yet 
somehow possesses a power that is not an act of a body, and inherits all of tasks outlined 
in the three prior combinations. That is to say, Aquinas is faced with providing a 
framework that can explain how the human soul includes intellect as one of its powers, 
7 Aquinas sometimes refers to the human soul as a separate substance. For 
instance, in the opening lines of De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4, Aquinas states “It 
remains to see in what way there is essence in separate substances, namely in the soul,
the intelligences, and the first cause. // Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit 
essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia et causa prima” 
(43.375.1-3). Moreover, in the Commentary on the Sentences 1 d. 8, q. 5, a 2, Aquinas
remarks, “The angel or the soul can be called quiddity or nature or simple form, 
insofar as their quiddities are not composed from diverse things. // Unde Angelus vel 
anima potest dici quidditas vel natura vel forma simplex, inquantum eorum quidditas 
non componitur ex diversis” (See Appendix I).
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without treating the soul as a separate substance or the intellect as a bodily act. Moreover,
since Aquinas’s orientation as a theologian is to show that truths of reason do not 
contradict the doctrines of Roman Catholic faith, we shall see that Aquinas thinks his 
framework can satisfactorily account for both the immortality of the soul and the 
possibility of bodily resurrection. 
The previous paragraph illustrates the importance of Aristotle’s work and the role 
of Aquinas’s spiritual tradition as factors in shaping the issues he faces concerning the 
human soul. This dissertation will focus on the principles Aquinas uses in framing his 
response to those issues. Just as familiarity with Aristotle’s works and the Latin Christian 
tradition clarifies the problems Aquinas faces when dealing with the ontology of the 
human soul, so also familiarity with the sources that Aquinas derives his principles from 
will clarify his solution to the problems. We shall see in the coming chapters that 
Aquinas’s account of the human soul a) employs principles from Avicenna and Averroes 
and b) inherits through Avicenna an approach to substantial form developed by 
Neoplatonic commentators. These contributions of the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic 
commentators are indispensable to Aquinas’s argument that the human soul can be both a 
substantial form and a subsistent intellectual substance. To illustrate this, I will first 
provide background on the principles as they are found in the works of the Arabic/Islamic
and Neoplatonic commentators. I will then show how Aquinas uses these principles to 
construct his ontology of soul, after which I will provide an assessment of LCI and AAA 
accounts of Aquinas presented earlier in this chapter.
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1.4.1 A Brief Sketch of the Coming Chapters
The second chapter of the dissertation will cover three doctrines that serve as 
principles for Aquinas but have their origin in Arabic philosophy and/or the Neoplatonic 
commentary tradition. The chapter will focus on the expression of those doctrines by 
Aquinas's sources without providing a sustained treatment of those principles as they 
appear in Aquinas’s works. The first part of the chapter will focus on Avicenna's 
distinction between form and essence in hylomorphic composites. The second part of the 
chapter will focus on the manner in which Neoplatonic commentators and Avicenna 
conceive of the possibility that a separate substance can be a substantial form. The third 
section will investigate how Averroes applies a notion of potentiality to separate 
intellectual substances.  
The third chapter focuses on how Aquinas uses the doctrines discussed in the 
previous chapter to construct his theory of human nature in his early works. I will treat in 
order how i) the form/essence distinction, ii) communicability of the soul's esse, and iii) 
potentiality of the human intellect factor into the De Principiis Naturae, Commentary on 
the Sentences, De Ente et Essentia, and Summa Contra Gentiles, in forming Aquinas's 
early to middle view of human personhood. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the same topic and follows the same procedure as 
the previous chapter, except that it treats the works of Aquinas that appeared later in his 
career. I will treat in order, again, how i) the form/essence distinction, ii) 
communicability of the soul's esse, and iii) potentiality of the human intellect factor into 
the Disputed Questions on the Soul, Commentary on De Anima, On Spiritual Creatures, 
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Commentary on Metaphysics, and Summa Theologia, in forming Aquinas's mature view 
of human personhood. 
The final chapter contrasts the accounts of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology 
provided in Chapters 3 and 4 with LCI and AAA accounts. This constrast highlights the 
shortcomings that result from precluding or neglecting to account for the influence that 
Arabic and Neoplatonic sources had on Aquinas’s thought. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of assessing Aquinas's anthropology in light of an SBC study of Aquinas, and 
of the general value of SBC for research in philosophy.
27
CHAPTER 2: AQUINAS'S INTERPRETIVE CONTEXT – NEOPLATONIC AND
ARABIC-ISLAMIC INFLUENCES
This chapter provides a survey of the positions of the Neoplatonic and Arabic-
Islamic commentators that had significant influence on Aquinas's ontology of soul. First, 
I discuss Avicenna's account of the relationship between form and essence in sensible 
substance, which he treats as distinct principles. Avicenna argues that since essence 
determines substances to be the kinds of things they are, and since sensible substances are
hylomorphic composites, the essence of any sensible substance includes both form and 
matter. On the other hand, the form of any sensible substance is the principle that 
determines its matter to be actual. Consequently, Avicenna treats sensible substances as a 
combination of essence and supposit in addition to being a hylomorphic composition. 
This differs in important ways from Aristotle's conception of the form-essence 
relationship presented in VII.7, which identifies essence as form. On this view, there are 
no principles of sensible substance beyond that which constitute the hylomorphic 
composition, and, consequently, no essence-supposit combination. However, Aristotle 
also makes remarks in Metaphysics 7.7 that could be used to derive at least something 
akin to Avicenna's distinction between form and essence. Aristotle never definitively 
adopts either position, leaving to his interpreters the dilemma of having to reconcile or to 
argue for one of these two apparently conflicting accounts. Aquinas follows Avicenna's 
account of the form-essence distinction, and ipso facto, the ontological implications it has
for hylomorphic substances. Aquinas consequently rejects the form-essence relationship 
presented in Aristotle's Metaphysics VII.7, opting instead for Aristotle's view in 
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Metaphysics VII.11, which he identifies with Avicenna's form-essence distinction. In later
chapters, I will show that Avicenna's hylomorphism plays an important role in Aquinas's 
arguments that the human soul is both a subsistent substance and a substantial form. 
Second, I discuss Robert Wisnovsky's work, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context, 
which outlines how Arabic translations of and commentaries on Aristotle's works were 
heavily influenced by a strand of earlier Neoplatonic commentators who introduced new 
subtleties and distinctions in Aristotelian terminology in their attempt to harmonize 
Platonic and Aristotelian psychologies and to make sense of Aristotle's noetics. The end 
result was a Neo-Aristotelian account that treats the human soul as a form of the body, 
but which also has being separate from the body and is the cause of the body's existence. 
Wisnovsky argues that the Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle's psychology had such 
widespread influence in the Islamic world that Avicenna would not have viewed his 
dualist account of human nature, which accords with the Neoplatonic account, as at odds 
with Aristotle's account. However, the Neoplatonic reading conflicts with the standard 
reading of Aristotle, which treats substantial forms as distinct principles of and actually 
inseparable from hylomorphic substances, whereas pure forms are separate substances, 
incapable of being the formal actuality of matter. Thus a Neoplatonic inspired 
anthropology is faced with the task of explaining how a separate immaterial substance 
can also be a constituent of a determinate material particular. This task mirrors the 
problem Aquinas faces in constructing a philosophical anthropology that avoids the 
anthropological dualism of his Scholastic predecessors without denying that the human 
soul depends for its existence on, and therefore perishes with, the body. Aquinas's 
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solution maintains that the human person is a unified substance despite its soul, which is 
a substantial form, having per se esse. Since anything with per se esse is a substance and 
hoc aliquid, Aquinas has to explain how the human soul can be a substantial form of a 
human person, who is a substance and hoc aliquid, when the soul is already itself a 
substance and hoc aliquid.  In later chapters, I show that although Aquinas's account of 
the relation between the human soul and its body does not agree in all aspects with the 
Neoplatonic account of the soul as a separate being and cause of the body, there is 
enough historical connection via Avicenna and enough similarity in formal features 
between the two views to suggest that Aquinas's account is an outgrowth of the general 
soul-body relation envisaged by the Neoplatonic tradition. This shared framework 
enables Aquinas to develop an account of soul that is compatible with Roman Catholic 
anthropology, but also commits Aquinas to a conception of the soul as substantial form 
that departs in important ways from Aristotle’s account.
Finally, I discuss Averroes's arguments in his Long Commentary on the De Anima 
against treating intellectual potentiality as a type of matter and his view that this 
potentiality belongs to every substance besides the first unmoved mover, which is a 
purely intellectual act. Separate substances are ordered in a hierarchical fashion on the 
basis of the actualization of their intellectual potential. The first unmoved mover thus 
occupies the highest rank as a consequence of its pure actuality. By contrast, potential 
intellect occupies the lowest rank as a consequence of being in pure potential to receive 
intellectual content via a process of abstraction that begins with perception of sensible 
substances. As such, the potential intellect has an essential relation to the human body 
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and its psychological processes. In later chapters I discuss how Averroes's comments on 
incorporeal potentiality influenced Aquinas's defense of the human soul as being 
essentially related to the body and his rejection of both Platonic and universal 
hylomorphic accounts of the human soul.
Although the central aim of this chapter is to provide sufficient acquaintance with 
the positions of Avicenna, Averroes, and certain Neoplatonic commentators such that in 
later chapters it will be apparent that Aquinas utilizes these positions in constructing his 
own philosophical anthropology, it also serves to highlight that commentators had 
motivations and faced philosophical problems that were perhaps foreign to Aristotle, and 
certainly weren’t explicitly dealt with in the Aristotelian corpus, but provided an 
opportunity for novel developments in Aristotelian thought. Given that Aquinas draws on 
these novel developments in presenting his unique theory on the soul-body relationship, it
should be unsurprising that Aquinas’s final position turns out different than Aristotle’s. 
Moreover, despite Aquinas’s own motivations and philosophical concerns stemming from
the religious and intellectual tradition of the Latin West, Aquinas integrates the principles 
presented in this chapter in his response to those motivations and concerns. A survey of 
the positions presented by the Neoplatonic and Arabic-Islamic commentators therefore 
sets the foundation for the analysis of Aquinas’s theory of human nature presented in later
chapters and provides some constraints on what that theory logically entails.
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2.1 The Form-Essence Distinction In Avicenna's Metaphysics
In Metaphysics 5, ch. 8, par. 5, Avicenna set out to explain his understanding of 
the difference between form and essence in sensible substance. Avicenna writes:
(1A) Nor are composites [the things] they are through form alone. For the 
definition of a thing indicates all the things that render it subsistent. (1B) Thus, it 
also, in some respect, includes matter. (1C) It is through this that the difference 
between quiddity {i.e. essence} in composite things is known. (1D) Form is 
always part of the quiddity in composite things... (1E) As for the quiddity, it is 
that by which it {i.e. a singular sensible substance} is what it is; (1F) and it {i.e. a 
sensible substance} is what it is only by virtue of the form being connected with 
matter, which {matter} is something additional to the meaning of form. (Avicenna
2005, p. 187-8).8
 As 1A indicates, Avicenna begins with the notion that the definition of sensible 
substances include their essential properties. Let us call this the “Completeness of 
Definition ” postulate:
Completeness of Definition: For any sensible substance its definition will 
contain every essential property of that substance.
When one combines the Completeness of Definition postulate with the notion that form 
and matter are essential properties of sensible substances, it follows that every sensible 
substance will contain form and matter in their definition. Let us call this the “Avicennian
Hylomorphic Definition” thesis: 
Avicennian Hylomorphic Definition: For any sensible substance its definition 
will contain both form and matter. 
As 1C makes clear, Avicenna takes the Avicennian Hylomorphic Definition thesis and the
Completeness of Definition postulate as grounds for distinguishing between form and 
8 All curly brackets in the passage from Avicenna's Metaphysics indicate my 
additions, whereas square brackets indicate Michael Maurmura's additions. 
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essence. However, Avicenna has made no mention of essence-quiddity up to this point. 
Unless it were the case that essences were identical with the definitions of things, the 
Avicennian Hylomorphic Definition thesis and the Completeness of Definition postulate 
would be insufficient by themselves to draw the distinction between essence and form. 
Avicenna did not subscribe to a deflationary linguistic or conceptual account of essence. 
To the contrary, Avicenna's remark at 1E indicates that he understood the essences of 
things to be the principles by which those things possess their essential properties.
Essencedf= that principle by which a thing has its essential properties
 Thus, Avicenna had to conceive of the essence-definition relation in a way that allowed 
him to move from the distinction between part of a thing's definition (viz. form) and the 
whole of the thing's definition to the distinction between the essence of things and their 
essential properties. In other words, Avicenna must take definitions to signify the essence 
of things such that the consideration of distinctions in a thing's definition accurately 
reflect distinctions in its essence. Let us call this the “Essence-Definition Isomorphism” 
hypothesis:
Essence-Definition Isomorphism: For any substance, the distinctions in its 
definition reflect distinctions in its essence. 
Since the Avicennian Hylomorphic Definition thesis makes explicit that form is part of 
the definition of any sensible substance, and seeing as a part is non-identical with the 
whole, Avicenna reaches his conclusion via the Essence-Definition Isomorphism 
hypothesis, namely, that the forms of sensible substances are not identical to their 
essences. Let us call this the “Form-Essence Distinction.”
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Form-Essence Distinction: For any sensible substance, its form is not identical 
to its essence.
Avicenna's remark at 1F makes his reasoning for the Form-Essence Distinction explicit: 
since a sensible substance is essentially a hylomorphic composition, i.e. a composition of 
form and matter, and essence is the principle by which things have their essential 
properties, then form is distinct from essence in the way that an essential property is 
distinct from the principle by which something has that essential property. Thus, being a 
hylomorphic composite is not due to form, but results from a sensible substance having 
an essence that determines a thing to have a form which actualizes matter. Thus, from the 
Form-Essence Distinction, one can derive what we shall call the “Essence as Principle of 
Hylomorphic Parts” thesis:
Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Parts: For any sensible substance, its 
essence is the principle by which it has form and matter.9
9 Avicenna appears to make some remarks in his Physics that correlate with the 
Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Parts thesis. First, when distinguishing nature 
and form in composite bodies in Book 1, Ch. 6, Avicenna states: 
In the case of composite bodies, the nature is something like the form but not the 
true being of the form. [That] is because composite bodies do not become what 
they are by a power belonging to them that essentially produces motion in a single
direction, even if they inevitably have those powers inasmuch as they are what 
they are. So it is as if those powers are part of their form and as if their form is a 
combination of a number of factors, which then become a single thing. An 
example would be humanness, since it includes the powers of the vegetative, 
animal, and rational soul; and when all of these are in some way “combined,” they
yield the essence of humanness (Avicenna 2009, Physics, p. 46).
Avicenna primarily uses “nature” throughout the Physics to indicate “the power [of a 
body] that gives rise to its producing motion and change.” Moreover, in the context of
Book 1, Ch. 6, Avicenna identifies form as the “essence by which {a bodily 
substance} is what it is” (Avicenna 2009, Physics, p. 45). I take Avicenna's point in 
the above passage, then, to be that the nature of composite substances is the principle 
of their varied activities, whereas their form/essence is what makes them be the kind 
of thing that has those activities. Thus, some power intrinsically belonging to a 
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As the Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Parts thesis indicates, essence has a type of 
ontological priority over form and matter. This has important implications for Avicenna's 
views on the constitution of sensible substances.
Immediately after concluding his argument for the Form-Essence Distinction, 
Avicenna writes,
(2A) The composite is also not this meaning [viz., of form] but is the assemblage 
of form and matter. For this is what the composite is, (2B) and the quiddity is this 
composition. (2C) Form is thus one of the things to which composition is added. 
(2D) The quiddity is this very composition that combines form and matter. The 
unity that comes about through both is due to this one [composition] (Avicenna 
2005, p. 188).
human (e.g. the soul) is the cause for his or her growth, digestion, reproduction, 
sensation, reasoning, etc., whereas the form/essence humanness is the principle 
whereby any individual human has that power, among other characteristics that are 
required to be human. In other words, the soul is the nature of human activities, and 
humanness is the form/essence, i.e., the principle by which humans have souls.
Second, when detailing the variety of things form is predicated of in Book 1 Ch. 10, 
Avicenna states:
The form taken as one of the principles {of a composite substance} is relative to 
what is composed of it and the matter – namely, that it is a part of it that 
necessitates its being actual in its instance, wheareas the matter is a part that does 
not necessitate it being actual... So the thing {i.e. the composite substance} is not 
what it is through the matter; rather it is through the existence of the form that 
something becomes actual. As for the form that makes the matter subsist, it stands
above [any] other kind. The formal cause might be related to either a genus or 
species – that is, the form that makes the matter to subsist. (Avicenna 2009, 
Physics, p. 70; emphasis added). 
Avicenna distinguishes two types of form: a) the form as a part or principle of 
composite substances, which actualizes matter (their other principle/part), and b) the 
form that makes matter subsist. Though Avicenna does not state it explicitly, the basis 
for his distinction seems to be that since the form as a part of composite substances 
presupposes that composite substances have matter as a part to be actualized and thus 
cannot account for the presence of matter in composite substances, there must be an 
ontologically prior form (which Avicenna identifies as essence or quiddity, and which 
Aquinas later calls forma totius, or “form of the whole”) that causes composite 
substances to have matter as a principle (and, presumably, form as a principle as 
well). See McGinnis 2012, p. 41-44 for a summary of Avicenna’s analysis of 
definition and how it reflects the form-essence distinction.
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At 2A, Avicenna makes the observation that substances with hylomorphic composition 
are a substantial unity of form and matter and so must be distinct from their form. Let us 
call this the “Form-Substance Distinction:”
 Form-Substance Distinction: For any sensible substance, it is non-identical 
with its form.
The non-identity of form and sensible substance seems to indicate for Avicenna that form 
is not by itself capable of accounting for the substantial unity of form and matter in 
hylomorphic compositions, since form does not encompass all of the constituents that 
make up the hylomorphic unity. Let us call this the “Hylomorphic Unity Explanation” 
requirement:
Hylomorphic Unity Explanation: For any sensible substance, whatever explains
its hylomorphic unity must encompass its constituent parts (i.e. form and matter).
  We have already seen with the derivation of Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Parts 
thesis from the Form-Essence Distinction that Avicenna's conception of the essences of 
sensible substances encompasses both form and matter, which Avicenna restates in 2B. 
As such, the essences of sensible substances turn out to be ripe for fulfilling the 
Hylomorphic Unity Explanation and therefore play the additional role of accounting for 
the substantial unity of form and matter in sensible substances. Avicenna's remark at 2D 
makes this clear. Let us call this the “Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Unity” thesis:
Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Unity: For any sensible substance its 
essence unifies its form and matter to be a substance.
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The general picture that emerges from the Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Unity 
thesis is that Avicenna envisions sensible substances as being constituted by two parts, 
form and matter, such that their forms actualize their matter. However, in order to account
for the totality of the hylomorphic composition, the essences of sensible substances are an
actuality of the whole sensible substance. Thus, Avicenna sees sensible substances as 
having an essence-substance combination (where substance is taken in the sense of 
primary substance) in addition to the hylomorphic composition of form and matter: Form 
and matter are the components, the sensible substance is the thing composed, and essence
is that which composes.
In light of the above analysis, we can summarize Avicennian hylomorphism as 
follows: 
Avicennian Hylomorphism: for any sensible substance, it a) is a composition of 
form and matter and b) has an essence that causes its composition.
2.1.1 The Form-Essence Relation In Aristotle's Metaphysics
Avicenna's hylomorphism contrasts with the hylomorphism presented by Aristotle
in Metaphysics VII, where he identifies form as to ti en einai, i.e. as the essence or 
principle which makes things be what they are, to the exclusion of matter.  For instance, 
Aristotle states in Chapter 7 that form should be taken to indicate “the essence of each 
thing” (Metaph. 1032b1-2), and that “essence [is] substance without matter” (Metaph. 
1032b14-15). Moreover, in keeping with the identification of form and essence, Aristotle 
states in chapter 10 that “only the parts of the form are parts of the formula [i.e. the 
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definition]” (Metaph. 1035B33). If definition signifies essence (in accord with Essence-
Definition Isomorphism), this would require that the contents of a thing's essence would 
not include matter, which is at odds with the Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Parts 
thesis as well as the consequent theses.10 Aristotelian hylomorphism can thus be 
summarized as holding:
Aristotelian Hylomorphism1: For any sensible substance it is a) a composition 
of matter and form, b) it is what it is by way of its essence, and c) its essence is its
form.
However, Aristotle also presents what appears to be a conflicting account of definition 
and its parts in Metaphysics VII.11, one which seems to agree with the Avicennian 
Hylomorpic Definition thesis in maintaining that matter is in some sense included in the 
definition of certain sensible substances. For instance, Aristotle states that:
Some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things
in a particular state... It is not possible to define [animal] without reference to 
movement – nor, therefore to the parts and to their being in a certain state” 
(Metaph. 1036B23-30), and “the soul is the primary substance and the body is 
matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally” (Metaph. 
1037A5-6). 
 
Again, if definition signifies essence, one could use the view expressed in Metaphysics 
VII.11 to derive an alternate version of Aristotelian hylomorphism:
10 I leave aside the question of whether Aristotle actually maintained Essence-
Definition Isomorphism for now. My interest here is to present an interpretation of 
Aristotelian hylomorphism that, as we shall see, Aquinas considers and rejects as 
inadequate.
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Aristotelian Hylomorphism2: For any sensible substance, a) it is what it is by 
way of its essence, b) it is composition of matter and form, c) and its essence 
causes its composition.11
Avicennian hylomorphism is in agreement with both accounts of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism  that sensible substances are understood to be composed of form and 
matter. However, as indicated earlier, Aristotelian Hylomorphism1 does not treat the 
definitions of sensible substances as signifying a distinct principle from which those 
substances have formal and material parts, and from which those parts are brought 
together in a substantial unity. Rather, it treats definitions as signifying the forms of 
substances, without reference to matter. Consequently, all that would be required to 
account for a hylomorphic unity would be form actualizing matter, since form has 
everything within it to make a thing be the kind of thing it is. By contrast, Aristotelian 
Hylomorphism2 has the potential to render something like Avicennian hylomorphism: if 
definitions express the essence of things, then essence is a cause that makes the 
hylomorphic composition be a hylomorphic composition, since the definitions of sensible
substances contain both form and matter. 
2.1.2 Relevance to Thomas Aquinas
The interpreter of Aristotle is faced with two apparently conflicting accounts of 
the relation between essence, definition, form, and matter. Moreover, the Aristotelian 
11 If one grants the Essence-Definition Isomorphism thesis, it isn't clear whether 
Aristotle himself would have accepted Aristotelian Hylomorphism2. In the closing 
remarks of Metaphysics VII.11, he seems to reject it: “we have stated that in the 
formula of the substance the material parts will not be present” (Metaph. 1037A24-5). 
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corpus is absent any statements that clearly and definitively favor either of the two 
versions of Aristotelian hylomorphism presented above, leaving Aristotle's commentators
the task of explaining the relation between essence, definition, etc., and detailing its 
entailments for hylomorphism. Unsurprisingly, commentators have responded to this task
with a dizzying variety of solutions.12 Though it is beyond the scope of this work to 
explore any solutions besides Aquinas's and those relevant to Aquinas's work, it should be
noted that the prima facie indeterminacy concerning the form-essence relationship in 
Metaphysics VII (and Aristotle's relative silence on the topic in other works) enables his 
predecessors to offer their solutions in the first place.  Since Aristotle appears to have 
offered different and incompatible accounts of the relationship between essence, 
definition, form, and matter, if the relationship between essence, definition, etc. makes a 
significant contribution to one's concept of hylomorphism, it would be inaccurate to 
speak of Aristotle's hylomorphism as if Aristotle had a singular and clearly defined 
concept by which the hylomorphic theories of later commentators might be measured. 
Instead, a more accurate portrayal would be that a range and variety of potential 
hylomorphisms could be built from the theoretical components strewn across Aristotle's 
work. As such, any account of hylomorphism derived from those components and 
combined in a logically consistent way would be Aristotelian, even if each of the various 
accounts on offer are incompatible. For instance, Averroes argues in his commentary on 
Metaphysics VII that the definitions of sensible substances refer only to formal properties,
and, consequently, presents an account of hylomorphism that accords with Aristotelian 
12 See Galluzzo (2006 p. 64-70 and 74-79) for discussion of contemporary 
interpretations of Metaphysics, Book 7 on the relationship between essence, form, and
composite, as well as the essence-definition relation.
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Hylomorphism1.13 This stands in contradistinction to the position of Avicenna, which, as 
we have seen above, distinguishes form from essence and argues on the basis of this 
distinction that essence is an additional principle in hylomorphic compositions, which is 
at least similar to Aristotelian Hylomorphism2. The fact that the two versions of 
hylomorphism are derivable from Aristotle's work marks them as Aristotelian. The fact 
that two incompatible accounts of hylomorphism can be derived from Aristotle's work is 
a consequence of the prima facie indeterminacy (or incompleteness) inherent in the work.
What is of importance historiographically, then, isn't whether Avicenna or Averroes have 
interpreted Aristotle correctly, but why they have offered their interpretations and how it 
affects the rest of their metaphysics and natural philosophy. Likewise for Thomas 
Aquinas. 
In coming chapters we shall see that Aquinas adopts Avicenna's hylomorphism in 
his early works and maintains it throughout his career, while interpreting Aristotle's 
remarks in Metaphysics VII in kind. Aquinas was aware of an account of hylomorphism 
based on form-essence identity but explicitly argues against it. Although Aquinas partly 
bases his rejection of form-essence identity on textual considerations, a version of 
hylomorphism that presupposes form-essence identity appears in multiple works of 
Aquinas as an objection to a doctrine central to his anthropology, viz., that the human soul
is both a subsistent substance and a substantial form. Aquinas's responses either draw 
implicitly or explicitly on the form-essence distinction (for which he often credits 
Avicenna, not Aristotle) as providing an alternative hylomorphism that allows for the 
13 See Galluzzo (2013, p. 199-217) for an extensive discussion of Averroes's 
account. 
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possibility that the human soul can be both a substantial form and subsistent substance. 
Aquinas appears to have adopted the form-essence distinction rather than alternative 
accounts of the form-essence relation precisely because of that possibility, which makes 
the Avicennian form-essence distinction an indispensable feature of Aquinas's 
anthropology.
2.2 Avicenna, The Neoplatonic Commentary Tradition & Separate Souls as 
Perfections of Body
The first section of Wisnovsky’s Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Wisnovsky 
2003) and the  second section of Wisnovsky’s section on Avicenna in the Cambridge 
Companion to Arabic Philosophy contain an analysis of subtle developments in 
terminology that appear in certain Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s psychological
works. According to Wisnovsky, these developments find their origin in attempts by 
Alexander and Themistius to clarify Aristotle's use of the term “entelekheia” in De 
Anima 2 and in his description of motion in Physics. The Neoplatonists made use of these
clarifications in their project of harmonizing Aristotle’s noetics with the rest of his 
psychology and Aristotle’s psychology with Plato’s psychology (Wisnovsky 2005, 97), 
which culminated in a view of the human soul as a form of the body that has being 
separate from the body and is the cause of the body's existence. The resulting 
Neoplatonic account of the soul and its relation to the body influenced Arabic translations
and commentaries on Aristotle, and, through this, provided background for Avicenna’s 
“Aristotelian” account of the soul. My primary aim here is to highlight the defining 
characteristics of the Neoplatonic account of the soul inherited by Avicenna and contrast 
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it with standard interpretations of Aristotle's account of the soul. However, Wisnovsky's 
research on how interpretive issues concerning the meaning of entelekheia lead to the 
emergence of the Neoplatonic account of soul that influenced Avicenna's reading of 
Aristotle is necessary background, so first I will provide a brief sketch of Wisnovsky's 
work.
2.2.1  Some Hermeneutical Problems Connected to Aristotle's Use of Entelekheia
In the opening remarks of De Anima, Book 2, Aristotle distinguishes form and 
matter in terms of actuality (entelekheia) and potentiality (dunamis), and, moreover, 
states (without further explanation) that there are two kinds of entelekheia: the first kind 
is like knowledge (episteme) whereas the second is like reflection (theoria). Drawing on 
these notions – i.e., that hylomorphic compositions are determinate particulars with 
formal and material constituents corresponding respectively to entelekheia and 
potentiality, Aristotle reasons that the soul, which is the active principle of life, cannot be 
a body, since the body of a substance possessing life is both the subject of and stands in 
potential to living activities such as nutrition and growth. Thus, the soul must not only be 
distinguished from the body, it must be related to the body as its form and, consequently, 
is its entelekheia. Moreover, Aristotle identifies the soul as a first entelekheia, on account 
of the priority of having to possess an ability before one engages in it, just as knowledge 
precedes reflection. With this, Aristotle has arrived at a complete definition of soul as “an
actuality [entelekheia] of the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it” (De 
Anima 412a 11-28)
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Wisnovsky finds Aristotle's use of entelekheia to indicate form and to contrast it 
with matter is clear and consistent. However, Wisnovsky also remarks that Aristotle's 
attempt to illustrate the distinction by citing the difference between episteme and theoria 
ends up introducing an interpretive tension. Since theoria is an actuality, whereas 
episteme appears as a potentiality for theoria, the first/second entelekheia distinction 
could be seen as a special type of potentiality/actuality distinction. Taking this together 
with Aristotle's identity of the soul as the form and entelekheia of hylomorphic 
composites in contrast to their matter/potentiality, one might be inclined to identify soul 
as a second entelekheia, which is associated with theoria. Yet, Aristotle ends up defining 
the soul as a first entelekheia, the type associated with episteme. If first entelekheia turns 
out to be a kind of potentiality, the actualization of first entelekheiai, such as the soul, 
would be the subject of and stand in potential to alteration, which characteristics, 
according to Aristotle's own reckoning, are associated with matter rather than form. 
As Wisnovsky notes, however, commentators generally are in agreement that 
Aristotle's intention in distinguishing first and second entelekheiai is to track hexis, i.e., 
possessing an ability to do something, and khrêsis, i.e. using that ability. For instance, 
acquiring or possessing episteme provides one with the ability to reflect, whereas theoria 
is the actual use of one's episteme, based on whether an object of thought is absent from 
or present to the thinking soul (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 23-24). Interpreting the distinction 
between first and second entelekheia as a possession/use distinction gets around having to
take first entelekheia and the soul as a special case of potentiality/matter, since exercising
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an ability does not necessarily involve alteration to the exercising entity, but is simply an 
issue of whether the actuality possessed by the entity is dormant or displayed. 
The possession/use interpretation would therefore seem to resolve the issue of 
how to interpret the first/second entelekheia in a way that preserves the connection 
Aristotle makes between entelekheia and form. However, Wisnovsky argues that 
Aristotle's employment of entelekheia in Physics, Book 3.1, when he defines change as 
“the fulfillment [i.e., entelekheia] of what is potentially, as such” (Physics 201a 11-12), 
differs significantly from his employment of entelekheia in De Anima (henceforth, I shall 
use “P-entelekheia,” to refer to entelekheia in the Physics and “D-entelekheia” to refer to 
entelekheia in De Anima). First, Aristotle identifies D-entelekheia as a state of 
actuality/form in contrast to matter/potentiality, whereas he makes no such identity or 
contrast in relation to P-entelekheia, leaving open the possibility that P-entelekheia may 
refer to the process of actualization rather than a state of actuality. Second, although 
Aristotle makes no direct reference to a first/second entelekheia distinction in relation to 
P-entelekheia, Wisnovsky points to a passage in Physics, Book 3.2, in which Aristotle 
states that change “is thought to be a sort of actuality (energia), but incomplete (atelês), 
the reason for this view being that the potential whose actuality (energia) it is is 
incomplete (ateles) (Physics 201b 32-33). This passage implies something like the 
first/second entelekheia distinction of D-entelekheia, but puts it in terms of 
incompleteness (ateles) and completeness (teleion) rather than possessing an ability 
(hexis) and using it (khrêsis) (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 24-27).14 Moreover, in Physics, Book 
14 Wisnovsky notes that the perfect/imperfect distinction implied in Physics, 
Book 3.2 is also referenced in De Anima, Book 2.5: “For movement is a kind of 
activity – an imperfect kind, as has elsewhere been explained” (De Anima 417a 16-
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3.1 (201a 6), Aristotle originally mentions ateles and teleion specifically as contraries of 
quantity. This contrasts with hexis and khrêsis, which are not contraries, but rather, as 
Wisnovsky puts it, “indications of the presence or absence of a relation” (Wisnovsky 
2003, p. 30). This left the early commentators, who generally treated Aristotle as a 
systematic thinker, with an interpretive quagmire of resolving the discrepancy between 
P-entelekheia, D-entelekheia, and their related distinctions.
Wisnovsky lays out the following interpretive possibilities for reconciling the 
difference between P-entelekheia and D-entelekheia:
Strong Identity: The identity of P-entelekheia and D-entelekheia is such that 
both the first/second distinction and the complete/incomplete distinction equally 
apply to both types of entelekheiai.
Weak Identity: The identity of P-entelekheia and D-entelekheia is such that 
either a) the first/second distinction pertains to both types of entelekheiai, but the 
complete/incomplete distinction pertains exclusively to P-entelekheia, or b) the 
complete/incomplete distinction pertains to both types of entelekheiai, but the 
first/second distinction pertains exclusively to D-entelekheia.
Adopting strong identity would require ascribing a change in quantity/magnitude to the 
soul when it passes from a first entelekheia (e.g. having episteme) to second entelekheia 
(e.g. engaging in theoria). There are two problems with such an ascription. First, it entails
predicating differing quantities at different instances to the soul. In order for the soul to 
be a proper subject of quantitative properties and for those properties to change, the soul 
would have to be a hylomorphic substance; but, as we have seen, Aristotle wants to 
17).
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maintain that the soul is the form of living substances. Second, strong identity entails that
the soul would be subject to change (kinêsis) and thus altered during any transition from 
first to second entelekheia; but Aristotle explicitly denies that passing from first to second
entelekheia is kinetic and that the soul is altered:
The expression 'to be acted upon' has more than one meaning; it may mean either 
the extinction of one of two contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is 
potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as 
actual to potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a 
transition which is either not an alteration of it at all... or at least an alteration in a 
quite different sense. Hence it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being 'altered' 
when he uses his wisdom, just as it would be absurd to speak of a builder as being
altered when he is using his skill in building a house (De Anima 417b 2-9).
Since the transition from first to second entelekheia does not involve the destruction of a 
contrary, its transition is not kinetic, and, therefore, doesn't involve alteration (at least in 
the sense that pertains to beings subject to kinesis). Likewise, strong identity would 
require that the completion of any expansion or contraction in quantity also be treated as 
a second entelekheia, the consequences of which are absurd. For instance, one must say 
that an oak, at the point of reaching the absolute limit of its size, would be exercising a 
capacity that it merely possessed during its period of growth. But this gets things 
backward: the oak actually possesses the absolute limit of its size after and only after its 
growth is complete. Since a strong identity interpretation doesn't show any promise, the 
early commentators pursued weak identity interpretation, favoring version (b) 
(Wisnovsky 2003, p. 27-32). 
According to Wisnovsky, the main reason the early commentators opted for 
version (b) over (a) was that “Aristotle simply provides more textual raw material with 
which to construct an interpretation along the lines of [(b)].” The first aspect of this “raw 
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material” comes from Metaphsyics, Book 5.16, in which Aristotle discusses the semantic 
range of  “completeness” (to teleion) beyond the quantitative considerations of the 
Physics:
Possessing all proper parts: “We call complete that outside of which it is not 
possible to find even one of the parts proper to it” (Metaph. 1021b 12-13).
Highest Excellence: “That which in respect of excellence and goodness cannot 
be excelled in its kind” (Metaph. 1021b 14-15).
End (terminus): “The end is something ultimate... is at its last point” (Metaph. 
1021B 25-28).
End (purpose): “The ultimate thing for the sake of which is also an end.” 
(Metaph. 1021B 30).
The benefit to the commentators of having a multitude of meanings of “completeness” at 
their disposal is that it potentially enables them to find one sense of “completeness” that 
is appropriate to D-entelekheia and another sense that is appropriate to P-entelekheia, 
thus avoiding the sort of conflict that arose with a strong identity interpretation. 
Wisnovsky summarizes:
The result of having so many meanings of teleion to choose from is that a 
commentator had more tools at his disposal with which to subsume the 
first/second distinction under the incomplete/complete distinction... Change could
be held to be an entelekheia atelês because it has not reached its telos qua “limit” 
or “terminus.” The changing thing either remained in an unfinished process which
had not reached its terminus or itself possessed the state of not having reached its 
terminus. On the other hand, knowledge and contemplation could each be held to 
be telia because both are “ended;” that is, both have a telos qua “end” or 
“purpose.” Knowledge, the first entelekheia of the De Anima, is “ended” in the 
sense of “having an end:” it refers to a capability which is directed towards an 
end. Contemplation, the second entelekheia of the De Anima, is “ended” in the 
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sense of “being an end:” it refers to a function which serves as an end. 
(Wisnovsky 2003, p. 35-36)
The second aspect comes from “teleiotēs” and “teleôsis,” abstract nouns derived from 
teleion, appearing in contexts in which Aristotle also uses entelekheia. Aristotle employs 
teleiotēs together with ateleia to indicate contraries involved in change of quantity, which
would associate it primarily with P-entelekheia. On the other hand, Aristotle also uses 
teleôsis to describe states in which change is absent (e.g. possessing a virtue or a vice) as 
well as instances of changes, which would seem to make it ripe for application to both D-
entelekheia and P-entelekheia (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 36-37). Nevertheless, Wisnovsky 
notes that commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius ended up 
settling on the term teleiotēs as an interpretation of entelekheia, applying it to Aristotle’s 
definition of the soul and his definition of change. Wisnovsky thinks that their rejection 
of teleôsis as an interpretation of entelekheia stems from Aristotle using teleôsis to refer 
primarily to processes of change, which conflicts with the entelekheiai pertaining to the 
first/second distinction referring to states (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 38).15
15 The above summary of Wisnovsky's work on the hermeneutical issues 
surrounding Aristotle's use of entelekheia is limited by the concerns of the present 
study. It should be noted, however, that Wisnovsky  includes an argument at 
(Wisnovsky 2003, p. 39-41) that every possible way of conceiving teleiotēs or 
teleôsis in relation to P-entelekheia, D-entelekheia, and their related distinctions leads
to unsavory results, leading Wisnovsky to suggest that the weak identity approach of 
the early commentators is an interpretive cul de sac. Better, then, to treat P-
entelekheia and D-entelekheia as unique cases of entelekheia, each of which pertain 
to their own specific domain (e.g. P-entelekheia pertains to change and D-entelekheia
pertains to the soul). 
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2.2.2  Wisnovsky on Alexander, Themistius, and the Expanded Meaning of Teleiotēs
Alexander of Aphrodisias contributes to the tradition of interpreting entelekheia as
teleiotēs by expanding the meaning of teleiotēs beyond its initial association with only 
quantitative completeness so  that it can equally apply, first, to each of the four changes 
that Aristotle introduces in his initial discussion of kinêsis in Physics, Book 3 (i.e. change 
of substance, quality, quantity, and location), and, second, to any non-kinetic transition 
from a state of first actuality to a state of second actuality (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 45). 
Alexander achieves this by making two interpretive moves. In Physics 5, Books 1 and 2, 
Aristotle distinguishes substantial change (genesis), which involves passage from one 
state to a contradictory state, from the other types of kinêsis (change of quality, quantity, 
and location), which involve alteration of a substance that passes from one state to a 
contrary state. To uphold the distinction between genesis and the other types of change, 
Aristotle adopts metabolê to refer to the four types of change generally. So Alexander's 
first interpretive move is to associate teleiotēs with metabolê, so that teleiotēs can be 
applied to each of the four kinds of change, rather than to quantity only, as it was in 
Physics, Book 3. Second, since Aristotle distances genesis from kinêsis in Physics 5, 
Alexander takes this as an opportunity to categorize non-kinetic transitions such as the 
reception of intelligible form in the intellect as instances of genesis. Moreover, since 
genesis is a sub-category of metabolê, this second move allows Alexander to claim that 
any non-kinetic transition is a metabolê, as well, and will therefore have a teleiotēs 
(Wisnovsky 2003, p. 45). Wisnovsky succinctly summarizes how Alexander envisions 
this interpretation:
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In his comments on Metaphysics 2.2 (ad 994a19-b6), Alexander says (in Metaph. 
2.2, 153, 14-28) that the teleiotēs is the end-state following various metabolai: the
metabolê from boy to man; the metabolê from learner to one with scientific 
knowledge; and the metabolê from not-contemplating to contemplating... The 
teleiotēs is the end-state following each of these types of metabolê, regardless of 
whether the metabolê is with respect to growth (auxêsis), as in the first case; with 
respect to quality (alloiôsis), as in the second case; or with respect to form (kat' 
eidos), as in the third case. (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 46)
Thus, since Alexander defines teleiotēs as an end state of metabolê, and since he treats 
both the four types of causes and the transitions from first to second entelekheia as 
metabolê, he can identify both D-entelekheia and P-entelekheia as teleiotēs. Moreover, 
since, per Aristotle's remarks in De Anima, Book 2, the soul is said to be a substantial 
form on account of its being entelekheia, teleiotēs can be predicated of the soul and of 
substantial form. 
Themistius follows Alexander in interpreting entelekheia as teleiotēs and 
acknowledges Alexander's use of teleiotēs to refer to the limit or end state of a metabolê. 
However, Themistius also broadens the meaning of teleiotēs so that it also can refer to the
extent to which something “is either directed at or serves as a telos, or ‘end’” (Wisnovsky
2005, 99). I shall refer to Alexander's use of teleiotēs as A- teleiotēs and Themisus's 
expanded senses as T-teleiotēs1 and T-teleiotēs2, respectively.  
A-teleiotēs1: the end state of a metabolê.
T-teleiotēs1: being directed at a telos.
T-teleiotēs2: serving as a telos.
Adding the two senses of T-teleiotēs to the mix provides Themistius the advantage of 
greater precision in determining how something is an entelekheia. For instance, consider 
Aristotle's claim in Physics, Book 3 that kinêsis is an entelekheia in conjunction with A-
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teleiotēs, the notion that entelekheia is synonymous with the end state of a metabolê. 
These two notions are contradictory to one another: how can kinêsis at the same time be a
metabolê and an entelekheia, i.e. an end state of a metabolê? Wisnovsky points out that 
Alexander's account of teleiotēs generates precisely this problem, and that Alexander was
not able to resolve it successfully (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 50-52). On the other hand, 
Themistius isn't limited to A-teleiotēs when discussing how something is an entelekheia, 
Themistius has at his disposal the two senses of T-teleiotēs, as well, and therefore he can 
claim that kinêsis is an entelekheia insofar as it is directed at an end. That is, any entity 
undergoing kinêsis is in a state of T-teleiotēs1 and is therefore still in potential to its end 
state. The upshot for all this with regard to the soul is that it enables Themistius to specify
just how the soul is an entelekheia in each of its roles, as Wisnovsky outlines:
The soul is the substantial form of the body and in that sense it is the end-state of 
the metabolê by which the matter of the body came to be informed by the soul. 
The soul is also a structure of faculties or capabilities which is ended in the sense 
that these faculties or capabilities are either... directed towards the coming-to-be 
of new actualities (as with the faculty of reproduction, whose activity is directed 
towards the coming-to-be of offspring); or... in their activities are ends in 
themselves (as with the faculty of intellection, whose activity is directed at no end
other than itself) (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 57).
In other words, the soul is an entelekheia as substantial form in the sense of A-teleiotēs, 
and the soul is an entelekheia as an organization of faculties in the sense of either  T-
teleiotēs1 or T-teleiotēs2, depending on the orientation of the faculty in question. 
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2.2.3 Teleiotēs in the Neoplatonic Commentary Tradition
Themistius's two senses of T-teleiotēs introduced causal import into teleiotēs and, 
consequently, entelekheia. That is, by Themistius adding the notion of telos to teleiotēs, 
Wisnovsky notes that the “concepts of actuality and activity were on their way to being 
viewed less as states of being and more as causes of being, and particularly as final 
causes of being” (Wisnovsky 2003, p. 61). This shift to conceiving of actualities as final 
causes provided an opportunity for Neoplatonic commentators,16 who were concerned 
with reconciling Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the soul,  to “direct attention 
away from the problem of what the soul is (i.e., what the soul is in relation to the body), 
and toward the problem of how the soul causes (i.e. how the soul causes the body)” 
(Wisnovsky, 2005, 99). In particular, this shifted the conception of the soul away from 
being a form/actuality of the body, and towards a conception of the soul as an efficient 
and final cause of the body. 
Wisnovsky also notes that, the Neoplatonic commentators formulated a 
conception of Aristotle's four causes that treated formal and material causes to be 
inseparable from their effects and efficient and final causes were to be actually separate 
from their effects. This formulation began with Proclus and came to fruition in the works 
of Ammonias and his students (Wisnovsky 2005, 100; Wisnovsky 2003, p. 69-75). 
Combining the separability of efficient and final causes with the Alexandrian and 
Themistian glosses of entelekheia as teleiotēs, Ammonias and his students concluded that
16  Wisnovsky specifically cites Syrianus, Proclus, Ammonias, Asclepius, and 
Philoponus as members of this tradition. See Wisnovsky 2003, p. 64.
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the soul is a final cause of the body, and therefore separate from the body. Wisnovsky 
calls this combination of ideas the “Ammonian Synthesis.” Wisnovsky writes,
The Ammonians... reasoned as follows: since Alexander, the most authoritative 
Aristotelian commentator, had glossed Aristotle’s entelekheia with teleiotēs, and 
since Themistius had added endedness – being directed at or serving as a telos, or 
final cause – to the semantic range of teleiotēs, the most likely way in which the 
soul causes the body is therefore the way in which a final cause acts on its effect. 
And given the fact that final causes are separate from or transcend their effects, so
the soul, as final cause, will be separate from or transcend its effect, the body 
(Wisnovsky 2005, 101).17
The Ammonian tradition therefore leaves us with the following account of the soul:
Ammonian Interpretation (AI): The soul is a) the entelekheia/teleiotēs of the 
body, b) the final cause of the body, and c) has its being separate from the body.
Moreover, the Ammonian position appeals to the soul being the final cause of the body to 
account for its being both an entelekheia/teleiotēs of the body and separate from the body.
So, to complete the characterization of AI, one must add the following:
AI1: d) The soul is the entelekheia/teleiotēs of the body because it is the final 
cause of the body; and e) the soul has its being separate from the body because it 
is the final cause of the body.
AI has two noteworthy implications. First, since the soul is a form on account of its 
entelekheia, and entelekheia is synonymous with teleiotēs, form or idieos in the context 
17 It should be emphasized that the semantic groundwork of Themistius and 
Alexander enable the Ammonians to make the transition away from considering form 
strictly as hylomorphic principle, to considering soul as formal cause, where formal 
cause is interpreted as teleiotēs. This distinction between form as principle and formal
cause frees the Ammonians from treating the being of the soul as necessarily 
dependent on the being of the composition. Instead, by emphasizing the soul’s 
causality within a framework where form is interchangable with teleiotēs, the 
Ammonians can use the language of Aristotle to address Neoplatonic concerns about 
how the soul, a separate intellectual substance, can cause bodily substance. 
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of psychology is synonymous with teleiotēs . This would allow one to speak of the soul 
as having being separate from the body while also giving being to the body. Thus, given 
that the soul is a perfection or form of the body and that the soul is separate from the 
body, AI seems to entail that the soul may be both a form of the body and a separate 
being, which I shall call the “Form and Separate Being” doctrine, for short:
  Form and Separate Being: The soul is a form of the body and a separate being.
In fact, the Ammonian position is that the soul is a form of the body precisely because of 
its final causality, as (d) in AI1 makes clear. This specifies why the Ammonians were 
committed to the Form and Separate Being doctrine. Note, however, that Form and 
Separate Being does not entail commitment to (d) in AI1.
The second implication of AI is that a separated being can cause the body’s existence, 
which I shall call the “Cause and Separate Being” doctrine, for short:
Cause and Separate Being: The soul is the cause of the body’s existence and a 
separate being.
For the Ammonian interpreter, both aspects of the Cause and Separate Being doctrine are 
wrapped up in the notion that the soul is the final cause of the body (see (e) in AI1). That 
is to say, in specifying the mode of causation whereby the soul causes the body as the 
final cause, the Ammonian interpreter has the advantage of treating the soul as causing the
body without entangling its own being with the being of the body. That is, soul and body 
could remain two substances of different and opposing genera, and yet still be causally 
related. In contrast, the Cause and Separate Being doctrine does not specify the mode of 
causation whereby the soul causes the body. Thus, the Cause and Separate Being doctrine 
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does not directly correspond with the notion that the soul is the final cause of the body. 
Nevertheless, AI still entails the Cause and Separate Being doctrine as a necessary 
condition for the soul being the final cause of the body. That is to say, the soul cannot be 
the final cause of the body unless the Cause and Separate Being doctrine is true, whereas 
the Cause and Separate Being doctrine could be true without holding the soul as a final 
cause.
Wisnovsky notes that AI had such widespread influence that Arabic translations 
of Aristotle's works almost invariably translated entelekhia, teleiotēs, and telos as the 
same Arabic term, tamam. Given that the Form and Separate Being and the Cause and 
Separate Being doctrines were effectively baked into the translations of Aristotle in the 
Islamic world, Avicenna would not have seen any conflict between his understanding of 
the soul as a separate being and Aristotle’s psychology. Wisnovsky concludes, 
When viewed in its proper context, as the product of a thousand-year history of 
shifting interpretive projects, Avicenna’s theory that the soul comes into existence 
with the body but that it survives bodily death – or at least that the intellectual part
of the soul survives the body’s death – is in no sense contradicted by his close 
reading of and deep commitment to the Arabic Aristotle’s texts and theories 
(Wisnovsky 2005, 102).
Indeed, if Wisnovsky is correct, Avicenna’s reading of Aristotle’s psychology had to have 
been influenced by the Ammonian tradition via the Arabic translators of Aristotle’s 
works.18 In other words, Avicenna at least would have treated the Form and Separate 
Being and the Cause and Separate Being doctrines as authentic aspects of Aristotle's 
psychology. 
18 Wisnovsky sees the influence of the Neoplatonic tradition on Avicenna to be 
indirect. However, (Bertolacci 2006, Chapter 3) and (Bertolacci 2005) argue that the 
Neoplatonic tradition had a more direct influence on Avicennian Metaphysics through 
Al-Farabi’s On the Goals of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
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2.2.4 Aristotle's View of Hylomorphic Form and Separate Substance
The previous three sections are intended to illustrate how interpreting entelekheia 
as teleiotēs ultimately produced a context in which the Form and Separate Being and the 
Cause and Separate Being doctrines could be treated as compatible with an Aristotelian 
account of the soul. Beyond this interpretive development there are also various passages 
in the Aristotelian corpus that lend credence to the notion that the soul is a separate 
substance and cause.19  Nevertheless, the Ammonian approach and those influenced by it 
conflict with key aspects of Aristotle's conception of substance in two ways. The first 
conflict arises from Aristotle's commitment to treating forms of sensible mobile 
substances as principles that a) can be distinguished from both their substances and from 
matter, which is the other principle that constitutes those substances, but b) cannot exist 
apart from the substances for which they are a principle.20 The second conflict comes from
Aristotle's account of separate substances as essentially immobile and therefore lacking 
matter. This entails separate substances are form alone, or pure actuality; i.e. they cannot 
serve as the formal actuality of matter, since this would make them principles of mobile 
19 In Generation of Animals, Book 2, Chapter 3, Aristotle claims that only the 
rational faculty of soul enters from without and is divine on account of the fact that it 
is not a bodily activity (Generation of Animals, 737b 26-27). In De Anima, Book 2, 
Aristotle raises the possibility that some part or parts of the soul might be separable, 
due to their not being an actuality of the body. He also raises the question whether the 
soul is a substance distinct from the body and a cause of actuality in the body as a 
sailor is the actuality in a ship (De Anima 413a 6-9). In De Anima Book 3, Aristotle 
affirms the separability of the soul. In Chapter 4, Aristotle argues that the passive 
intellect is non-bodily and separable on account of its receptivity of all forms (De 
Anima 429a 18 – 429b 5), and in Chapter 5, Aristotle describes active intellect as 
actually separate (De Anima 430a 17-18).  For further discussion of other passages 
suggesting causal interaction between soul and body, implying dualism, see (Menn 
2002). 
20 See: Physics, 193a 30 -193b 5; De Anima, 412a 15-21, 414a 15-21
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substances.21 Thus, if the overarching framework for understanding Aristotle's account of 
soul as form is taken in the two strict senses above rather than treated as a stand-in for 
entelekheia-interpreted-as-teleiotēs, one is left with the following results:
1. If the soul is a form of the body, then the soul cannot be a separate substance.
2. If the soul is a separate substance, then it cannot be the form of a body.
Both results conflict with the Form and Separate Being doctrine. Recall that the Form and
Separate Being doctrine states that the soul is both a form and a separate being. But 
adopting (1) requires denying that the soul is a separate being, and adopting (2) requires 
denying that the soul is a form of a body. Moreover, (1) conflicts with the Cause and 
Separate Being doctrine, which states that the soul is both the cause of the body's 
existence and a separate being, when it specifies the soul as a formal cause of the body, 
since this entails that the soul cannot be a separate being. Note, however, that the Cause 
and Separate Being doctrine does not conflict with (2); it only requires that if the soul is a
separate being, it must cause the existence of the body in terms of efficient or final 
causality. This further entails that any reference to the soul as form would be analogical, 
which is precisely what treating entelekheia as teleiotēs seems to have accomplished.
2.2.5 Relevance to Aquinas
The discrepancy outlined in the previous section highlights how a proponent of 
the Form and Cause of Separate Substance doctrines could potentially face the problem 
of accounting for the unity of the human person: even though the body is nothing without
the causal influence of the soul, body and soul are nevertheless viewed as having separate
21 See: Metaphysics 1071b 12-22
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being. How, then, does the human person, which is body and soul together, constitute one
being? On the other hand, the problem of the unity of the human person never arises for 
any account that takes the soul to be a substantial form of the body: the soul is not a 
substance by itself, but a principle of a determinate particular human, and therefore 
already the constituent in a/the unified being. 
Aquinas's position that the soul is both a substantial form and a separate substance
accords with the Form and Cause of Separate Substance doctrine, and thus finds itself 
facing the problem of the unity of the human person. Aquinas seems to have been aware 
of this fact, since, as we shall see in later chapters, he regularly presents objections that 
recite the mutual exclusivity presented in the previous section between treating the soul 
as a form of the body and treating it as a separate substance. Aquinas consistently replies 
to these objections by presenting what I call the “Communicability of Being” doctrine, 
which holds that the soul plays the dual role of perfecting the body as its form and 
communicating its per se esse to the body. As we shall see, the Communicability of 
Being doctrine assigns a role to hylomorphic form and to separate substance that conflicts
with Aristotle's. The reason for the conflict is that Communicability of Being doctrine 
shares enough formal features with the Ammonian approach that Aquinas could be 
understood as presenting a variant of this tradition of interpreting Aristotle's psychology.  
2.3 Averroes on Potentiality in Separate Substances
This section traces how Averroes develops his conception of intellectual 
potentiality from  Aristotle's remarks about potential intellect in De Anima 3.4. Averroes 
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argues that introducing potential intellect as a feature of intellectual cognition required 
Aristotle to posit incorporeal potentiality as a class of being distinct from both the form 
and matter of sensible substances and from the pure actuality of the first unmoved mover.
Moreover, Averroes maintains that Aristotle's remarks on intellection require a) 
incorporeal potentiality to be a property of all separate substances besides the first 
unmoved mover, and b) that separate substances are ordered in a hierarchical fashion on 
the basis of the actualization of their intellectual potential. Thus, the first unmoved mover
marks the highest position in the hierarchy as a result of it being a purely actual 
intellectual act of self thinking thought, whereas the human potential intellect marks the 
lowest position within the hierarchy as a result of its being a pure potentiality to receive 
the forms of sensible substances abstracted from matter. Since abstraction depends on 
perceptive and imaginative activities, both of which require a body, the potential intellect 
is essentially related to the human body and its psychological processes despite being 
ontologically separate.22
2.3.1 The Potential Intellect In Aristotle's De Anima: What is it?
In De Anima 3.4, Aristotle remarks that the potential intellect “can have no nature 
of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity,” and that it is “not actually any 
22 It should be noted that although elements of Avicenna’s noetics influenced 
Aquinas, we shall see that Aquinas nevertheless follows Averroes in maintaining that 
human intellectual content is acquired, viz. as impressions of intelligible forms on the 
potential intellect after having been abstracted from sensible form. Human intellectual
content is derived from sensible content, consequently, the forms of sensible 
substances. By contrast, Avicenna maintains that the receptivity of sensible forms 
prepares the soul for conjunction with the agent intellect, which already contains all 
intelligible forms. (See Gutas 2016; Ivry 2012) 
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real thing” before intellection occurs (De Anima, 429A 20-24). This raises the question: if 
intellect has no nature of its own, what sort of entity is it? One possibility might be to 
classify intellect as matter, given that Aristotle claims matter is a potentiality to receive 
form and is indeterminate in its pre-receptive state; but the context of Aristotle's remarks 
in De Anima excludes such a classification. If intellection entailed actualization of 
material potentiality, the process would result in a hylomorphic composition (e.g. the 
process of understanding redness would require that intellect has become a red 
individual). However, Aristotle tacitly denies this when he likens the receptivity involved 
in intellection to the receptivity of sense perception. Both intellectual and perceptive 
processes, he says, consist of a thinker/perceiver taking in the form of their objects 
without becoming a determinate particular hylomorphic substance. (De Anima, 424A 18-
19, 429A 13-17). To put it another way, the capacity (qua capacity) to understand or to 
perceive remains unaltered after understanding or (ceterius paribus) perceiving an object 
has taken place.23 Thus, the receptivity of intellect is of a different sort than the 
receptivity of matter. 
Despite the above-noted similarity between intellectual and sensory receptivity, 
Aristotle also draws a crucial distinction. Sense perception occurs through an organ (De 
Anima, 424A 24, 429A 25-27), and each sensory capacity is restricted to perceiving only 
specific classes of objects based on the makeup of its organ (De Anima 418A 13-19). 
Moreover, damage to an organ via excessive exposure to a sense object can impair or 
23 This should not be taken to claim that no alteration whatsoever takes place 
during sense perception. My concern here is to consider the import of Aristotle's 
analogy between sense and intellect while remaining neutral with regards to whether 
Aristotle's account of sense perception is primarily physiological or is purely 
cognitive. 
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extinguish its corresponding sensory capacity (De Anima 424A 29-31, 429A 29 – 429B  2). 
By contrast, the range of intelligible objects extends to everything that is (429A 18), and 
no intelligible object, regardless of its degree of intelligibility, can impair further 
intellectual receptivity (De Anima 429B  2-5).  For Aristotle, this contrast indicates that 
intellectual receptivity is free from “admixture” (De Anima 429A 19) and cannot be 
“blended with the body” (De Anima 429A 25), which is to say that, unlike the senses, 
intellect is not first an actuality of an organ before proper engagement in its activity.
2.3.2 Averroes: incorporeal potentiality is a Fourth Kind of Being
Though the context of De Anima precludes treating the potentiality of intellect as 
either material or a first actuality of a bodily organ, it provides no clear statement 
addressing what the potential intellect is. The reader is thus faced with the task of 
explaining the ontology of the potential intellect by drawing on elements of the broader 
context of the Aristotelian system. One explanation on offer is that of Averroes in his 
Long Commentary on De Anima. There Averroes argues that since the potential intellect 
is not a material potentiality, a capacity of a body, or an actuality, it belongs to an entirely 
different class of being than sensible substances, their properties, or the first unmoved 
mover. He first argues this in the opening paragraphs of Book 3, Comment 5. Averroes 
writes: 
(3A) The definition of the material Intellect... is that which is in potency all the 
intentions of universal material forms and is not any of the beings in act before it 
understands any of them. (3B) Since that is the definition of the material intellect, 
it is evident that according to him it differs from prime matter in this respect: it is 
in potency all the intentions of the universal material forms, while prime matter is 
in potency all those sensible forms [and is] not something which knows or 
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apprehends [things]. (3C) The reason why that nature {of material intellect} is 
something which discerns and knows while prime matter neither knows nor 
discerns, is because prime matter receives diverse forms, namely, individual and 
particular forms, while this [nature] receives universal forms. (3D) From this it is 
apparent that this nature is not a determinate particular (aliquid hoc)24 nor a body 
nor a power in a body. For if it were so, then it would receive forms inasmuch as 
they are diverse and particular; and if it were so, then the forms existing in it 
would be intelligibles in potency; and thus it would not discern the nature of the 
forms inasmuch as they are forms, as is the disposition in the case of individual 
forms, be they spiritual or corporeal. (3E) For this reason, if that nature which is 
called intellect receives forms, it must receive forms by a mode of reception other 
than that by which those matters receive the forms whose contraction by matter is 
the determination of prime matter in them. (3F) For this reason it is not necessary 
that it be of the genus of those matters in which the form is included, nor that it be
prime matter itself. (3G) Since if this were so, then the reception in these would 
be of the same genus; for the diversity of the received nature causes the diversity 
of the nature of the recipient. (3H) This, therefore, moved Aristotle to set forth 
this nature {i.e., incorporeal potentiality}, which is other than the nature of matter,
other than the nature of form, and other than the nature of the composite.25 
(Averroes 2009, De Anima, p. 304-5)26
24 An aliquid hoc or, hoc aliquid is equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of todi ti,
or primary substance.
25 All curly brackets in the passage from Averroes's Long Commentary indicate 
my additions, whereas square brackets indicate Taylor's additions. 
26 The concluding line of this passage presents what Averroes a few pages later 
in the Long Commentary calls the “question of Theophrastus,” Aristotle’s remarks 
about the potential intellect as a receptive disposition commit him to maintaining that 
it a) has intellectual being, b) is without form, and c) isn’t a material potentiality. 
“Since {the potential intellect} is a being and does not have the nature of a form, then 
it remains that it has the nature of prime matter, which is altogether unthinkable, for 
prime matter is neither apprehensive nor discerning. How can this be said regarding 
something the being of which is such that it is separate?” (Averroes 2009, De Anima, 
p. 315) Commentators such as Themistius addressed the question of Theophrastus in 
their own ways, but Averroes found their solutions unsatisfactory, see (Averroes 2009,
De Anima, p. 315-325). Richard Taylor has noted in the Introduction to his translation 
of the Long Commentary that the question of Theophrastus leads Averroes to treat the 
potential intellect as “both intellect and also recptivity so that the intelligibles may be 
understood as received into an immaterial intellect. The novelty lies in the 
contradiction of the common notion of the Greek and Arabic tradition that immaterial 
intellect – that is, separate existing form – must be actually without potency. Yet the 
solution of the problem of the understanding of intelligible in act requires that these 
be in an immaterial intellect, indeed, in an immaterial intellect which is not a 
determinate particular of a species” (Averroes 2009, De Anima, p. lxxx). 
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Averroes's conclusion at 3H that the potential intellect has a nature distinct from the other
three classes of being (viz., form, prime matter, and sensible substance) hinges on three 
axes. The first axis is the claim that “the diversity of the received nature causes the 
diversity of the nature of the recipient,” which Averroes introduces at 3G.27 I shall call 
this claim the “Diversity Thesis.” The second axis is the definition of the potential 
intellect that Averroes settles on, at 3A. The final axis is his comparison of the potential 
intellect and prime matter, at 3B-E. 
Averroes's remarks at 3C make apparent that when he speaks of something as 
“diverse” he should be taken to be speaking of something as having particularized 
content and, therefore, cognizable as a distinct individual. Thus, the Diversity Thesis 
implies that a being with particularizing conditions has two constitutive principles, 1) a 
potential principle that makes a being receptive to particularizing content, and 2) an 
active principle from which the potential principle receives the particularizing content. 
For instance, the enumerability of individual pine trees in an evergreen forest depends 
27 The Latin for the second half of 3G reads as follows: “Diversitas enim nature 
recepti facit diversitatem nature recipientis” (Averroes 1953, De Anima, p. 388, 53-
54). It would be tempting to take “diversity” here to mean “difference,” and read the 
passage as saying that different natures or forms are received into different kinds of 
recipients. Averroes’s position certainly is not at odds with such a claim, but Averroes 
seems to be making the stronger claim that the form or nature received determines the
recipient to have the nature it possesses. This is consistent with the context of the 
passage, as well as with his larger commitment to the view that being is solely 
determined by form. For instance, both 3C and 3D mention that a form with 
particularizing content will determine the recipient of that form it to be of a 
particularized nature, whereas a form with universal content will determine its 
recipient to be of a universal, non-particularized nature. Moreover, Deborah Black has
argued that Averroes simply didn’t think that one could distinguish the types of 
receptivity without first determining the forms they receive, since form has priority 
over matter and makes things be what they are (Black 2011, p. 174). Thus, I take 
Averroes at 3G to be saying that formal content determines its recipient to be what it 
is.
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upon each having particularizing conditions, thanks to their forms determining prime 
matter with particularizing content, that make them sensibly apprehensible as distinct 
individuals. By contrast, the “diversity” of an intelligible form is such that it has been 
stripped of particularized content, and is therefore cognizable as a universal. Thus, the 
Diversity Thesis also implies that a being with universalized content, which that lacks 
particularizing conditions,  has two constitutive principles, 1) a potential principle that 
makes a being receptive to universalized content, and 2) an active principle from which 
the potential principle receives the universalized content. For instance, the universality of 
‘pine tree’ depends on that form bearing all and only the characteristics that constitute 
what a pine tree is, thanks to it determining some non-particularizing potentiality, which 
makes it cognizable in an intelligible manner. 
In light of the above, a generalized statement of the Diversity Thesis would be 
that the content of the active principle (i.e. form) determines the potential principle 
(either prime matter or intellectual potentiality) to be of the nature of the active principle. 
Diversity Thesis: For any being, if that being can have particularizing or 
universalizing conditions, it has a receptive principle in potency to receive the 
respective conditions and it has an active principle from which the respective 
conditions are actually received, and the content of the active principle causes the 
particularization or universalization of the receptive principle.
Moreover, in treating the active principle as the cause of particularization or 
universalization of the receptive principle, the Diversity Thesis entails what I shall call 
the Condition for Diversity: 
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Condition for Diversity: If an active principle has particularizing or 
universalizing conditions, then the receptive principle it acts upon has 
particularizing or universalizing conditions.
The Condition for Diversity further entails that a receptive principle which cannot have 
particularizing conditions would have an active principle that altogether lacks 
particularizing conditions, and vice versa. Thus, universalization would involve 
altogether different types of principles than active and receptive principles that possess 
particularizing conditions. Averroes wants to argue that the definition of potential 
intellect entails that it could never fulfill the particularization side of the Condition for 
Diversity. Consequently, the Condition for Diversity requires that intellectual potentiality 
be categorized as its own class of potentiality.
Averroes defines the potential intellect as “that which is in potency all the 
intentions of universal material forms and is not any of the beings in act before it 
understands any of them” (see 3A). This definition produces several consequences in 
relation to what we've discussed so far. First, since potential intellect is in potency to be 
the intelligible forms, it is a receptive principle. Second, whatever kind of receptive 
principle potential intellect is, it must be capable of receiving “the intentions of universal 
material forms.” Finally, potential intellect is nothing more than a potentiality to receive 
the intentions of universal material forms. The first and second of these consequences 
indicate that the receptivity of potential intellect cannot be classified in any way with 
form. But Averroes's primary concern is to establish that the receptivity of potential 
intellect is such that it cannot have particularizing conditions. The claim that potential 
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intellect is nothing more than a potentiality to receive won't get him very far in meeting 
his concern, since this is also in its own way true of prime matter, which takes on 
particularizing conditions when actualized by material form. As Averroes points out at 
3B, the difference in receptivity between prime matter and potential intellect is that prime
matter is a receptive principle for all (and only) sensible forms, whereas potential intellect
is a receptive principle for all (and only) intelligible forms. Thus Averroes directs his 
comments at showing that the potential intellect is only capable of receiving intelligible 
forms. 
At 3C, Averroes remarks that material forms have particularizing conditions and 
therefore individuate their receptive principle. On the other hand, intelligible forms are 
universal and therefore lack particularizing conditions. Were the receptivity of potential 
intellect such that it could receive material forms, then via the Diversity Thesis, potential 
intellect would be a receptive principle that belongs to an individual sensible substance, 
i.e., a being capable of having particularizing conditions. Furthermore, as Averroes notes 
at 3D, any form that the potential intellect received would have particularizing conditions
and, consequently, preclude potential intellect as the receptive principle in intellection. 
Thus, Averroes concludes that if the potential intellect receives intelligible forms, it must 
lack particularizing conditions (see 3E). As such, not only is it not necessary to place the 
receptivity of potential intellect in the same category as prime matter, but one must also 
treat this receptivity, which I shall call incorporeal potentiality, as its own class of being 
(see 3F&G). 
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We have seen that Averroes has given a positive answer to what the potential 
intellect is: it is pure intellectual potentiality, distinct in kind from both the form and 
matter of sensible substances and from pure form.  Later in Long Commentary, Book 3, 
Comment 5, Averroes expands on his positive answer: 
(4A) The... question how the material intellect is a being and [yet] is not one of 
the material forms nor even prime matter is resolved in this way. One should hold 
that it {i.e., intellect} is a fourth kind of being. (4B) For just as sensible being is 
divided into form and matter, so too intelligible being must be divided into things 
similar to these two, namely, into something similar to form and into something 
similar to matter. (4C) This {division of intelligible being into potentiality and 
actuality} is [something] necessarily present in every separate intelligence which 
understands something else. And if not, then there would be no multiplicity in 
separate forms. (4D) It was already explained in First Philosophy that there is no 
form free of potency without qualification except the First Form, which 
understands nothing outside itself. (4F) Its being is its quiddity. Other forms, 
however, are in some way different in quiddity and being. (4G) If it were not for 
this genus of beings which we have come to know in the science of the soul, we 
could not understand multiplicity in separate things, to the extent that unless we 
know here the nature of the intellect, we could not know that the separate moving 
powers ought to be intellects. 
(4H) This was unknown to many modern [thinkers] to the extent that they 
denied what Aristotle says, in the Eleventh Book of First Philosophy, that the 
separate forms moving the bodies must be in accord with the number of celestial 
bodies. (4I) To this extent knowledge of the soul is necessary for knowledge of 
First Philosophy. (4J) That receptive intellect must understand the intellect which 
is in act. (4K) For while it understands material forms, it is even more befitting 
that it understand immaterial forms. (4L) What it understands of separate forms, 
for example, of the agent intelligence, does not impede it from understanding 
material forms. (Averroes 2009, De Anima, p. 326-8)
In the above passage we see that Averroes's response to the question raised at the 
beginning of this section and posed again at 4A – i.e., what kind of being is the potential 
intellect if it has no nature of its own and can't be identified with matter – is that the 
analysis of intellection requires an expansion of the Aristotelian ontological scheme. In 
the Physics, Aristotle identifies two states of sensible substance: a potential (material) 
68
state and an actual (formal) state. Additionally, Physics 8 and Metaphysics 12 trace the 
motion of sensible substances to an initial mover that is itself unmoved (Physics 8.5 258B 
4-9), “whose very substance is actuality” and “without matter.” (Metaphysics 12.6 1071B 
20-1). Thus, Aristotle's analysis of motion in sensible substance renders three states of 
being: 1) corporeal actuality, 2) corporeal potentiality, and 3) incorporeal actuality. As we
have seen, the discussion of intellection in De Anima 3.4 reveals that intellectual 
receptivity is a) of a different sort than the material receptivity of sensible substances, and
b) not an actuality/form on account of its ability to receive all intelligible forms. 
Moreover, we have seen Averroes argue that prime matter and the potential intellect 
contrast in their manner of receptivity: whereas prime matter receives form with 
particularizing conditions, the potential intellect receives form universally, or with no 
particularizing conditions. For these reasons Averroes maintains that intellectual 
receptivity cannot be identified with any of the three states of being presented in 
Aristotle’s Physics, which entails that intellection reveals a fourth state of being, viz., 
incorporeal potentiality. Averroes thus concludes that the discovery of incorporeal 
potentiality indicates that some separate substances operate on an act-potency model 
similar to the one governing sensible substances, as 4B states. 
At 4C, Averroes notes two consequences of introducing incorporeal potentiality as
a fourth kind of being. First, Averroes identifies incorporeal potentiality as an essential 
attribute of separate substances who think something other than themselves, which 
distinguishes these substances from the first unmoved mover.  Second, it allows for a 
multiplicity of separate substances ordered in a hierarchical fashion. Averroes expands on
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this at 4G-H, arguing that the discovery of incorporeal potentiality in the study of 
psychology provides insight into Aristotle's claim in Metaphysics 12.8 that the number of 
unmoved movers (i.e. separate substances) is identical to the number of celestial bodies 
(each body has its own mover). I shall treat each of these consequences in kind. 
2.3.3 Simplicity vs. Complexity of Thought and Distinctions Among Intellectual 
Substances
The Aristotelian position that the potential intellect must receive the form of a 
sensible substance before it actually thinks implies several factors that underpin this first 
consequence. To begin, actualization of intellectual potentiality requires a potential 
thinker, an object of thought, and an act of thinking that object. Moreover, if a thinker 
must receive the form of a substance in order for the thinker actually to think about its 
object, as in the case of human intellection, then the object of thought can be neither the 
thinker itself, nor thought by the thinker essentially; rather a) the object of thought must 
be distinct from the thinker and b) the first thought of the thinker would be of its object. 
Finally, in light of (b), the thinker would remain forever in potential to think in the 
absence of exposure to its object. Thus, while the potential to think necessarily belongs to
such thinkers, one cannot attribute actual thought to them pe se, since the presence of 
such a thinker alone meets only one of the three requirements for thought. 
Averroes covers several of the above-mentioned factors in commenting on a 
passage in Metaphysics 12.9, in which Aristotle explicitly draws on the distinction 
between thinker, thought, and object of thought:
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(5A) Evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have 
always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way. (5B) 
Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does 
goodness belong to thought? For being an act of thinking and being an object of 
thought are not the same. (5C) We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the
object. In the productive sciences (if we abstract from the matter) the substance in
the sense of essence, and in the theoretical sciences the formula or act of thinking,
is the object. (5D) As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in 
the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will 
be one with the object of its thought. ( Metaphysics 12.9 1074b 35 - 1075a 4)
It should be noted that Aristotle is dealing with an objection that the thought of the 
unmoved movers cannot be considered a “a thinking on thinking” ( Metaphysics 12.9 
1074b 34), since as 5A-B states, thought and object of thought are distinct in every 
instance of cognition. Let us call this the “Universalized Thought-Object Distinction”
 Universalized Thought-Object Distinction: For every thinker, their act of 
thinking is a) distinct from, and b) something other than, its object of thought. 
However, Aristotle follows up at 5C-D by pointing to cases of human cognition in which 
the object of thought is a thought. In scientific reasoning or in the blueprint-design stage 
of the crafts, one reflects on forms independent of the particular conditions that pertain to 
them as substantial forms. Isolation of form from matter and, consequently, 
particularizing conditions, renders forms intelligible. Thus, thinking about form in 
isolation from matter involves a thinker thinking about one of its thoughts. Since even 
humans can think about form in isolation from matter, the thought-object distinction is 
not universalized and therefore needn't apply to the cognition of the unmoved movers.
In the Commentary on Metaphysics, Averroes uses Aristotle's rejection of the 
Universalized Thought-Object Distinction as an occasion to outline why human 
intellection cannot be essentially self-reflective. Commenting on 5A, Averroes highlights 
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Aristotle's qualification of the claim that instances of human cognition involve a 
distinction between the cognitive act and the object of cognition:
(6A) It is seen that comprehension (fahm), which is what he {i.e. Aristotle} meant
by knowledge, perception, thought, and intellection, is distinct from that of which 
it is (comprehension)... (6B) for these acts of these powers are of other things, not 
of themselves, except by accident... (6C) in other words, our intellect does not 
think itself except by accident, I mean insofar as it happens to the object of 
intellection to be form of the intellect... (6D) This is only because the intellect is 
not our object of intellection in any way. (Averroes 1986, Metaphysics, p. 194)
Although Aristotle's concern was to argue that the notion of thought-object identity in the 
case of the unmoved mover isn't absurd since even human cognition sometimes has this 
feature, Averroes focuses on how Aristotle presents thought-object identity in human 
cognition as accidental. Averroes seems to have two points in mind. First, at 6B, Averroes
notes that the various powers of cognition are oriented towards their proper objects. For 
instance, human intellectual cognition is oriented towards the forms of sensible 
substances, which are its proper objects. However, as we have seen, intellect is not itself 
the form of a sensible substance. Thus, intellect cannot in any way be considered a proper
object to itself, which Averroes concludes at 6D.  Second, Averroes also seems to be 
claiming that a human cannot think about its own intellection until it first understands a 
proper object, since there would otherwise be no intellectual act for thought to think 
about. That is to say, self-intellection is accidental in the case of human intellection 
because a) the proper object of thought is the forms of sensible substances, not intellect 
itself, and b) self-intellection is dependent on intellect having first understood its proper 
object of thought. 
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Averroes's comment on 5B expands on the two points discussed in the above 
paragraph to make explicit the relationship between human intellect, its act of 
intellection, and its proper objects of understanding. Moreover, Averroes uses 5C-D as an
occasion to highlight how the intellection of separate substances contrasts with human 
intellection. Averroes writes:
(7A) If this [human] intellect thinks something other than itself, there will 
be a subject of intellection, a process of intellection, and an object of 
intellection; (7B) from which one of the two will the subject of intellection 
acquire excellence? From the process of intellection, or from the essence 
which is the subject of intellection, or from the thing which is the source of 
the process of intellection? (7C) For these three things are similar but 
distinct in everything which thinks something other than itself. Therefore, 
as he [i.e. Aristotle] says, the essence of the intellect is not the same as 
intellection, which is the act of our intellect, and the object of our 
intellection (is not) the same thing in any respect; the reason for that is that 
the object of our intellection is distinct from the subject of intellection. 
(7D) As for the intellects which are not in matter, their objects, the intellect 
and the act of the intellect must be one and the same thing... (7E) Just as it 
is correct to say that knowledge is the object known and the object known 
is knowledge in matter, as in the case of art and the artifact, and we say that
the form of the artifact which is in matter and which is in the soul of the 
artisan are one and the same thing, how much more fitting it is that the 
same should apply to intellective things with which matter is not mixed and
which are only a form and an essence denoting the existence of the thing. 
(Averroes 1986, Metaphysics, p. 194-5)
In 7A-C, Averroes states unambiguously the distinction between thinker, thought, and 
object of thought that is implied in the Long Commentary, Book 3, Comment 5 (see 
passage 4, above). Thus combining Averroes's remarks from passage 6 and 7A-C,  we can
summarize Averroes depiction of human intellect as follows:
Human Intellect: an intellect that a) is distinct from its proper object of thought, 
b) is distinct from its act of thinking, c) is in potential to receive its proper object, 
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d) has a proper object of thought that is not itself an act of thought, and e) can 
think about its thinking only after it has thought about its proper object.
Averroes's depiction of non-human separate intellects in 7D-E thus contrasts directly with
human intellect:
Separate Intellect: an intellect who is identical with its object of thought and act 
of thinking.
It would seem at this point that Averroes is committed to maintaining that any separate 
intellect must be an active self-thinker by its very essence, since it is identical with its 
object of thought and its act of thinking. However, we have already seen Averroes remark
in the the Long Commentary that essential self-thought belongs to the first unmoved 
mover alone. 
According to Averroes, the distinction between the first unmoved mover and the 
other separate intellects concerns simplicity versus complexity in their object/s of 
thought. The thought of the first unmoved mover is altogether simple, which requires that
its thought have only one object (i.e. itself). By contrast, the thoughts of the other 
separate intellects admit of varying degrees of complexity, which requires that their 
thoughts have multiple objects; the greater complexity, the more objects their intellect 
thinks. Moreover, the more objects they think, the more their thought refers to and is 
dependent upon things outside themselves. Averroes summarizes the reasoning as 
follows: 
There remains a doubt concerning the object of its [i.e. the first unmoved mover's]
intellection, (namely) whether it is simple or composed of many intelligibles; but 
if it is composed of many intelligibles, it will necessarily have parts different one 
from another, not similar to another; and that which is of such a nature thinks 
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many things, and that which thinks many things thinks something external to 
itself and the objects of its intellection are the cause of itself (Averroes 1986, 
Metaphysics, p. 195-6).
Averroes's remarks in the above passage clarify what he means when he notes at 4D that 
the first unmoved mover has itself as an object of thought, free of any potency. Not only 
is the first unmoved mover a separate intellect (and thus identical with its thought and its 
object), its object is altogether simple, which entails that the object refers to nothing 
outside itself. Consequently, the thought of the first unmoved mover depends on nothing 
outside itself: it must always by its very essence be active in thought. On the other hand, 
since other intellects admit of grades of complexity and thus refer to external objects, 
their thought depends on another; they are by their essence in potency for thought and 
made active in thought by their objects, which clarifies Averroes's remarks at 4C that 
there would be no multiplicity in the thought of separate intellects without incorporeal 
potentiality.  Hence, at 4F Averroes draws a contrast between the being of the unmoved 
mover as identical to its quiddity, versus the being of other separate substances as 
different from their quiddity. This is to say that active thought belongs to the unmoved 
mover essentially and to other separate substances potentially. The first consequence of 
introducing incorporeal potentiality as a category of being therefore culminates in an 
ontological distinction between the first unmoved mover and the rest of the separate 
substances, which I shall call “P-separate substance,” where “P” denotes that such 
substances possess incorporeal potentiality. 
First Unmoved Moverdf= a separate intellect a) whose essential object of thought
is itself only, and b) actively thinks.
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P-separate substance df= a separate intellect a) whose objects of thought are 
multiple, and b) potentially thinks.
The above distinctions, based as they are on the discovery of incorporeal potentiality in 
psychology, therefore, have important consequences for metaphysics, as we have seen 
Averroes state at 4G-I. For instance, the following passage from Averroes's Commentary 
on Metaphysics employs the above definition to contrast the simplicity of the first 
unmoved mover from the diversity of thought in other intellects:
The absolutely one is that in which there is no multiplicity at all, neither on 
account of the differentiation between the intellect and the intelligible, nor on 
account of the multiplicity of intelligibles; for the multiplicity of intelligibles in 
the same intellect, as happens with our intellect, is the consequence of the 
differentiation which exists in it, that is between the intellect and the intelligible; 
for when the intellect and the intelligible are completely united, it follows that the 
many intelligibles of this (intellect) are united and become, for this intellect, one 
and simple in every respect, because if the intelligibles occurring in one intellect 
are many, then they are not united with its essence and its essence is distinct from 
them (Averroes 1986, Metaphysics, p. 196-7).
2.3.4 The Hierarchy of Intellectual Substances
The previous section sketches how Averroes distinguishes human intellect from 
separate intellects and, among separate intellects, the first unmoved mover from P-
separate substances. This section shows how Averroes utilizes a Platonic concept, which 
Matteo Di Giovanni has called synonymic analogy, to rank the distinct intellectual 
substances according to a hierarchical ontological scheme (Di Giovanni 2006, p. 452-3). 
Briefly, beings that are synonymically analogous have the same essence but differ in the 
degree to which their essence is realized (Di Giovanni 2006, p. 451). Those with greater 
realization of their essence are ranked as better, more noble, more excellent, and more 
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simple than those with lesser realization of their essence. For instance, Averroes 
illustrates the concept in his Commentary on Metaphysics by drawing on the differences 
in degree of heat as an example: 
The excellent in every genus is whole and simple and indivisible; it is something 
isolated by itself, outside the composite, I mean its essence is not in the 
composite. For instance, hot things surpass one another by the small or great 
amount of heat; therefore, the absolutely hot thing is that in which there is no 
composition, that is to say fire, since no other body is mixed with it because it 
would become low in heat and abate (Averroes, 1986 Metaphysics, p. 196).
     
Averroes's view in the passage above implies not only that a superlative predication is a 
sufficient condition for simplicity, but also that it is a necessary condition for simplicity. 
That is to say, simplicity entails occupying the highest position within a class of being, 
and vice versa. Moreover, any comparative predication is both a sufficient and necessary 
condition for multiplicity.  
Intellectual substances are related to one another by synonymic analogy.28 We 
have already seen in the previous section that the first unmoved mover is distinguished 
from P-separate substances on the basis of its absolute simplicity of thought. Applying 
the logic of synonymic analogy to intellectual substances entails that the first unmoved 
mover occupies the top rank in the hierarchy: As pure thinking on thinking, it does not 
depend on anything else for realization of its essence. Moreover, as Aristotle states in 
28 Di Giovanni's work is primarily concerned with the the difference and rank of 
celestial bodies. However, Di Giovanni notes that the rank of celestial bodies is 
dependent on their movers, which are the separate intellects: 
[In the case of celestial substances,] intellects are identical with souls and souls 
are the essence of celestial bodies. This amounts to saying, clearly, that separate 
intellects are the very essence of celestial bodies... If intellects are the essence of 
celestial bodies, then what belongs to the former must belong to the latter by 
virtue of its essence. And this is why, according to Averroes, degrees of being 
belong by essence to celestial bodies: since they belong in practice to separate 
intellects (Di Giovanni 2006, p. 459).
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Metaphysics 12.9, the unmoved mover cannot be the best substance if its thought 
depended on something else, as would be the case if it were in potential to think.29  By 
contrast, the P-separate substances vary in the actualization of their intellect. As we have 
seen, their object of thought refers to something other than the thinker, which entails that 
their thought admits of some complexity. Thus the intellectual substances besides the first
unmoved mover are ranked in descending order below the first unmoved mover in accord
with the degree of their complexity of thought. The descent terminates in the human 
potential intellect, which is the lowest possible realization of intellectuality, since its 
intellect is actualized through a process of abstracting the form of objects that are 
ontologically distinct from thought, i.e. the forms of hylomorphic substances:
He {i.e., Aristotle} said: For the agent is always more noble than the patient. That 
is, the former is always activity in its substance, while the latter is found in each 
disposition. It was already explained that the relation of the agent intellect to the 
patient intellect is just as the relation of the moving principle in some way to the 
moved matter. The agent, however, is more noble than the patient and the 
principle [more noble] than the matter. For this reason it should be held according 
to Aristotle that the last of the separate intellects in the hierarchy is that material 
intellect. For its activity is less [immaterial] than the activity of those other 
29 See Aristotle's remarks at Metaphysics 12.7 1074b 15-34. Averroes expresses 
the ontological dependency of the thought of P-separate substances on the principle(s)
of their existence as early as the Epitome on Metaphysics:
The [actual] intelligible is the entelechy and form of him who is able to think 
[618]. Hence, if we assume that one of these [intellects] thinks something other 
than itself, it reaches its entelechy through thinking this. Thus, this other [thing] 
must be prior to it and the cause of its existence. Likewise, if we assume that 
some of these [intellects] are caused through others, that which is caused must 
conceptualize its cause, so that these two meanings become convertible, I mean 
that if these principles conceptualize something other than themselves, this other 
[thing] must be their cause, and that if these [principles] have a cause, that which 
is caused must conceptualize this [cause]. For that which is caused cannot 
conceptualize its own essence without conceptualizing that which constitutes its 
essence. Having shown that each of them conceptualizes itself, it thus follows 
necessarily that that which is caused among them conceptualizes its cause 
(Averroes 2010, Epitome, p. 157).
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separate intellects since its activity seems more to be affection rather than activity.
(Averroes 2009, De Anima, p. 354)
 Thus the second consequence of establishing incorporeal potentiality is that it reveals the
hierarchical relation among separate substances, and, consequently, the rank of the agent 
and potential intellects.
2.3.5 Abstraction Requires Bodily Activity
We have seen Averroes argue against the notion that intellectual receptivity can be
treated as a material receptivity; rather it must be treated as a distinct kind of receptivity 
that only belongs to beings that are incorporeal. Moreover, among intellectual beings, the 
human potential intellect is the lowest of intellectual substances as result of being a pure 
potentiality for thought. That is, the human potential intellect is altogether distinct from 
its objects of thought (the natures of hylomorphic substances), and comes to think of its 
object only after having been actualized by those natures through the process of 
abstraction. For Averroes, the early stages of abstraction involve stripping away all 
particularizing conditions of the cognized form still present in the faculties of sensation 
until only the bare particular nature remains.30 Only after this stripping away occurs can 
30    “There are three powers, the being of which was explained in Sense and Sensibilia, 
namely, the imaginative, the cogitative, and the memorative. For those three powers 
are in human beings for presenting the form of a thing imagined when the sense is not
present. For this reason it was said there that when those three powers assist each 
other, perhaps they will represent the individual nature of the thing insofar as it is in 
its being, even though we may not sense it. He {i.e., Aristotle,} meant here by 
passible intellect the forms of the imagination insofar as the cogitative power proper 
to human beings acts upon them. For that power is a kind of reason and its activity is 
nothing but the placing of the intention of the form imagined in its individuality in 
memory or the discerning of it from [the individual] in conception and imagination. 
And it is evident that the intellect which is called material receives the imagined 
intentions after this discernment. That passible intellect, therefore, is necessary for 
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the image be made intelligible by the illuminative activity of the agent intellect and be 
received into the potential intellect:
For to abstract is nothing other than to make imagined intentions intelligible in act
after they were [intelligible] in potency. But to understand is nothing other than to
receive these intentions. For when we found the same thing, namely, the imagined
intentions, is transferred in its being from one order into another we said that this 
must be from an agent cause and a recipient cause. The recipient, however, is the 
material [intellect] and the agent is [the intellect] which brings [this] about. 
(Averroes 2009, De Anima, p. 351)
 Sensory cognition, which culminates in the formation of an image, is therefore a 
necessary condition for the actualization of potential intellect.31 Since sensory cognition 
is dependent on a body, Averroes's account of abstraction and, ipso facto, his account of 
incorporeal potentiality, imply that the actualization of the potential intellect requires a 
body despite the potential intellect being a separate substance. 
2.3.6 Relevance to Aquinas
Averroes's position to some extent precludes treating the potential intellect in 
ways that Aquinas intends to maintain. That is, since Averroes maintains that the potential
intellect is a separate substance in its own right, it cannot be treated as a power of a soul 
that is related to a body as its form.32 Moreover, a sizable portion of the Thomistic corpus 
is occupied with arguing against Averroes's view that humans share a singular intellect. It 
therefore may seem odd to suggest that Averroes's account of intellect has had a 
constructive influence on Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. However, my thesis for 
conceptualization. (Averroes 2009, De Anima, p. 359)
31  See: Averroes 2009, De Anima, pp. 308, 316, 359, 374.
32 Taylor (Forthcoming) illustrates that Albert the Great, at an early point in his 
career, read Averroes to have maintained that the Agent and Material intellects are 
powers of the soul. 
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the coming chapters is that Aquinas weaves select features of Averroes's account of 
intellect into his own account of the human soul as a substantial form and subsistent 
substance. 
Averroes has drawn several conclusions that Aquinas works into his account: 
1. Aristotle's discussion of intellectual receptivity in De Anima 3.4 requires 
introducing a new category of being, viz. incorporeal potentiality.
2. The reception of form in the human intellect involves something that is 
wholly characterized by incorporeal potentiality, viz. the potential intellect.
3. Among intellectual substances, the potential intellect has the highest 
degree of incorporeal potentiality/weakest degree of incorporeal actuality, and 
thus its actualization depends on abstraction of the forms of objects external to
it, viz. the forms of hylomorphic substances.
4. Abstraction terminates in a) the illumination of the form as present in the 
imagination, and b) the reception of the form in the potential intellect.
5. Both the presence of images and their formation require a body.
Aquinas's employs Averroes's reasoning behind (1-2) to combat universal 
hylomorphism,33 which is the first stage of Aquinas's arguments against the notion that 
the soul is a composition of form and matter and in favor of the immateriality of intellect.
The intellect having a potentiality that is not material and belongs to intellect in its own 
33 Briefly, universal hylomorphism is the view that 1) God alone is absolutely 
simple, whereas every other being admits of composition, and 2) all compositions are 
composed of matter and form. Universal hylomorphism seems to have originally been
proposed by Avicebron/Ibn Gabirol, and was adopted by a number of thinkers in the 
Latin Christian tradition, including Bonaventure. Aquinas's understanding of universal
hylomorphism – especially as it relates to issues surrounding the immortality of the 
human soul – will be presented in full in later chapters.
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right (as opposed to intellectual receptivity belonging to or being reducible to some other 
part of  the soul or arrangement of bodily parts) is necessary for understanding Aquinas's 
doctrine that the soul is a subsistent substance. Moreover, Aquinas treats intellectual 
substances as having various degrees of actualizing incorporeal potentiality, with human 
intellect being of the lowest degree as a pure potential for thought, dependent on 
abstraction of form from hylomorphic substance to actually think, in line with (3). 
Likewise, Aquinas conceives abstraction in line with (4), which stands in contrast to the 
account of abstraction offered by other commentators.34 Finally, since (4) implies (5), the 
34    For instance, Avicenna treats the imagined form as a trigger for the soul to 
be united to the agent intellect, which contains all forms:
Just as the Sun is actually visible in itself and through its light it makes actually 
visible what is not actually visible, so likewise is the state of this {Active} 
intellect vis-a-vis our souls; for when the intellecting faculty reviews the 
particulars that are in the imagery [faculty], and the Active Intellect sheds light 
onto us upon them, the things abstracted from matter and its associations are 
altered and impressed upon the rational soul. [“Being altered” is] not in the sense 
that [the particulars] themselves are transferred from the imagery to our intellect, 
nor [is “being impressed”] in the sense that the connotational attribute immersed 
in the [material] associations which in itself and with regard to its very being is 
separate from matter) makes something like itself. Quite the contrary, [the 
alteration and being impressed] is in the sense that reviewing [the things 
abstracted from matter and its associations] prepares the soul in order that the 
thing separate from matter [coming] from the Active Intellect [i.e., the intellectual 
forms] flows down upon them; for discursive thought and selective attention are 
certain motions that prepare the soul in a way to receive what flows down. 
(Avicenna 2007, De Anima, p. 199-200). 
Since the Active Intellect already contains form, the imagined form need not be 
something made intelligible by the illumination of agent intellect for intellection to 
occur. Nor would there be any need to posit that incorporeal potentiality belongs to 
the intellect. Hence Avicenna's view that intellectual potentiality comes in degrees of 
ability of the theoretical faculty of soul to conjoin with the agent intellect. See: 
(Avicenna 2007, De Anima, p. 184-185; D'Ancona 2008; Davidson 1992, p. 83-88;  
McGinnis 2007). This effectively denies that intellect receives intelligible form from 
hylomorphic substances, making the relationship between intellectual activity and the 
body accidental, at best. Avicenna thus could not have been a source for Aquinas's 
account of potential intellect, though Avicenna influenced Aquinas's noetics in other 
ways.
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human intellect's dependence on abstraction for its content of thought enables Aquinas to 
reject the Platonism that would otherwise seem to be entailed by treating the human soul 
as a subsistent substance. That is to say, the process of abstraction depends on sensitive 
and imaginative acts, which require a body. Therefore, the human soul must have an 
essential relation to the body for its proper intellectual activity.
Chapter 2: Summary
The next two chapters will discuss the manner in which Aquinas utilized the 
philosophical positions of the Neoplatonic and Arabic-Islamic commentators in 
constructing his ontology of soul. It should be helpful to recap those positions before 
moving on. First, we saw that Avicenna presents an account of form and essence as being 
distinct principles in sensible substances. Avicenna reasons that the essence of any 
sensible substance must include both form and matter, since essence determines 
substances to be the kinds of things they are, and sensible substances are hylomorphic 
composites. Moreover, Avicenna argues that sensible substances have a combination of 
essence and supposit in addition to having a hylomorphic composition. That is, since 
form is a principle that determines only matter to be actual, it must be essence, not form, 
that determines the entire sensible substance to be a homomorphic composition. Aristotle 
had presented something like Avicenna's position in Aristotle's Metaphysics VII.7, yet in 
that same book Aristotle also presents a seemingly contrary position, which identifies 
essence as form. That is, treating essence as form and vice versa entails that the only 
principles that make up a sensible substance are the principles that make up its 
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hylomorphic composition. Therefore, form-essence identity has no need for introducing 
an essence-supposit combination. Nothing in the Aristotelian corpus indicates whether 
Aristotle himself endorsed form-essence identity or form-essence distinction, leaving it to
commentators to explain whether the two apparently conflicting theories could be 
reconciled, or which of the two theories fit best within the context of the Aristotelian 
corpus and other philosophical commitments of the commentators. We shall see in the 
coming chapters that Aquinas rejects form-essence identity, opting instead to follow 
Avicenna's account of the form-essence distinction. One (if not the only) reason for 
Aquinas endorsing the form-essence distinction is that it has ontological implications for 
hylomorphic substances that enable Aquinas to argue that the human soul is both a 
separate substance and subsistent substantial form. 
Second, we saw that Robert Wisnovsky's work illustrated how the Ammonian 
Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle helped shape the Arabic tradition's understanding 
of Aristotle's psychology in such a way that it would have been natural for them to treat 
the human soul as a form of the body, but which also has being separate from the body 
and is the cause of the body's existence. Of course, the Ammonian reading conflicts with 
the standard reading of Aristotle, which treats substantial forms as distinct principles of 
and actually inseparable from hylomorphic substances, whereas pure forms are separate 
substances, incapable of being the formal actuality of matter. The task of any Ammonian 
inspired anthropology is to explain how a separate immaterial substance can also be a 
principle of a particular hylomorphic substance. Although Aquinas's account of the 
relation between the human soul and its body does not agree in all aspects with the 
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Neoplatonic account of the soul as a separate being and cause of the body, the coming 
chapters will highlight how Aquinas presents a variant of the Ammonian interpretation in 
presenting what I call the “Communicability of Being” doctrine. As such, Aquinas's 
conception of separate substance and hylomorphic form deviates from Aristotle's.  
Finally, we saw that Averroes argues against treating intellectual potentiality as a 
type of matter and instead indicates that it requires us to introduce another category of 
being besides the pure actuality of the first unmoved mover, and the active and passive 
principles of hylomorphic substances. We also saw that Averroes combines intellectual 
potentiality/actuality with synonymic analogy to schematize separate substances in a 
hierarchical order: the first unmoved mover occupies the highest rank as a consequence 
of its pure actuality, whereas the potential intellect occupies the lowest rank as a 
consequence of being in pure potential to receive intellectual content via abstraction. This
entails that the potential intellect must be related to the human body and its psychological
processes. We shall see over the next two chapters how Aquinas adopts Averroes's 
approach to intellectual potentiality. Aquinas replicates Averroes's argument for the 
reality of incorporeal potentiality in his critique of universal hylomorphism, and adopts 
the hierarchical approach that treats the human soul as being the lowest of intellectual 
substances, such that it depends on the body for its content. This serves as a basis for 
Aquinas to argue that the human soul is essentially related to the body, contrary to the 
Platonic  accounts of the human soul presented by his Latin Christian peers.
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CHAPTER 3: HUMAN CONSTITUTION IN AQUINAS'S EARLY WORKS
This chapter  provides an exposition of key texts from the early works of Thomas 
Aquinas (ca. 1252-1265), proceeding chronologically. These texts illustrate that Aquinas 
presents a conception of the human soul that that is closer to the account of form and 
separate substance presented by the Ammonian tradition than it is to Aristotle's account. 
Moreover, Aquinas adopts Avicenna's form/essence distinction and employs it in 
defending his view that the soul is both a subsistent substance and substantial form, 
against objections inspired by form/essence identity. Finally, Aquinas employs Averroes's 
arguments for the ontological reality of incorporeal potentiality in his criticism of 
universal hylomorphism, and draws on the extreme degree of incorporeal potentiality in 
human potential intellect to reject a Platonic interpretation of the human soul's 
subsistence.
3.1  Aquinas’s Conception of Form in De Principiis Naturae
Although De Principiis Naturae does not deal directly with the human soul, 
Aquinas presents an account of substantial form as “giver of esse”  that enables Aquinas 
to develop an account of soul that, on one hand, accords with the Form and Separate 
Being and the Cause and Separate Being doctrines of the Ammonian tradition, but, on the
other hand, avoids the implication that the body has its own being distinct from the soul. 
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3.1.1  Form as “Giver of Esse”
Aquinas’s first mention of form in De Principiis Naturae comes at Chapter 1: 
“Matter has esse from that which comes to it, because it has incomplete esse of itself. 
Thus, simply speaking, form gives esse to matter” (De Principiis 1).35 Aquinas’s concern 
in the opening chapter is with establishing what causes a potential sensible substance to 
have esse.36 The conclusion that it is form which gives esse to matter would not be 
obvious to the reader without first taking for granted a hylomorphic analysis of sensible 
substance. As such, Aquinas wants the reader to consider that either form or matter 
explains what causes a potential sensible substance to have esse. Since matter is nothing 
more than a potentiality for esse, matter a) cannot by itself be the cause of esse, and b) is 
the subject that receives esse. This leaves form as the only remaining candidate for 
explaining what causes a potential sensible substance to have esse. Hence, Aquinas 
writes:
(8A) Everything from which something has esse, whether the esse is substantial 
or accidental, can be called form. (8B) For instance, man, since he is potentially 
white, is made actually white by whiteness; and sperm, since it is potentially man,
is made actually man by the soul. (8C) Because form makes esse in act, form is 
said to be an act.37
35 Materia habet esse ex eo quod ei advenit, quia de se habet esse incompletum. 
Unde simpliciter loquendo forma dat esse materie (De Principiis, Chapter 1, 
43.39.30-33). All translations from the works of Thomas Aquinas are mine.
36 See the opening line of De Principiis Naturae: “Note that some things are able
to be although they are not, whereas others truly are. Those that are able to be are said
to be in potential. Those that are, are said to be in act. / Nota quod quoddam potest 
esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. Illud quod potest esse dicitur esse potentia; illud 
quod iam est, dicitur esse actu” (De Principiis, Chapter 1, 43.39.1-4).  
37 Omne a quo aliquid habet esse, quodcumque esse sit sive substantiale, sive 
accidentale, potest dici forma; sicut homo cum sit potentia albus, fit actu albus, per 
albedinem et sperma, cum sit potentia homo, fit actu homo per animam. Et quia forma
facit esse in actu, ideo forma dicitur esse actus. (De Principiis, Chapter 1, 43.39.37-
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Several consequences follow from Aquinas’s reasoning that form causes sensible 
substance to have esse. First, in light of Aquinas’s remarks at 8A and 8C, his general 
conception of form can be summarized as follows:
Form: For any act, that act is a form if and only if it causes some subject to have 
esse.
Second, Aquinas’s examples at 8B illustrate that the nature of a form’s subject determines
whether that form is substantial or accidental. Man as a primary sensible substance and 
the subject of the accidental form whiteness indicates that the subjects of accidental 
forms are primary substances, whereas sperm being the matter of man and the subject of 
the soul indicates that the subjects of substantial forms are matter:38
Accidental Formdf: For any act, that act is an accidental form if and only if it 
causes a sensible substance to have esse.
Substantial Formdf: For any act, that act is a substantial form if and only if it 
causes matter to have esse. 
Third, Aquinas’s examples at 8B clarify that esse has two senses, viz., as existence, and as
properties that determine a sensible substance to belong to a species. To say that white 
exists (accidentally) in a human because of whiteness is to imply that whiteness causes 
white to exist in a human. Moreover, to say that a human exists (substantially) from 
sperm because of the soul is to imply that the soul causes both a) sperm to exist as the 
matter of a human and b) essential properties to exist in a particular human, which 
43)
38 Aquinas earlier refers to both types of subjects as matter. Substances proper 
are “matter in which / materia in qua,” (De Principiis, Chapter 1, 43.39.15-16) 
whereas the matter of a substance is “matter from which / materia ex qua” (De 
Principiis, Chapter 1, 43.39.17).
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determine him or her to be a member of humanity. To generalize, accidental forms cause 
substances to exist in some way under one of the nine accidental categories, whereas 
substantial forms cause matter to exist39 and to be actualized under the category of 
substance, which causes the subsequent sensible substance both to exist and to belong to 
a species. In light of this, the descriptions of accidental and substantial form can be 
reformulated as follows:
Accidental Formdf1: For any act, that act is an accidental form if and only if it 
causes an accidental property to exist in a sensible substance.
Substantial Formdf1: For any act, that act is a substantial form if and only if it 
causes a sensible substance a) to exist (via giving existence to matter) and b) to 
have essential properties of a species. 
39 When Aquinas says that form causes matter to exist, he does not mean that, for
instance, the human soul causes the sperm and ovum to exist, absolutely speaking, 
since the latter must pre-exist for the soul to actualize it and make it to be a human 
being. Nor does Aquinas mean that the soul makes the sperm and ovum to be matter 
for a human. Rather, Aquinas’s remark that form causes matter to exist should be 
considered in light of his view that prime matter, which he calls “matter from which,” 
is a “potency to substantial existence,” and therefore “has existence by reason of what
comes to it” (De Principiis, Chapter 1, 43.39.14-25). Note that Aquinas’s analysis of 
matter is expressed in terms of potential for existence, rather than simply as a 
substrate which receives the quiddative characteristics of a species. An existent form 
gives its existence to what it actualizes. To return to the above example, then, sperm 
and ovum, as a potential human, are already matter because they possess potential for 
the substantial existence the soul would give to them. Yet sperm and ovum, as, each 
give existence to some substrate that are in potential to substantial existence, and so 
on until one arrives at prime matter. As we shall see below, this is consistent 
Aquinas’s ontological distinction between existence, form, and essence. Form, as 
such, doesn’t have existence, but is related to existence as a potency is to actuality. 
Thus something must cause form to exist, and Aquinas argues in De Ente et Essentia, 
Chapter 4, that cause must be God. Thus, when Aquinas says that form gives esse to 
matter, this is equivalent to saying that God causes prime matter to exist through 
form. Or, to put it another way, form acts as an instrument for God to give substantial 
existence to matter. 
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 Finally, the dual role of substantial form results in a chain of ontological priority. The 
existence of accidental forms depends on the existence of the sensible substances they 
inhere in, despite accidental forms actualizing primary sensible substances to be in some 
way.40 By contrast, the existence of a sensible substance depends on a substantial form 
giving its existence to matter. That is to say, without form giving existence to matter, 
there would be no primary sensible substance, and therefore no subject to bear essential 
properties or for accidental forms to inhere in. Aquinas’s conception of substantial form 
therefore entails what I shall call the “Existential Priority of Substantial Form” thesis 
(EPSF):
EPSF: The existence of a sensible substance, the essential properties of that 
substance, and the accidents that inhere in it depend on substantial form causing 
matter to exist. 
EPSF makes clear that although both form and matter are necessary for a sensible 
substance to exist, matter is the subject of the causal activity of substantial form, but has 
no existence in the absence of that activity, and, therefore, serves strictly as a necessary 
condition for the existence of sensible substance.41 Hence Aquinas remarks that matter 
40 The figure [imprinted in bronze], because of which it is called an idol, is the 
form, but not a substantial [form], because bronze, before it receives the form or 
figure, has esse in act, and this [i.e. having esse in act] does not depend on that 
figure // figura autem a qua dicitur idolum, est forma, non autem substantialis quia 
cuprum ante adventum formae seu figurae habet esse in actu, et eius esse non 
dependet ab illa figura (De Principiis, Chapter 1, 43.40.74-78)
41 But [prime matter] is never by itself able to exist. Because it does not have 
some form within its ratio, it does not have esse in act, since nothing is an esse in act 
except by form, but is only in potential. // Sed per se nunquam potest esse, quia cum 
in ratione sua non habeat aliquam formam, non habet esse in actu, cum esse in actu 
non sit nisi a forma, sed est solum in potentia. (De Principiis, Chapter 2, 43.41.114-
118)
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can be called a cause of form to the extent that form requires matter for its causal activity.
On the other hand, form is called a cause of matter precisely because it causes matter to 
exist.42  Therefore, the existence of the sensible substance comes from form alone, even if
form requires matter for its causal activity. 
3.1.2  A Comparison of Form as “Giver of Esse” and the Ammonian Conception of 
Soul
The section above has made clear that, in treating substantial form as cause of the 
existence of matter, Aquinas has assigned more to the role of form than that of simply 
being the cause of essential act(s). In this section, I will argue that the role of form in the 
works of Aristotle does not necessarily present any analogue to the additional role 
Aquinas assigns to form. R. E. Houser (2012) has illustrated that it is Avicenna’s Physics,
rather than the works of Aristotle, that serves as a basis for Aquinas’s treatment of 
physical principles in the De Principiis Naturae. Given the influence of the Ammonian 
conception of form on Avicenna, this establishes a historical link between the respective 
conceptions of form presented by Aquinas and the Ammonian thinkers. It should be 
unsurprising, then, to find that Aquinas’s conception of form bears similarities with the 
Ammonian view. 
Aristotle’s first sustained treatment of form in the Physics appears in the opening 
chapter of  Book 2, in which he identifies form over matter as the nature of a sensible 
42 Matter is called a cause of form, insofar as there is no form except in matter, 
and similarly, form is the cause of matter, insofar as matter does not have esse in act 
except through form. / Materia enim dicitur causa formae, inquantum forma non est 
nisi in materia; et similiter forma est causa materiae, inquantum materia non habet 
esse in actu nisi per formam. (De Principiis, Chapter 2, 43.44.37-40)
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substance (Physics 193a31-193b6). Consider the following example: “What is potentially 
flesh or bone has not yet its own 'nature', and does not exist until it receives the form 
specified in the definition, which we name in defining what flesh or bone is” (Physics 
193b1-2). Although Aristotle says that the matter of flesh or bone does not exist until it 
receives the form of flesh or bone, this is not to be taken as saying that the form of flesh 
or bone causes its matter to exist simpliciter, and in addition to causing it to bear essential
properties. Rather, Aristotle seems to be saying that matter does not exist as flesh or bone,
i.e. it is not actively a part of that type of nature, until it receives either of those respective
forms. This reading finds support in Aristotle’s description of form  as “the definition of 
the essence… and the parts of the definition” in his presentation of the formal cause later 
in chapter 2 (Physics, 194b27). Finally, despite the controversy  surrounding incongruity 
of form as presented in the Physics and the Metaphysics, Aristotle still envisaged the 
causal role of form to be the same. For instance, Aristotle writes in the Metaphysics:
Natural comings to be are the comings to be of those things which come to be by 
nature; and that out of which they come to be is what we call matter; and that by 
which they come to be is something which exists naturally; and the something 
which they come to be is a man or a plant or one of the things of this kind, which 
we say are substances if anything is – all things produced either by nature or by 
art have matter; for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and 
this capacity is the matter in each – and, in general, both that from which they are 
produced is nature, and the type according to which they are produced is nature 
(for that which is produced, e.g. a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so is that 
by which they are produced--the so-called 'formal' nature, which is specifically 
the same (though this is in another individual); for man begets man. (Metaphysics
1032a15-25).
The general picture that emerges from the above citations is that Aristotle would conceive
of the causal role of substantial form as follows:
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Aristotle's Substantial Form: For any act, that act is a substantial form if and 
only if it causes a sensible substance to have essential properties of a species (via 
actualizing matter). 
 To be sure, the above formulation entails that the matter of a sensible substance cannot 
be said to be a principle and, consequently, to exist, unless the substantial form first 
actualizes it. Note, however, that substantial form actualizing matter does not entail that 
the existence of the sensible substance and its properties depend on substantial form 
causing matter to exist, as Substantial Formdf1 and EPSF requires. Rather, the formulation 
of Aristotle’s Substantial Form would have it that for Aristotle there is nothing more to 
the existence of a sensible substance than substantial form determining matter to bear 
essential properties, and consequently, the existence of both substantial form and matter 
consists in nothing more than their being principles of a sensible substance. 
The causal role of Aristotle’s Substantial Form ties its being to matter in a way 
that Aquinas’s version of substantial form does not. For Aristotle, substantial form serves 
only as principle that determines sensible substance to have essential properties. As such, 
it depends on the presence of matter to satisfy its causal role as “giver of essence,” and, 
therefore, to exist. By contrast, we have seen that Aquinas characterizes substantial form 
as the “giver of esse.” Since esse stands for both essential acts and the act of existence, 
respectively, Aquinas maintains that substantial form plays the dual role of “giver of 
essence” and “giver of existence.” Consequently, we have seen with EPSF (see p. 4) that 
since substantial form causes matter to have existence in addition to causing sensible 
substance to have essential properties, substantial form enjoys a priority of existence that 
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simply isn’t present on Aristotle’s account. Although Aquinas does not explicitly draw the
metaphysical distinction between essence and existence in the De Principiis Naturae, the 
dual role “existential essentialist” account of substantial form he presents provides a 
strong hint.43
R. E. Houser has noted that the expanded role of substantial form in Aquinas’s De
Principiis Naturae has been adopted from the Physics of Avicenna, who also 
unsurprisingly maintains a metaphysical distinction between essence and existence 
(Houser 2012, 591-94). To give the reader a sense of commonality between the 
Avicennian and Thomist accounts of substantial form, it should suffice to cite Houser’s 
summaries of the two views. First, Houser writes of the comparison between Avicenna 
and Aristotle on substantial form in a way that mirrors the analysis presented over the last
few pages:
Avicenna explains the need for form very differently from Aristotle, who 
understood matter as potency for quiddity, and form as giving a being its actual 
quiddity. Avicenna does not deny that form causes the quiddity of the whole 
43 In the De Ente et Essentia, which is contemporaneous with the De Principiis 
Naturae, Aquinas is explicit about the distinction between existence and essence in 
his so-called intellectus essentiae argument: “Whatever [belongs to a thing and] 
doesn’t follow from the understanding of essence or quiddity, this is coming from 
without and making composition with essence,  because no essence can be understood
without those which are the parts of the essence. For, every essence or quiddity can be
understood without this: that something is understood about its existence. For I can 
understand what a man is or what a phoenix is and nevertheless be ignorant about 
whether it has existence in reality. Thus it is evident that existence is other than 
essence or quiddity.  //  Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, 
hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia 
sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas 
potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere 
quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo 
patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate”  (De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4, 
43.376.95-103). See (Houser 2007) for discussion of how Aquinas’s intellectus 
essentiae argument is rooted in the works of Al-Ghazali and Avicenna.
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being, but by using his own expression—“has existence”—he shows that here he 
is thinking of the other function of form, to act as an instrumental cause of the 
very existence of matter. Matter is potency for existence, form is cause of 
existence, where quiddity and existence are two different principles, a point fully 
explained by Avicenna only in his Metaphysics. (Houser 2012, p. 589-90).44
Likewise, Houser’s summary of Aquinas’s account of substantial form restates in its own 
way what has been presented above, while additionally making explicit the connection 
between the dual role of substantial form and the essence/existence distinction:
While form gives the whole being (ens) its quiddity, God gives existence to the 
creature by means of the form giving existence to matter. This is what makes such
a being a “subject”: it is a whole whose quiddity is caused by its form, while this 
form is the instrumental means God uses to bestow existence on its matter, and 
thereby on the whole subject… Its substantial form is the fundamental principle in
both the existential and quidditative orders (Houser 2012, 592-3).
In conjunction with other similarities between Avicenna’s Physics and Aquinas’s De 
Principiis Naturae, the strong similarity between Aquinas’s account of substantial form 
and the one presented by Avicenna indicates that Avicenna’s Physics is the source of 
Aquinas’s conception of substantial form at this early stage in his career. 
We had seen in Chapter 2 that Avicenna’s conception of the soul as a form was 
influenced by developments in Aristotelian commentary on the conception of form, 
44 The pertinent passage from Avicennia’s Physics reads as follows: “Let it be 
posited for the science of physics, then, that body qua body has a principle that is 
material and a principle that is form, whether you intend an absolute corporeal form, 
or a species form from among the forms of bodies, or an accidental form ([as] 
whenever you regard body, insofar as it is white, strong, or healthy). Let it also be 
posited for [this science] that what is material is never separated from form so as to 
subsist in itself. In other words, [the material] does not actually exist unless form is 
present and so actually exists through [the form]” (Avicenna 2009, Physics 1.2, p. 15).
Houser mentions that although Aquinas likely did not directly draw on the Avicenna’s 
Physics as his source for the De Principiis Naturae, he nevertheless had a synopsis of 
the first book of Avicenna’s Physics available to him, entitled Liber primus 
naturalium: Tractatus primus de causis et principiis naturalium (See: Houser 2012, p.
578).  
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culminating in the Ammonian position that the soul could be considered both a form and 
separate substance, as well as the cause of existence of the body (Chapter 2, p. 54). It was
also noted that Aristotle’s conceptions of hylomorphic form and separate substance stand 
in fundamental opposition to the Ammonian account of soul. That is, taking the soul to be
a substantial form would exclude it from being a separate substance, and vice versa 
(Chapter 2, p. 56). This fundamental opposition between Aristotle and the Ammonian 
interpretation of soul is born out again in the summary of Aristotle’s conception of 
substantial form presented above. That is to say, since substantial form serves the single 
role of actualizing matter, thereby causing the sensible substance to have its essential 
properties, it would be impossible for anything classified as substantial form to exist 
separate from matter. By contrast, the view of substantial form presented by Avicenna and
Aquinas opens up the possibility that a substantial form could both cause matter to have 
existence and the essential properties of the sensible substance while also being capable 
of existing on its own. As Substantial Formdf1 indicates, an act is to be classified as a 
substantial form if it can fulfill the role of giving existence and essence to matter. This 
entails nothing about whether that existence belongs properly and per se to the substantial
form,45 which makes possible what I call the “Communicability of Being” Doctrine:
45 In the De Ente et Essentia, which is contemporaneous with the De Principiis 
Naturae, Aquinas makes this very point: “ The relationship of matter and form is 
discovered to be such that form gives existence to matter. Therefore, it is impossible 
that matter exists without some form. However, it is not impossible that some form 
exists without matter. For form does not have a dependence on mater in its essence (in
eo quod est).  //   Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat 
esse materiae. Et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma. Tamen non est
impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia. Forma enim non habet in eo quod est 
forma dependentiam ad materiam” (De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4, 43.376.45-50)
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Communicability of Being: For any substantial form, if that substantial form has
per se existence, it causes the sensible substance to have that existence (via giving
existence to matter). 
As we shall see, Aquinas maintains that the human soul is a substantial form with per se 
existence. He draws precisely on the Communicability of Being when responding to 
criticisms that the human soul cannot be a subsistent substance if it is a substantial form 
or vice versa, and so must be only one or the other. 
3.2  The Form/Essence Distinction and the Communicability of Being Doctrine in 
the Commentary on the Sentences
This section provides an exposition of a representative article from Book 1 of Aquinas’s 
Commentary on the Sentences. I show that Aquinas employs Avicenna's form/essence 
distinction as a way of conceiving the Boethian quod est/quo est distinction, which 
Aquinas uses as a framework to explain how the soul can be a spiritual substance (i.e., 
have per se existence) and give esse to the body as a substantial form. Moreover, I show 
that Aquinas uses the Communicability of Being Doctrine to defend his conception of the
human soul as a subsistent substantial form against objections oriented around an 
Aristotelian conception of hylomorphism. 
3.2.1 The Form/Essence and Quod Est/Quo Est Distinctions
In In. Sent. 1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2, Thomas Aquinas addresses whether the soul is a simple
substance.46 We have seen that Aristotle treats the soul as a substantial form, which entails
46 See the Appendix for a complete translation of the article. The Latin text for 
all Commentary on the Sentences citations are from the Mandonnet and Moos edition,
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that the soul is a principle of a hylomorphic substance. In light of what has been 
discussed in the last section, an Aristotelian inspired account of the soul would maintain 
that the soul is simple precisely because of its status as a principle of a composition. As 
such, its existence would be dependent on the existence of the composition. However, we
have also seen that Aquinas’s conception of substantial form deviates from Aristotle’s, 
such that it allows for the possibility that substantial form might also be a subsistent 
substance. Aquinas wants to maintain exactly this about the human soul. To do so he 
draws on both Avicenna's Form/Essence Distinction and the Communicability of Being 
Doctrine. First, the form/essence distinction enables Aquinas to analyze the sense in 
which he understands the human soul to be a composition and the sense in which he 
understands it to be simple, thereby distinguishing the human soul from sensible 
substance on the one hand, and God, on the other. Second, the Communicability of Being
Doctrine enables Aquinas to explain how a subsistent substance can also serve as a 
substantial form.
Speaking of the manner in which something might be a quo est, i.e. a principle by 
which a substance is in some way, Aquinas writes, 
In all those in which there is a composition of matter and form, there is a 
composition from quo est and quod est. In compositions from matter and form, 
quo est can be said in three ways. (9A) First, quo est can name the form of the 
part (forma partis), which gives being to matter. (9B) Quo est can also name the 
act of being (actus essendi), namely esse... Finally, (9C) quo est can name the 
very nature that remains from the conjunction of form with matter, for instance, 
humanity. (9D) The latter is so especially according to those who hold that the 
form of the whole (forma, quae est totum) – that is, the quiddity – is not the form 
of the part (forma partis), among whom is Avicenna. (In Sent. 1, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, 
c.o.)47 
Aquinas 1929. 
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 We see that Aquinas expresses the Form/Essence Distinction through the technical 
terminology of forma partis and forma totius and that at 9D he cites Avicenna as the 
originator of the distinction. In 9A Aquinas presents form as the constituent part of a 
hylomorphic composite which functions as the actuality of the composite's other 
constituent part, namely, matter. To round out his picture of hylomorphism, Aquinas 
claims at 9C that the essence of a hylomorphic composition can also be a thing's quo est, 
since its essence unifies the total composition to be a substance. This is a direct correlate 
to the Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Unity thesis of Avicenna’s hylomorphism:
Essence as Principle of Hylomorphic Unity: For any sensible substance its 
essence unifies its form and matter to be a substance (Chapter 2, p. 35).
But the human soul cannot be a quod est for either of the two senses of quo est that 
Aquinas derives from the Form/Essence distinction, since a) they each determine a 
sensible substance to be a hylomorphic composition in their own way and b) the human 
soul does not have hylomorphic composition. First, this is because the human soul 
functions as a substantial form for the body and so is quo est in the sense of forma partis 
for the complete hylomorphic composite. Second, this is because Aquinas holds that the 
human soul is capable of intellectual activity and so must be “immune from matter” (In 
47 Unde in omnibus illis in quibus est compositio ex materia et forma, est etiam
compositio ex quo est et quod est. In compositis autem ex materia et forma quo est
potest  dici  tripliciter.  Potest  enim  dici  quo  est  ipsa  forma  partis,  quae  dat  esse
materiae. Potest etiam dici quo est ipse actus essendi, scilicet esse, sicut quo curritur,
est  actus  currendi.  Potest  etiam  dici  quo  est  ipsa  natura  quae  relinquitur  ex
conjunctione formae cum materia, ut humanitas; praecipue secundum ponentes quod
forma,  quae est  totum, quae dicitur quidditas,  non est  forma partis,  de quibus est
Avicenna (Aquinas 1929, p. 229).
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Sent. 1 d. 8, q. 5 a. 2, c.o.).48 As such, its existence does not depend on its informing the 
body. This leaves only the act of existing to be quo est for the human soul, which stands 
in potentiality to receive it.  To the extent that one emphasizes the intellectuality of the 
human soul, Aquinas remarks that it “can be called a quiddity or nature or simple form” 
(In Sent. 1 d. 8, q. 5 a. 2).49 Thus, on Aquinas's Avicennian hylomorphism-inspired 
depiction of human nature, the essence humanity encompasses a hylomorphic 
composition of body and soul such that the soul is ordered to the body as its act. 
However, the soul has its own act independent of the body and can exist without it while 
retaining its role as forma partis within the essence humanity.50
48 Avicenna dicit, quod aliquid dicitur esse intellectivum, quia est immune a materia.
(Aquinas 1929, p. 228).
49 It should be noted that the simplicity of the soul is one type of simplicity that 
Aquinas derives from his analysis of the various senses of quod est and quo est. First, 
simplicity can be having existence through that of which they are a principle. Form 
would be simple in this sense, but so would matter, because both are principles of 
hylomorphic compositions. However, this sense of simplicity does not pertain to the 
human soul, because the human soul has existence per se rather than through the 
substance of which it is a principle. The second sense of simplicity would be the lack 
of form/matter composition. This sense of simplicity does apply to the soul as well as 
to the intelligences. The third and final sense of simplicity would be the non-
difference of all quo est and quod est, including the difference between existence and 
essence. This final sense of simplicity pertains to God alone. See In Sent. 1 d. 8, q. 5 
a. 2, c.o. in the appendix (Aquinas 1929, p. 229).
50 It should be noted that Aquinas took seriously Aristotle’s remark that the 
human soul “comes from without” (On the Generation of Animals, 736b 25), and 
subscribed to the view that the rational soul is immediately created by God and 
introduced at some point during embryonic development. At the early stage of his 
career, Aquinas maintained that ensoulment for males occurred around 40 days after 
conception and around 90 days for females. See: In Sent. 3. d. 3 q. 5 a 2. (Aquinas 
1933, 145-146).
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3.2.2 The Communicability of Being Doctrine as a Response to Aristotelian of 
Objections
Two of the objections against Aquinas’s view that the soul is a subsistent 
substantial form hinge on the proposition that being a substantial form and having 
subsistence or per se existence is mutually exclusive. We have already seen that 
Aristotle’s approach to hylmorphism entails just such exclusivity. Thus the objections are 
tacit arguments for Aristotle's hylomorphism. The first objection reads as follows: “It 
seems that the soul is simple. For just as the Philosopher says in De Anima II, the soul is 
the form of the body. He also says there that the form is neither matter nor a composite. 
Therefore, the soul is not a composite” (In Sent.1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2. arg 1).51 As a form of the 
body, the soul is taken to be a principle of a sensible substance; it constitutes one aspect 
of a hylomorphic composition, and is therefore not itself composed. In other words, being
a principle of a sensible substance is the sole sense in which the human soul is said to be 
simple. Of course, Aquinas doesn’t deny that the soul is simple in this sense, but his 
conception of the soul as a composition of existence and essence, as well as his 
distinction between form and essence are integral to his thesis that the soul also has per 
se existence. Aquinas counters this objection by considering the classification of the soul:
Because the soul is an absolute form (forma absoluta), it does not depend on 
matter, which belongs to it on account of its likeness and proximity to God, and it 
has esse through itself (esse per se), which other corporeal forms do not. 
Therefore, there is found a composition of esse and quod est in the soul, and not 
in other forms, because esse itself isn't of corporeal forms absolutely. (In Sent.1 d. 
8 q. 5 a. 2. ad 1) 52
51 Videtur quod anima sit simplex. Sicut enim dicit philosophus, anima est forma
corporis. Sed ibidem dicit, quod forma neque est materia neque compositum. Ergo 
anima non est composita (Aquinas 1929, p. 227).
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The soul is to be classified among spiritual and separate substances on account of its 
likeness and proximity to God. Although this appears to be drawing on a theological basis
for justifying his alternative conception of the role of soul as a form, upon close 
examination, Aquinas holds that the human soul has a specific likeness to God, which is 
his definition of divine image. As it turns out, this specific likeness hinges on the human 
soul and other spiritual substances having an intellectual nature: 
It must be said that every form is a certain likeness to the First Principle, Who is 
pure act. Thus, the extent to which a form more a approaches the likeness of Him, 
the more it partakes of His perfections. Among corporeal forms, the rational soul 
more approaches toward likeness of God, and so it partakes of the God's nobility, 
namely that it understands, that it is able to move, and that it has existence 
through itself (esse per se)” (In Sent.1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2. ad 5; emphasis mine).53 
Aquinas is therefore stating in a different way what he had already said in the Respondeo:
the human soul is to be classified as a substantial form with per se existence on account 
of its having an intellectual act, which is “immune from matter.” As such, the 
Communicability of Being Docrtine can be applied to understanding how the human soul
can have per se existence and also share its existence with the whole human substance.
52 Quia anima est forma absoluta, non dependens a materia, quod convenit sibi 
propter assimilationem et propinquitatem ad Deum, ipsa habet esse per se, quod non 
habent aliae formae corporales. Unde in anima invenitur compositio esse et quod est, 
et non in aliis formis: quia ipsum esse non est formarum corporalium absolute, sicut 
eorum quae sunt, sed compositi (Aquinas 1929, p. 230).
53 Omnis forma est aliqua similitudo primi principii, qui est actus purus: unde 
quanto forma magis accedit ad similitudinem ipsius, plures participat de 
perfectionibus ejus. Inter formas autem corporum magis appropinquat ad 
similitudinem Dei, anima rationalis; et ideo participat de nobilitatibus Dei, scilicet 
quod intelligit, et quod potest movere, et, quod habet esse per se (Aquinas 1929, p. 
231).
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The second objection is inspired by the same viewpoint as the first objection, but 
argues that the human soul stands in the way of accounting for the unity of a human being
if per se existence is ascribed to it:
Everything that is composite has existence from its components. If, therefore, the 
soul were a composite, then it would have a certain existence in itself (per se 
esse), and that existence would never be removed from it. But from the 
conjunction of the soul to the body, the existence that is the existence of the 
human being remains. Therefore, in a human being existence is two, namely an 
existence of the soul and an existence of the conjunct. But this cannot be, since 
there is one existence of one thing (In Sent.1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2. arg 2).54
The issue being raised is that if the human soul were to have composition, it would be a 
substance with per se existence. But such an entity cannot be a hylomorphic principle, 
since it would be an already existing substance conjoining to another existent. As such, 
the human being would be a conjunction of two existents, soul and body, rather than a 
unitary existent composed of formal and material principles. The supposed failure to 
account for the unity of the human being therefore results in forcing the same dichotomy 
that resulted from the first objection: if the soul is said to have per se existence, it would 
be composed rather than simple, and would not therefore be able to be conceived as a 
substantial form; or, if it is said to be a substantial form, it would be a simple principle of 
a substance rather than a substance itself, and therefore per se existence could not be 
ascribed to it. Aquinas is at pains to offer a third way between an Aristotelian 
hylomorphism that ties the existence of the soul to the sensible substance and body, and a
dualist notion that the soul and body have two separate existences tied together in a 
54 Omne quod est compositum, habet esse ex suis componentibus. Si igitur anima
sit composita, tunc ipsa in se habet aliquod esse, et illud esse nunquam removetur ab 
ea. Sed ex conjunctione animae ad corpus relinquitur esse hominis. Ergo esse hominis
est esse duplex, scilicet esse animae, et esse conjuncti: quod non potest esse, cum 
unius rei sit unicum esse (Aquinas 1929, p. 227).
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quasi-accidental relation. Aquinas counters the second objection by drawing on the 
Communicability of Being Doctrine to defend the view that something with per se 
existence can also serve as a substantial form:
(10A) The soul has perfect existence in itself (in se esse perfectum), although this 
existence does not result from the component parts of its quiddity, (10B) nor is 
some other existence made through the conjunction with the body; rather this 
existence that is of the soul though itself (animae per se) becomes the existence of
the conjunct. (10C) For the existence of the conjunct is nothing more than the 
existence of the form itself. (10 D) But it is true that other material forms, because
of their imperfection, do not subsist through that existence, but are only principles
of existence (principia essendi). (In Sent.1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2. ad 2).55
The Respondeo and the reply to the first objection have already established that the 
classification of the human soul as a spiritual substance follows from it having an 
intellectual nature. Thus the intellectual act of the soul is the basis for ascribing it per se 
or “perfect existence,” as Aquinas describes it at 10A.   However, the crux of the reply 
comes at 10B-C, where Aquinas introduces the Communicability of Being Doctrine to 
preserve the substantial unity of a hylomorphic composition that has a substantial form 
possessing per se existence. Any substantial form is a “principle of existence;” that is, it 
causes the existence of sensible substance by causing the existence of matter. The 
Communicability of Being Doctrine entails that a substantial form possessing per se 
existence would not be different in this regard. The human soul has per se existence on 
account of its having an intellectual nature,56 but since it is also a substantial form, it 
55  Anima sine dubio habet in se esse perfectum, quamvis hoc esse non resultet ex
partibus componentibus quidditatem ipsius, nec per conjunctionem corporis efficitur 
ibi aliquod aliud esse; immo hoc ipsum esse quod est animae per se, fit esse conjuncti:
esse enim conjuncti non est nisi esse ipsius formae. Sed verum est quod aliae formae 
materiales, propter earum imperfectionem, non sunt per illud esse, sed sunt tantum 
principia essendi (Aquinas 1929, p. 230).
56 It should be stressed here that Aquinas’s conception of the human soul as a 
subsistent substantial form not only hinges on a particular conception of 
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gives its existence to the composite, and therefore the existence of the whole human 
being is no different than the soul’s existence. Hence, Aquinas states at 10D that the 
human soul is unique among substantial forms: its existence is per se, in addition to being
a principle of existence for a hylomorphic composition. 
The above considerations show that at the earliest stage in Aquinas’s career, he 
moved towards the direction of Avicenna and the Ammonian thinkers with regard to the 
ontological status of the human soul as a form. In the next section, I will show that in the 
De Ente et Essentia, Aquinas adopts precisely the reasoning that Avicenna had presented 
in favor of the form/essence distinction. I will also show that Aquinas draws on 
Averroes’s arguments for the reality of incorporeal potentiality as part of his critique of 
universal hylomorphism.
3.3  The Form/Essence Distinction and Incorporeal Potentiality in the De Ente et 
Essentia
In Chapter 2 of the De Ente et Essentia, Aquinas presents Avicenna’s arguments 
for the form/essence distinction as a basis for rejecting form/essence identity. The 
relevant passage shows that Aquinas is consistent in maintaining the form/essence 
distinction early in his career. We have already seen that Aquinas employed the 
distinction in the Commentary on the Sentences to argue that the human soul is both a 
hylomorphism that allows for the possibility that a substantial form can subsist. He 
must also provide evidence that the soul is subsistent, and for Aquinas this rests both 
in the soul having an intellectual nature in which the process of intellection requires 
an immaterial act and in the human soul being the subject of that act. As we shall see 
in the expositions of De Ente et Essentia and the Summa Contra Gentiles, the 
receptivity of the intelligible form and all its entailments, which Aquinas draws from 
Averroes and develops in his own way, is the central piece to his argument that the 
soul is subsistent.
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subsistent substance and substantial form. Aquinas's discussion in the De Ente et Essentia
also indicates that Aquinas is committed to the form/essence distinction in its own right, 
beyond its usefulness for philosophical anthropology. Aquinas draws from Averroes's 
reasoning for treating incorporeal potentiality as an ontological reality in Chapter 4 of the
De Ente et Essentia. Aquinas uses Averroes's argument as part of his criticism of 
universal hylomorphism, which maintains that spiritual substances have a composition of 
form and matter. Since Aquinas maintains that spiritual substances have their own non-
material kind of potentiality, as is shown by an analysis of human intellection, Aquinas 
thinks the form/matter distinction can only pertain to corporeal substances. Moreover, 
like Averroes, Aquinas uses the ontological reality of incorporeal potentiality to outline a 
hierarchy of spiritual substances, of which human souls occupy the lowest position on 
account of being a pure potentiality to receive intelligible forms of hylomorphic 
substances. The human soul therefore requires a body that participates in its being if it is 
to fulfill its intellectual activity.
3.3.1 The Form/Essence Distinction
At the outset of Chapter 2 of De Ente et Essentia, Aquinas makes clear that he 
rejects the form/essence identity of strict Aristotelian hylomorphism in favor of the 
form/essence distinction: 
(11A) In complex substances, there is form and matter, just as in human beings 
there is soul and body. For we cannot say that essence is to be said of either of 
them... (11B) Form alone cannot be called the essence of composite substances, 
although some try to assert this. (11C) It is clear from what has been said that the 
definition of a thing signifies its essence, (11D) but the definition of natural 
substance does not contain form alone, but also matter... (11E) It follows, 
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therefore, that the term “essence” in composite substances signifies that which is a
composite from matter and form... (11F) This is reasonable, because the “to be” 
of the composite substance is not [predicated] of form alone nor of matter alone, 
but is of the composed thing itself. (11G) The essence is that by which a thing is 
said “to be.” (11H) Therefore, it is necessary that the essence by which a thing is 
called a being cannot be form alone nor matter alone, but is both.57 (De Ente, Ch 
2)
Where 11A and 11B announce Aquinas's endorsement of the form/essence distinction and
indicate that Aquinas was aware that one can conceive of essence as identical with form, 
the rest of the passage bears a striking resemblance in its content to Avicenna's 
Metaphysics 5, Ch. 8, par. 5. It is worth looking at the two passages side by side, in 
conjunction with the formulations that followed from the analysis of Avicenna’s work in 
Chapter 2 (p. 31-34):
Avicenna, Metaphysics 5, 
Ch. 8
Aquinas, De Ente 2 Formulation
(1A) Nor are composites 
[the things] they are through
form alone. For the 
definition of a
thing indicates all the things 
that render it subsistent. 
(1B) Thus, it also, in some 
respect,
 (11C) The definition of a 
thing signifies its essence, 
(11D) but the definition of 
natural substance does not 
contain form alone, but also 
matter.
Completeness of 
Definition: For any sensible
substance, its definition will 
contain every essential 
property of that substance.
Avicennian Hylomorphic 
Definition: For any sensible
57 In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima
et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur...
Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc
quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud,
quod per  diffinitionem rei  significatur. Diffinitio  autem substantiarum naturalium
non tantum formam continet,  sed etiam materiam...  Relinquitur ergo quod nomen
essentiae in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum
est... Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum
formae nec  tantum materiae,  sed  ipsius  compositi.  Essentia  autem est  secundum
quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet  quod essentia,  qua res denominatur ens, non
tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque. (De Ente, Chapter 2, 43.371-
372.1-56
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includes matter. (1C) It is 
through this {i.e. the 
definition} that the 
difference between quiddity 
{i.e. essence} in composite 
things is known.
substance its definition will 
contain both form and 
matter.
Essence-Definition 
Isomorphism: For any 
substance, the distinctions in
its definition reflect 
distinctions in its essence.
(1D) Form is always part of 
the quiddity in composite 
things. (1E) As for the 
quiddity, it is that by which 
it {i.e. a singular sensible 
substance} is what it is; (1F)
and it {i.e. a sensible 
substance} is what it is only 
by virtue of the form being 
connected with matter, 
which {matter} is something
additional to the meaning of 
form.
(11G) The essence is that by
which a thing is said “to 
be…”
(11E) It follows, therefore, 
that the term “essence” in 
composite substances 
signifies that which is a 
composite from matter and 
form…
Essencedf= that principle by 
which a thing has its 
essential properties
Form-Essence Distinction:
For any sensible substance, 
its form is not identical to its
essence.
Essence as Principle of 
Hylomorphic Parts: For 
any sensible substance, its 
essence is the principle by 
which it has form and 
matter.
(2A) The composite is also 
not this meaning [viz., of 
form] but is the assemblage 
of form and matter. For this 
is what the composite is, 
(2B) and the quiddity is this 
composition. (2C) Form is 
thus one of the things to 
which composition is added.
(2D) The quiddity is this 
very composition that 
combines form and matter. 
The unity that comes about 
through both is due to this 
one [composition]
(11F) The “to be” of the 
composite substance is not 
[predicated] of form alone 
nor of matter alone, but is of
the composed thing itself… 
(11H) Therefore, it is 
necessary that the essence 
by which a thing is called a 
being cannot be form alone 
nor matter alone, but is both.
Form-Substance 
Distinction: For any 
sensible substance, it is non-
identical with its
form.
Hylomorphic Unity 
Explanation: For any 
sensible substance, whatever
explains its
hylomorphic unity must 
encompass its constituent 
parts (i.e. form and matter).
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Aquinas is shown to have presented in his own way all of the propositions that inform 
Avicennian hylomorphism, which follows from the form/essence distinction. Avicennian 
hylomorphism states:
Avicennian Hylomorphism: for any sensible substance, it a) is a composition of 
form and matter and b) has an essence that causes its composition (Chapter 2, p. 
36).
 Of course, Aquinas also mentions the form/essence identity approach, found in 
Aristotle’s works, which offers an alternate way to conceive hylomorphism:
Aristotelian Hylomorphism1: For any sensible substance it is a) a composition 
of matter and form, b) it is what it is by way of its essence, and c) its essence is its
form (Chapter 2,  p. 37).
In light of Aquinas’s remarks in 11A-H, it is impossible to deny that Aquinas chose to 
adopt an Avicennian rather than an Aristotelian understanding of hylomorphism. Of 
course, we have already seen that Aquinas employs the form/essence distinction to clarify
the Scholastic quod est/quo est distinction in the Commentary on the Sentences 1 d. 8 q. 5
a. 2. Moreover, we saw Aquinas argue that the human soul, which has per se intellectual 
activity and can therefore subsist when separated from the body, always maintains its 
status as a substantial form, since it is part of the essence humanity. Aquinas’s argument 
presupposes Avicennian hylomorphism, and is therefore integral to Aquinas’s 
demonstration and defense of the thesis that the soul is a subsistent substance and 
substantial form. However, Aquinas’s  restatement of Avicenna’s argument in 11C-H 
stands as a strong indication that that Aquinas found Avicennian hylomorphism to be 
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philosophically sound in its own right, and not simply because it could be useful for his 
philosophical project. We will see in the next chapter that Aquinas continued to present 
arguments in favor of the form/essence distinction and, consequently, Avicennian 
hylomorphism, as well as treat it as a staple in his reasoning for and defense of the thesis 
that the human soul is both a subsistent substance and a substantial form. 
3.3.2 Incorporeal Potentiality and the Place of the Human Soul in the Hierarchy of 
Intelligences
Avicenna is not the only Arabic/Islamic thinker that Aquinas uses in the De Ente 
et Essentia to support his positions. One of Aquinas’s aims in Chapter 4 of De Ente et 
Essentia is to critique universal hylomorphism, which maintains that all beings except 
God have a composition of form and matter. To do so, Aquinas recruits Averroes’s 
argument that human intellection requires treating non-material or incorporeal 
potentiality as ontologically real. According to Aquinas, since the human soul is an 
intellectual substance with incorporeal potentiality, it cannot be classified as a being 
whose existence depends on the composition of form and matter. Therefore, the 
form/matter distinction would apply only to material sensible substances and not to 
intellectual substances such as the human soul.  Moreover, like Averroes, Aquinas uses 
the degree of incorporeal potentiality in the human intellect to establish that the human 
soul occupies the lowest place among spiritual substances. This is important because it 
establishes that body is essential for the fulfillment of the intellectual activity. 
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3.3.2.1 The Reality of Incorporeal Potentiality, against Universal Hylomorphism
De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4 is principally occupied with determining the 
manner in which essence is present in the soul, the intelligences/angels, and God. Though
all admit the simplicity of God, universal hylomorphists maintain that the intelligences 
and the human soul have form-matter composition.58 Aquinas argues against the view that
58 As mentioned in Chapter 2, note 23, universal hylomorphism had a strong 
following among Franciscan contemporaries of Aquinas. Universal hylomorphists 
share the view that God alone is simple, whereas every other being admits of a form-
matter composition. This was consistently used by universal hylomorphists as a gloss 
on the Boethian quo est-quod est distinction (See: Weisheipl 1979, p. 274). Although 
the human soul and angels are treated as having form-matter composition on this 
view, universal hylomorphists distinguished spiritual substances from corporeal 
substances on the basis that spiritual substances actualize spiritual matter, whereas 
corporeal substances actualize corporeal matter. For instance, John Francis Quinn 
says of Bonaventure’s view concerning the human soul’s composition (in contrast to 
God’s simplicity) and its lack of corporeal matter (in contrast to bodily substances):
For Bonaventure, the human soul is a substance existing through itself and, 
having its own matter and form, is a singular and incorruptible thing. The matter 
in the human soul is a spiritual matter created together with a form; so, because 
the form is also spiritual, the soul is self-subsistent as a spiritual creature. But the 
Soul is not a pure spirit. God alone is a pure spirit, since only He is entirely free 
from matter, from every sort of composition, and from dependence on any 
creature. Hence, God is a spirit through His essence. As a being (ens) through 
Himself, God has no need of another in which to subsist. Although a creature is 
not a being (ens) through itself because it is in another as in a subject, even so, a 
creature needs another for its own conservation. Consequently, God alone subsists
perfectly in being (esse). The rational soul, then, is a spiritual being (ens), 
subsisting in itself and through its matter and form. As a creature, however, the 
soul depends on God for the conservation of its being (esse). As a created spirit, 
moreover, the rational soul is not free entirely from matter. It is free only from 
corporeal matter. Thus the rational soul is spiritual because it has no corporeity.  
(Quinn 1973, p. 140).
We shall see that Aquinas’s critiques of universal hylomorphism encompass the 
position of Boethius, summarized above. Nevertheless, whenever Aquinas argues 
against universal hylomorphism, he only mentions Avicebron/Ibn Gabirol, who he 
takes to be the originator of the theory. There is some controversy over whether the 
universal hylomorphists of Aquinas’s day were in fact following Avicebron or 
whether their view was developed from Augustine. Weisheipl (1979) argues that 13th 
century universal hylomorphists introduced novel ideas into the scholastic tradition 
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the human soul and the intelligences have such a composition, arguing instead that they 
are simple forms. The pertinent passage reads as follows:
(12A) Although everyone concedes the simplicity of the First Cause, some have 
tried to introduce composition of form and matter into the intelligences and in the 
soul; the  creator of this position appears to be Avicebron, the author of Fontis 
Vitae.  (12B) But this view is incompatible with the common statements of the 
philosophers, because they call these substances separated from matter, and they 
prove them to be altogether absent of matter. The strongest possible 
demonstration is from the power of intellection that is in [these substances]. (12C)
For we see that forms are not actually intelligible except as they are separated 
from matter and its conditions, nor are they made intelligible in act, except 
through the substance’s power of intellection, by which the forms are made 
[intelligible] and are received into. (12D) Therefore, it is necessary that in any 
intelligent substance there is a complete immunity from matter, such that the 
substance has neither a material part itself nor is it like a form impressed in 
matter, as it is with material forms. (12E) Nor can it be said that matter does not 
[generally] impede intelligibility, but only corporeal matter [does]. For, if it were 
by reason of corporeal matter only (since matter is not called corporeal unless it 
stands under a corporeal form), then it would have to follow that matter would 
impede intelligibility of the corporeal form. But this cannot be, because the 
corporeal form itself, just as other forms, is an intelligible in act, insofar as it is 
abstracted from matter. (12F) Hence, there is no manner in which there is a 
composition of matter and form in the soul or the intelligences, in such a way that 
an essence is received in them like they are in corporeal substances.59
because they drew on the ideas of Avicebron’s Fontis Vitae, which was made 
available to them through the works and translations of Gundissalinus. By contrast, 
Sullivan (2010) argues that Avicebron was largely unimportant for universal 
hylomorphists, who instead drew on Augustine as their central source. Pessin (2013) 
(especially pp. 106-112) argues that the universal hylomorphism of the 13th century 
scholastics is not altogether congruent with Avicebron’s theory of corporeal and 
spiritual matter, and that Aquinas misrepresents – or at least fails to capture the 
totality of – Avicebron’s universal hylomorphism. Whether Aquinas found the views 
of his peers to originate from Avicebron’s work leads to questions about the precise 
target of Aquinas’s critiques of universal hylomorphism: is he primarily arguing 
against (a misreading of) Avicebron, or is he arguing against his peers under the guise 
of arguing against Avicebron? For present purposes, it should suffice to say that the 
version of universal hylomorphism Aquinas presents in his works provided a basis for
presenting his alternate understanding of the difference between God and creatures, 
and the spiritual and corporeal beings, as well as his alternate gloss of the quod est-
quo est distinction, each of which were explicated using principles derived from or 
traceable back to Avicenna, Averroes, and the Ammonian Neoplatonic tradition.
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 The basis for Aquinas’s rejection of universal hylomorphism is presented in 12B, where 
he observes that the consensus of the prior philosophers is that intellectual substances and
the human soul are not composites of form and matter. Aquinas believes that the 
emergence of intellectual understanding through actualization of the power of intellection
(virtute intelligendi) was the best explanation the philosophers had offered to account for 
the lack of composition in incorporeal substances. Aquinas therefore makes clear that the 
argument he recites at 12C and the conclusion he draws at 12D is not original, but has 
precedent in the work of at least one other previous thinker. 
The argument in 12C and Aquinas’s characterization of the conclusion at 12D 
presents a short summary of Averroes’s argument in the Long Commentary on De Anima 
that the nature of intellectual receptivity requires that the potential intellect be treated as 
having a potentiality distinct in kind from the material potentiality of sensible substances.
59 Quamvis autem simplicitatem cause primae omnes concedant, tamen 
compositionem formae et materiae quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in 
animam, cuius positionis auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri Fontis Vitae. 
Hoc autem dictis philosophorum communiter repugnat, qui eas substantias a materia 
separatas nominant et absque omni materia esse probant. Cuius demonstratio 
potissima est ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est. Videmus enim formas non esse 
intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia et a condicionibus eius; 
nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu, nisi per virtutem substantiae intelligentis 
secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum quod aguntur per eam. Unde oportet 
quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, ita quod 
neque habeat materiam partem sui neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia, ut 
est de formis materialibus. Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non 
impediat materia quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione 
materiae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod 
stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet impedire 
intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali. Et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma 
corporalis actu intelligibilis est, sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a materia 
abstrahitur. Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et
forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus. (De 
Ente, Chapter 4, 43.375-376.3-36).
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It will be helpful to compare side by side Aquinas’s argument with the heart of Averroes’s
argument in the Long Commentary:
Aquinas, De Ente 4 Averroes, Long Commentary on De 
Anima 3
(12C) For we see that forms are not 
actually intelligible except as they are 
separated from matter and its conditions, 
nor are they made intelligible in act, except
through the substance’s power of 
intellection, by which the forms are made 
[intelligible] and are received into. 
(12D) Therefore, it is necessary that in any 
intelligent substance there is a complete 
immunity from matter, such that the 
substance has neither a material part itself 
nor is it like a form impressed in matter, as 
it is with material forms.
(3C) The reason why that nature {of 
material intellect} is something which 
discerns and knows
while prime matter neither knows nor 
discerns, is because prime matter receives 
diverse forms, namely, individual and 
particular forms, while this [nature] 
receives universal forms. 
(3D) From this it is apparent that this 
nature is not a determinate particular nor a 
body nor a power in a body. For if it were 
so, then it would receive forms inasmuch 
as they are diverse and particular…  
(3E) For this reason, if that nature which is 
called intellect receives forms, it must 
receive forms by a mode of reception other 
than that by which those matters receive 
the forms whose contraction by matter is 
the determination of prime matter in them. 
(3F) For this reason it is not necessary that 
it be of the genus of those matters in which 
the form is included, nor that it be prime 
matter itself.
First, the dissimilarities between the two arguments: Aquinas includes the active principle
of intellection in his argument. Averroes, who is commenting on the potential intellect 
presented in De Anima 3.4, does not. Averroes details that the separability of intelligible 
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forms is due to their universality. Aquinas does not mention this (though it is implied).60  
Aquinas does not mention that the intellectual substance is not a body, a power in a body, 
etc., whereas Averroes does. This is because Aquinas is concerned with responding to the 
universal hylomorphists, who agree that the human soul and intelligences are incorporeal 
but nevertheless maintain that they are a composition of form and matter; Averroes is 
instead concerned with determining the character of intellectual potentiality in contrast to 
material potentiality. Finally, Averroes’s argument covers more detail, whereas Aquinas’s 
argument is a summary.
Despite the differences between the two passages, one can see that Aquinas’s 
passage in the De Ente et Essentia follows the core of Averroes’s reasoning in the Long 
Commentary on De Anima. Moreover, with a bit of unpacking, Aquinas’s summary 
argument can be shown to be committed to every detail that Averroes presents in his 
argument. Averroes’s argument states that the process of human intellection requires that 
the intelligible form be received universally, or devoid of any particularizing content that 
a form has as a result of actualizing matter. Since corporeal forms are actualities of matter
and, therefore, particularized forms, the intellect cannot be a corporeal composition, a 
body, or the power of a body. Moreover, intellectual receptivity cannot therefore be the 
same as material receptivity; the intellect must have its own kind of immaterial and, 
consequently, incorporeal receptivity. 
60 In the next chapter, we will see that Aquinas maintain in the Summa 
Theologiae and in other works that the universality of intelligible form entails 
complete separability from matter, and that form actualizing matter entails the 
particularization of form.
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Aquinas presents a more generalized version of Averroes’s reasoning, since he is 
not trying to show that intellection is a corporeal act; rather, he is dealing with universal 
hylomorphism, which holds that there is such a category as spiritual matter in addition to 
corporeal matter. Aquinas states that in order for an intellectual substance to make 
material forms actually intelligible and to receive forms separated from matter, the 
intellectual power and, consequently, the subject of this power must itself be separate 
from matter. Presumably the separability of the intelligible form from matter is due to its 
universality, or lack of particularization, as Averroes had stated. As such, materiality 
implies particularity. This reading is supported by Aquinas’s argument at 12E, which 
states that it is not the presence of corporeality that is an impediment to intellectual 
understanding, since corporeality is a form that can be understood; rather it is matter, that 
impedes the form from being intelligible. Again, this impediment is presumably due to 
the particularization found in forms that actualize matter. Thus Aquinas concludes that 
since the intellect receives intelligible forms, the receptivity of intellectual substances 
cannot itself be matter, nor can intellectual activity itself be seen as the actuality of 
matter. This requires that both the potentiality to receive an intelligible form and the 
active principle behind that receptivity are immaterial.61 Having no matter whatsoever, 
the human soul and other intelligences must be simple in the sense that they are not 
hylomorphic composites.
61 Implicit in Aquinas’s conclusion is Averroes’s classification of being into four 
genera, viz. matter/corporeal potentiality, form/corporeal actuality, intellectual 
receptivity/incorporeal potentiality, and intellectual/incorporeal actuality (See Chapter
2, p. 67-69).
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3.3.2.2 The Place of the Human Soul in the Hierarchy of Intelligences
We have seen that incorporeal potentiality features in Aquinas’s critique of 
universal hylomorphism, but this is not the only area that Averroes’s notion had 
influenced Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. Aquinas also follows Averroes – 
explicitly citing him, even – in  tracing the implication of incorporeal potentiality for 
determining the place of human intellect within a hierarchal ontology. At the end of De 
Ente et Essentia Chapter 4, Aquinas writes:
(13A) Because there is potency in the intelligences as well as act, it will not be 
difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there 
were no potency in them.  Thus, the Commentator says in De Anima 3 that, if the 
nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we would not be able to find a 
multitude in the separated substances. (13B) Therefore, there is a distinction 
among each of them from another according to their grade of potency and act 
such that a superior intelligence, which is of greater proximity to the First Cause, 
has more act and less potency, and so with the others. (13C) This [gradation of 
intelligences] is terminated in the human soul, which holds the lowest grade in 
intellectual substances.  (13D) Therefore, the possible intellect is related to 
intelligible forms as prime matter, which holds the lowest grade in sensible 
existence, is related to sensible forms, as the Commentator says in De Anima 3. 
This is why the Philosopher compares it to a blank tablet on which nothing has 
been written. (13E) Because it has more potency among other intelligible 
substances, it follows that the human soul is in such proximity to material things 
that a material thing is drawn to it to participate in its existence, such that from 
soul and body results one existence in one composition, yet, so far as this 
existence is the soul’s existence, it is not dependent on the body (De Ente et 
Essentia, Chapter 4).62
62 Quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit difficile invenire 
multitudinem intelligentiarum; quod esset impossibile, si nulla potentia in eis esset. 
Unde Commentator dicit in III de anima quod, si natura intellectus possibilis esset 
ignorata, non possemus invenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo 
distinctio earum ad invicem secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod 
intelligentia superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, habet plus de actu et minus de 
potentia, et sic de aliis. Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum 
gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad 
formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, 
ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III de anima dicit. Et ideo philosophus 
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Aquinas follows Averroes in 13A-B by maintaining that once one comes to know the 
reality of incorporeal potentiality through the science of psychology, one can come to 
know the differences among intellectual substances, because this discovery provides 
insight into the varying degrees to which intellectual substances possess incorporeal 
potentiality.63  Aquinas’s subsequent analysis of the consequence of admitting incorporeal
potentiality as an ontological category aligns closely with Averroes’s analysis, as well. As
has been done with previous passages from the De Ente et Essentia, it is worth comparing
side by side with the relevant passages in Averroes:
Aquinas, De Ente 4 Averroes, Long Commentary on De 
Anima
(13B) There is a distinction among each of 
them [i.e., intellectual substances] from 
another according to their grade of potency 
and act such that a superior intelligence, 
which is of greater proximity to the First 
Cause, has more act and less potency, and 
so with the others.
(4C) This {division of intelligible being 
into potentiality and actuality} is 
[something] necessarily present in every 
separate intelligence which understands 
something else. And if not, then there 
would be no multiplicity in separate forms. 
(4D) There is no form free of potency 
without qualification except the First Form,
which understands nothing outside itself. 
(4F) Its being is its quiddity. Other forms, 
however, are in some way different in 
comparat eam tabulae, in qua nihil est scriptum. Et propter hoc quod inter alias 
substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua 
rebus materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum, ita scilicet 
quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse, 
prout est animae, non sit dependens a corpore (De Ente, Chapter 4, 43.377.167-192).
63 See the following two passages from Averroes’s Long Commentary on De 
Anima in Chapter 2, p. 67: “(4G) If it were not for this genus of beings which we have
come to know in the science of the soul, we could not understand multiplicity in 
separate things, to the extent that unless we know here the nature of the intellect, we 
could not know that the separate moving powers ought to be intellects.” See (Taylor 
1998) for discussion of the importance of the discovery of incorporeal potentiality in 
determining the subject of metaphysics, according to Averroes.
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quiddity and being.
(13C) This [gradation of intelligences] is 
terminated in the human soul, which holds 
the lowest grade in intellectual substances.
The agent… is more noble than the patient 
and the principle [more noble] than the 
matter. For this reason it should be held 
according to Aristotle that the last of the 
separate intellects in the hierarchy is that 
material intellect. For its activity is less 
[immaterial] than the activity of those other
separate intellects since its activity seems 
more to be affection rather than activity.64
(13D) Therefore, the possible intellect is 
related to intelligible forms as prime 
matter, which holds the lowest grade in 
sensible existence, is related to sensible 
forms.
(4B) For just as sensible being is divided 
into form and matter, so too intelligible 
being must be divided into things similar to
these two, namely, into something similar 
to form and into something similar to 
matter.
At 13B, Aquinas remarks that the degree of incorporeal potentiality/actuality 
possessed by an intellectual substance determines its place within the hierarchy of being. 
Since God is an absolutely simple substance possessing all perfections, and his existence 
is identical with its essence,65 he possesses no incorporeal potentiality and consequently 
64 See Chapter 2, p. 76-78.
65 “Although [God] is existence alone, it is not necessary that he is deficient in 
the other perfections and nobilities. Rather he has all the perfections which are in 
every genus. This is why he is called simply perfect, as the Philosopher and the 
Commentator say in book five of the Metaphysics. But he has these perfections in a 
more excellent way than all things because in him they are one, but in others they 
have diversity. And this is so because all these perfections belong to him according to 
his simple existence. Just as if were able to perform operations of all the qualities 
through one quality, he would have all qualities in that one quality, so also God has all
these perfections in his own existence itself.   //  Quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet 
quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet omnes perfectiones, 
quae sunt in omnibus generibus. Propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut 
philosophus et Commentator in V metaphysicae dicunt. Sed habet eas modo 
excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed aliis diversitatem habent. Et 
hoc est, quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum esse suum simplex; 
sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in
illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes 
perfectiones habet (De Ente, Chapter 5, 43.378.30-43).
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ranks as the highest being.  For all other intellectual substances, the more intellectual 
actuality/less intellectual potentiality they possess, the greater their realization of an 
intellectual nature, and the greater their proximity to God. Similarly, Averroes argues that 
God’s being, i.e. his essential activity, is identical with his essence. Consequently, God 
possesses no potency and is therefore the first among beings of intellectual natures, 
whereas the potency in other intellectual beings to realize their essential activity places 
them lower in the hierarchy. It should be noted, however, that despite the general 
agreement regarding the importance of the reality of incorporeal potentiality for 
establishing an ontological hierarchy of intellectual substance, Aquinas and Averroes 
differ in related metaphysical commitments. This affects their respective uses of 
incorporeal potentiality below the surface. 
For Averroes, intellectual potentiality/actuality served as a basis for distinguishing
and ranking the nature of the movers of the heavenly bodies.66 As we saw in Chapter 2, 
Averroes’s analysis concerning the distinction between human intellect, the intellect of 
the celestial souls, and the intellect of the first unmoved movers centers around the 
respective relationship between thinker, the act of thinking, and the object of thought. 
Since God is absolutely simple, thought, thinker and object thought are identical. 
Thought and thinker are identical in separate substances, but the object of their thought 
66 See Chapter 2, p. 67: “(4H) This {i.e. the intellectual potentiality of the 
unmoved movers} was unknown to many modern [thinkers] to the extent that they 
denied what Aristotle says, in the Eleventh Book of First Philosophy, that the separate
forms moving the bodies must be in accord with the number of celestial bodies. (4I) 
To this extent knowledge of the soul is necessary for knowledge of First Philosophy. 
(4J) That receptive intellect must understand the intellect which is in act. (4K) For 
while it understands material forms, it is even more befitting that it understand 
immaterial forms. (4L) What it understands of separate forms, for example, of the 
agent intelligence, does not impede it from understanding material forms.”
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have varying degrees of multiplicity and refer to something outside thought. Finally, 
since human intellect is in pure potential for thought, it is dependent on receiving the 
diversity of forms in sensible substances to be actualized; it has the greatest multiplicity 
in thought, the act of thinking is distinct from the subject of thought, and the content of 
thought almost always refers to the natures of sensible substance, which are outside the 
nature of thought.67 Likewise, since God, the separate substances, and the human intellect
have the same essence as intellectual beings but have different gradations of realizing that
essence, Averroes uses synonymic analogy to distinguish them. That is to say,  God 
occupies the highest place in the hierarchy because he realizes intellectual essence to the 
fullest degree, whereas intellectual substances fulfill the intellectual natures to varying 
degrees. Moving down the hierarchy, one ultimately arrives at the material intellect, 
which is in pure potentiality to understanding and depends on active intellect making 
sensible forms intelligible for it to have active thought. 
In contrast to Averroes, Aquinas did not index the number of intellectual 
substances to the movers of the heavens, nor did he maintain that God, the intellectual 
substances, and the human soul share the same nature. Rather, Aquinas argues that since 
each of the intellectual substances (save the human soul) are pure forms, they are 
identical with their essence. As such, each intellectual substance constitutes its own 
species: “The nature or quiddity [of intellectual substances] is absolute, not received in 
any matter… this is why, as has been said, there is not found among such substances a 
multiplicity of individuals in one species, with the exception of the human soul on 
67 See Chapter 2, p. 72-75 for discussion of the relationship between thought, 
thinker, and object in the human intellect, the separate substances, and in God. 
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account of the body to which it is united” (De Ente Et Essentia, Chapter 5).68 Likewise, 
Aquinas’s basis for analyzing the gradation among intellectual substances differs from 
Averroes. For Aquinas, the difference in gradations constitute specific differences,69 
although these differences are not known to humans, since the proper objects our 
understanding are the essences of sensible substances:
Separated substances agree with each other in immateriality, and differ from each 
other in grade of perfection, according as they withdraw from potentiality and 
approach pure actuality. The genus is taken from that in them which follows upon 
their being immaterial; for example, intellectuality or something of this sort. But 
the difference, which is unknown to us, is taken from that in them which follows 
upon their grade of perfection (De Ente Et Essentia, Chapter 5).70
 Finally, unlike Averroes, Aquinas maintains that the degree of potentiality found in 
creatures is indicative of having an essence that is in potential to receive existence from 
God:
Everything that receives something from another is in potency to that 
which it receives, and what is received in it is its act. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the quiddity itself or the form, which is the intelligence, be 
in potency with respect to the existence which it receives from God; and 
this existence is received through the mode of an act. It is in this way that 
potency and act are found in the intelligences, but not form and matter, 
except equivocally (De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4).71
68 Sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia… Et 
ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut 
dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus, cui unitur. (De Ente, Chapter 5, 
43.378.49-59).
69 See De Giovanni 2004 (p. 449-53) for a detailed discussion of how Aquinas 
and Averroes develop their respective notions of the ordering of intellectual 
substances.
70 Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate et differunt 
ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad 
actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales 
sumitur in eis genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ab eo autem 
quod consequitur in eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen 
ignota (De Ente, Chapter 5, 43.379.106-115).
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For Aquinas, the distinction between God and creatures is not therefore the degree of 
simplicity or perfection of a generically shared essential act. Rather, God is radically 
different from the intellectual substances because his existence and essence are identical; 
in all other beings, existence and essence differ.
In spite of  Averroes’s and Aquinas’s respective metaphysical differences leading 
to some disagreements in the details that make up their accounts of the hierarchy of 
intelligences, both are committed to the implications of admitting the ontological reality 
of incorporeal potentiality and actuality, as 13C-D and their corollaries in Averroes 
indicate. Although Averroes is known for maintaining that the potential intellect is not a 
power predicated of the human soul, Aquinas’s position strongly accords with what 
Averroes presents in the Long Commentary on De Anima. Aquinas reasons that the 
similarity in breadth of receptivity between the potential intellect and prime matter 
indicates that each holds the lowest position within their respective orders. As a pure 
potentiality to receive sensible forms, prime matter is the lowest reality in the sensible 
order. So also, the human soul, which possesses the potential intellect as one of its 
powers, is a pure potentiality to receive intelligible forms.
As a consequence of the unique incorporeal potentiality possessed by the human 
soul, it sits at the cusp of both the intelligible and sensible worlds such that it naturally 
relies on the sensible world to receive intelligible forms. At 13E, Aquinas draws the 
conclusion that such reliance on the sensible world requires that “a material thing is 
71 Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc 
quod receptum est in eo est actus eius. Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma, 
quae est intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo recipit; et illud esse 
receptum est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non 
tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce (De Ente, Chapter 4, 43.377.147-154).
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drawn to participate in its [i.e. the human soul’s] existence, such that from soul and body 
results one existence in one composition.” In other words, a body must belong to the 
human soul by its essence, because the fulfillment of its intellectual nature requires 
receptivity of intellectual form from sensible substance. Although Aquinas does not detail
it here, he has in mind that the actualization of the potential intellect is the end product of 
the process of abstraction of intelligible form from sensible substances. In Chapter 2 we 
saw Averroes maintain that abstraction begins with the reception of form in the senses, 
which begins a process of de-particularization of cognitive content that culminates in the 
presence of a bare particular nature in the imaginative faculty. The agent intellect then 
illuminates that nature, which makes it intelligible and therefore capable of being 
received into the potential intellect.72  Since sensory activity occurs through bodily 
organs, it follows that a body must participate in the actualization of the potential 
intellect. That is to say, the potential intellect requires a body by its essence, because 
abstraction is the process by which the potential intellect receives intelligible forms, 
sensory activity is an essential feature of abstraction, and the various sensory activities 
are forms of bodily organs. Since Aquinas maintains that the human soul possesses the 
potential intellect as one of its powers, the human soul must be part of an essence that 
orders it to a body. To put it another way, the human soul is therefore a principle of a 
composition conceived in terms of Avicennian hylomorpism. 
Finally, at 13E  we see Aquinas maintain that the human soul belongs to the genus
of intellectual natures and therefore has per se existence. This guarantees the soul’s 
subsistence in the absence of a body, naturally leading one to suppose that the soul and 
72 See Chapter 2, p. 77-78.
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body each have their own respective existence. However, such a supposition conflicts 
with the notion that the soul and body constitute a composition. Thus Aquinas remarks 
that the existence of both the soul and body is the same, because the body partakes of the 
soul’s existence. Despite the Platonic way of expressing the point, Aquinas’s remark is in 
line with his analysis of substantial form as the “giver of esse” in the De Principiis 
Naturae and with his usage of the Communicability of Being doctrine in the 
Commentary on the Sentences to explain how the soul shares its existence with the body. 
That is, the human soul, being a unique species of intellectual substance that requires a 
body, and thus a unique case of substantial form possessing per se existence, is part of the
essence of a hylomorphic composition, and, consequently, communicates its per se 
existence to the body. 
The above sections on the De Ente et Essentia show that Aquinas treats the form-
essence distinction and, by extension, Avicennian hylomorphism as philosophically 
defensible doctrines in their own right, contra form/essence identity and the Aristotelian 
hylomorphism that follows from it. Moreover, we saw that Averroes’s argument for the 
reality of incorporeal potentiality is crucial for Aquinas’s defense of the immateriality of 
the human intellect against universal hylomorphism. Aquinas also followed Averroes in 
using the degree of incorporeal potentiality in the human intellect to determine its place 
as the lowest among intellectual beings. Since Aquinas treats the human intellect as a 
power of the human soul, it sits at the precipice of both the spiritual and material worlds; 
lowest among intellectual beings and highest among sensible substances. This puts the 
human soul in the unique position of being both an intellectual substance (thus possessing
125
per se existence) and a substantial form (thus having an essential relationship to matter), 
such that the body shares in this existence by way of its role as a substantial form.  In the 
next section, I will show that Aquinas presents a more detailed account of the role of 
incorporeal potentiality in accounting for the unique intellectual nature of the human 
soul.
3.4  The Communicability of Being Doctrine and Incorporeal Potentiality in Summa
Contra Gentiles, Book 2
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2 Chapters 56-68 contain Aquinas’s most 
comprehensive treatment of the relationship between the body and the human soul. 
Chapter 56 raises the question as to whether an intellectual substance might be united to a
body. At the outset, he dismisses the notion that intellect and body can be united by way 
of admixture, since this requires a common matter between the two, but intellect lacks 
matter altogether. Nor can intellect and body be connected by way of a contact such that 
they touch, since this would require that the intellectual substance be a body.  However, 
Aquinas considers in a dialectical manner that the intellect might be in contact with the 
body such that it acts at a distance, just as the heavenly bodies act on the terrestrial 
elements. Such contact “impresses its form upon the body,” and the agent in such a 
contact touches touches the body to the extent that it acts. Aquinas calls this a “contact by
way of power.” Contact by power has the advantage of allowing an incorporeal whole to 
be in contact with a body by way of actualizing the body’s potentiality and by affecting 
the body without alteration of its nature. Contact by power has the further advantage of 
indicating that the unity of intellect and body would consist in acting and being acted 
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upon, rather than being a unity of absolute numerical identity. That is to say, the unity 
would be such that intellect would be related to the body as substantial form is related to 
matter. 
Aquinas of course wants it to be possible for there to be an intellect-body 
relationship that is a form-matter relationship, but keeping with his dialectical 
investigation, he presents a series of potential problems with this view: 
• If the intellect and body have two distinct acts, then they will be two things, not 
one. 
• Form and matter are of the same genus, whereas intellect and body belong to 
different genera. 
• If an intellectual substance were a form of a body, it would have material 
existence, because “every thing whose being is in matter must be material.”
• The intellect is neither a body nor a power in the body, but has separate existence.
• If the intellect shares its existence in common with the body, as it would if it were 
the substantial form of the body, then its operation would be a body or a power in 
a body.
Aquinas maintains that the above considerations led prior thinkers to present alternative 
accounts of the human soul that eschewed treating it 1) as a form of the body if the soul 
were taken to contain intellect, or 2) treating human intellect as a power of the soul if the 
soul were taken as being a form of the body. The majority of Chapters 57-68 present 
Aquinas’s critique of these alternatives, with a few chapters and stray sections dedicated 
to his defense of the thesis that the human soul can be both an intellectual substance and a
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substantial form. As interesting as an investigation of Aquinas’s critiques would be in its 
own right, this dissertation is concerned with Aquinas’s use of Neoplatonic and 
Arabic/Islamic philosophical positions to construct his ontology of the human soul. Thus,
the exposition below will focus on Aquinas’s positive doctrine. I will first present 
Aquinas’s key argument in Chapter 68, concerning how the intellectual soul can be 
related to the body as a substantial form.  I will then turn the concluding lines of Chapter 
68 to show that although Aquinas rejects Averroes’s account of the potential intellect as 
having existence separate from the human soul, he nevertheless maintains that the degree 
of incorporeal potentiality possessed by the human soul places it at the boundary between
composite and separate substances in the hierarchy of being.
3.4.1  The Communicability of Being Doctrine and the Soul as Formal Cause
In Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 68, Aquinas presents his explanation 
of how an intellectual substance can be a substantial form:
(14A) In order for one thing to be the substantial form of another, two things are 
required, the first of which is that the form be the principle of the substantial 
existence of that whose form it is. I predicate “principle” not as productive, but as 
formal, as that whereby something is and is called a being. (14B) The other 
[requirement] then follows from this, namely, that the form and the matter come 
together in one existence, which [unity] does not pertain to the efficient cause that
gives it existence. (14C) This existence is that in which the composite substance 
subsists, which is one in being, consisting of matter and form. (14D) Now, the fact
that an intellectual substance subsists, as has been proven, is not an impediment 
for it to be the formal principle of the existence of matter, as though 
communicating its own existence to matter.  (14E) For it is not unsuitable that the 
same existence be that in which the composite and its form subsist, since the 
composite exists only by the form, and neither of them subsists separately. 
(14F) However, one may object that an intellectual substance cannot 
communicate its own existence to corporeal matter such that the intellectual 
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substance and corporeal matter are one existence, because there is a diverse mode 
of existence among diverse genera, and to the nobler substance belongs a nobler 
existence. (14G) This argument would be said to hold if that existence belonged 
to the matter in the same way as the intellectual substance. But it does not. For 
existence belongs to corporeal matter as its recipient and its subject, elevated to 
something higher. Existence belongs to the intellectual substance as its principle 
and in congruence with its proper nature. Therefore nothing prohibits an 
intellectual substance from being the form of the human body, which is the human
soul.73
At 14A and 14B, Aquinas maintains that two criteria must be met in order to consider 
something a substantial form: 1) it must cause the existence of matter as a form, and 2) it 
must share the same existence with matter. Moreover, at 14C, Aquinas maintains that the 
resulting hylomorphic composition subsists because of the existence given by form. 
Taken together, 14A-C summarizes Aquinas's analysis of form in De Principiis Naturae, 
which resulted in the following definition:
73 Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. 
Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma: 
principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens.
Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse: quod non 
contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui dat esse. Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit 
substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse, ex materia et forma constans. Non 
autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est,
esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae. 
Non est enim inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum et forma 
ipsa: cum compositum non sit nisi per formam, nec seorsum utrumque subsistat. 
Potest autem obiici quod substantia intellectualis esse suum materiae corporali 
communicare non possit, ut sit unum esse substantiae intellectualis et materiae 
corporalis: diversorum enim generum est diversus modus essendi; et nobilioris 
substantiae nobilius esse. Hoc autem convenienter diceretur si eodem modo illud esse 
materiae esset sicut est substantiae intellectualis. Non est autem ita. Est enim materiae
corporalis ut recipientis et subiecti ad aliquid altius elevati: substantiae autem 
intellectualis ut principii, et secundum propriae naturae congruentiam. Nihil igitur 
prohibet substantiam intellectualem esse formam corporis humani, quae est anima 
humana. (Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 68, 13.440.15-45).
129
Substantial Formdf1: For any act, that act is a substantial form if and only if it 
causes a sensible substance a) to exist (via giving existence to matter) and b) to 
have essential properties of a species.74
We had seen in our discussion of De Principiis Naturae that the above definition allows 
for the possibility that something with per se existence can be a formal cause. Thus, 
Aquinas concludes at 14D that there is nothing about intellectual substances as such that 
does not allow them to fulfill the criteria needed to be classified as a substantial form, so 
long as it be treated as a special case in which the per se existence of the intellectual 
substance is communicated to matter. That is to say, in such cases the Communicability 
of Being Doctrine will apply:
Communicability of Being: For any substantial form, if that substantial form has
per se existence, it causes the sensible substance to have that existence (via giving
existence to matter).75
Aquinas therefore concludes at 14E that the hylomorphic composition and the form that 
causes it will have the same existence regardless of whether that existence belongs to that
form per se.
At 14F Aquinas presents the objection that matter and intellectual substances must
have distinct existences because they belong to distinct genera, which would render 
application of the Communicability of Being Doctrine useless. Aquinas responds at 14G 
by stating that an intellectual substance as substantial form and its corresponding matter 
would have the selfsame existence but in different ways. Existence would belong to an 
74 See Chapter 3, p. 88.
75 See Chapter 3, p. 96.
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intellectual substance as a principle, and in accordance with its nature as an intellectual 
being. Presumably, what Aquinas has in mind is that an intellectual act is an essentially 
immaterial act, and therefore doesn’t depend on matter to exist. Thus, if there is an 
intellectual act, essence and existence are the two principles by which the subject of 
intellect is in act. Yet, as the above analysis of substantial form indicates, an intellectual 
substance that is a substantial form will be a principle of existence of a hylomorphic 
composition. By contrast, existence belongs to matter by way of receiving it from the 
substantial form, which enables it actually to be something, and, therefore, to belong to a 
genus in the first place. We have seen Aquinas present precisely this view of the human 
soul and the body in the Commentary on the Sentences and in De Ente et Essentia. 
Existence and essence are quo est, or the principles by which the soul exists and by which
it is what it is, respectively. However, the soul, as forma partis, is the quo est of matter, or
the principle by which matter exists and is the bearer of essential properties. Since 
existence belongs to the soul as a quo est, it is possible for it to remain in existence 
without actualizing its quod est, matter, which has, to use Aquinas’s terminology, 
participated or communicated existence. Of course, Aquinas maintains that the human 
soul possesses per se existence as a result of its intellectual and therefore immaterial 
operation. It is therefore classified as an intellectual substance and continues to exist as 
such even when it is not communicating its existence to matter/the body.  
Given that Aquinas is drawing on the Communicability of Being Doctrine and 
related ideas in 14A-G both to devise his solution to how an intellectual substance might 
be related to a body and to defend his solution against critiques, we can conclude that 
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Aquinas’s conception of substantial form is continuous with what was presented in the 
De Principiis Naturae, the Commentary on the Sentences and De Ente et Essentia. Ipso 
facto, the Summa Contra Gentiles presents a conception of substantial form that is 
heavily influenced by Avicenna and the Ammonian tradition. In the next section, we will 
that although Aquinas rejects Averroes’s conception of the human intellectual operation 
as belonging to a substance that stands outside the human soul, he nevertheless continues 
to treat the reality of incorporeal potentiality as a basis for maintaining that the human 
soul stands at the threshold of intellectual and material being. 
3.4.2  The Body is Essential to the Operation of the Potential Intellect
In the closing lines of Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 68 Aquinas 
presents the position that the human soul occupies the lowest place in the hierarchy of 
intelligible substances, yet is the highest among substantial forms:
(15A) Above all these [corporeal] forms, however, is a form similar to the 
superior substances with respect to the kind of knowledge proper to it, which is 
understanding. (15B) So it is capable of an operation that is completed absent any 
corporeal organ. And this is the intellective soul; for the act of understanding is 
not brought about through any bodily organ. (15C) Thus it is necessary that this 
principle whereby man understands, which is the intellective soul and which 
exceeds the condition of corporeal matter, must not be completely bound to or 
immersed in matter, as in the case of other material forms. This is shown by its 
intellectual operation, in which corporeal matter has no share. (15D) 
Nevertheless, since the act of understanding of the human soul requires powers 
that operate through corporeal organs, namely, imagination and sense, this itself 
shows that [the human soul] is naturally united to the body, to complete the 
human species.76
76 Super omnes autem has formas invenitur forma similis superioribus substantiis
etiam quantum ad genus cognitionis, quod est intelligere: et sic est potens in 
operationem quae completur absque organo corporali omnino. Et haec est anima 
intellectiva: nam intelligere non fit per aliquod organum corporale. Unde oportet quod
illud principium quo homo intelligit, quod est anima intellectiva, et excedit 
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At 15A, Aquinas presents the conclusion that there is in fact an entity that is a substantial 
form and shares the same intellectual operation as the separate substances. At 15B, 
Aquinas makes clear that intellectual operations are immaterial acts, and therefore do not 
come about through the activity of a bodily organ. Since it is through an immaterial 
operation that a human being understands, and since the soul is the principle of human 
acts, Aquinas concludes at 15C that the human soul is unlike other material forms in that 
it has an immaterial act. However, the separateness of the human soul is tempered by the 
intellect’s reliance on sensory and imaginative powers in the process of abstracting the 
intelligible form from sensible substances. Thus Aquinas concludes at 15D that the 
peculiar intellectual powers possessed by the human soul require it to be naturally united 
to a body; or, to put it another way, the human soul must be united to the body as a 
substantial form is united to matter. 
There are three points that deserve attention concerning the above passage. The 
first point has to do with Aquinas’s treatment of incorporeal potentiality as ontologically 
real and as a basis for ordering bodily substances, the human soul, and separate 
intellectual substances into a hierarchy. The second point has to do with Aquinas’s 
identification of the potential intellect as a power of the human soul and as the specific 
difference of humanity, which stands in contrast to Averroes’s treatment of the potential 
intellect as a separate substance. The final point has to do with the modifications that 
conditionem materiae corporalis, non sit totaliter comprehensa a materia aut ei 
immersa, sicut aliae formae materiales. Quod eius operatio intellectualis ostendit, in 
qua non communicat materia corporalis. Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animae 
humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet 
imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad 
complendam speciem humanam. (Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 68, 
13.441.53-70).
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Aquinas had to make to the Ammonian/Avicennian conception of soul as form as a 
consequence of adopting the view that the potential intellect is a power of the soul.
3.4.2.1 Implications for the Ontological Position of the Soul
In the discussion of Averroes's influence on De Ente et Essentia above, we saw 
that Aquinas was in agreement with Averroes’s position that the intellectual receptivity 
involved in human understanding requires the introduction of incorporeal potentiality as 
its own category of being, and that the potential intellect is wholly characterized such 
potentiality. This high degree of incorporeal potentiality distinguishes the potential 
intellect from other intellects, which admit varying degrees of actuality. Moreover, the 
actualization of the potential intellect depends on the process of abstraction in order to 
receive intelligible forms. Since the process of abstraction relies on sensation and 
imagination, and both sensation and imagination are bodily operations, the actualization 
of the potential intellect consequently requires a body. Aquinas is following precisely this
line of reasoning again at 15A-D. 
3.4.2.2 Implications for the Specific Difference of Human Nature
Although Aquinas is in agreement with Averroes concerning the reality of 
incorporeal potentiality and its implications for the order of intellectual substances, the 
two thinkers diverge when it comes to the issue of whether the human soul is to be 
classified as an intellectual substance. At 15D,   we see Aquinas maintain that the human 
soul is in fact an intellectual substance, because the potentiality to receive intelligible 
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forms is a power of the human soul. By contrast, Averroes maintained that the potential 
intellect is a substance in its own right, separate from the human soul, but which the soul 
conjoins to in the act of cogitation. As Aquinas reads Averroes, the cogitative act is the 
specific difference of the human being. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapters 
59 and 60, Aquinas writes:
Averroes was moved… to hold that the possible intellect, by which the soul 
understands, has a separate existence from the body, and is not the form of the 
body.77 
Averroes says that man differs specifically from the brutes through the intellect 
that Aristotle calls passive, which is the same as the cogitative power that is 
proper to man, in place of which other animals have the natural estimative power. 
It is the function of this cogitative power to distinguish individual intentions and 
to compare them to others, just as the intellect that is separate and unmixed 
compares and distinguishes between universal intentions. Since, by this 
[cogitative] power, together with the imagination and memory, the phantasms are 
prepared to receive the action of the agent intellect, by which they are made 
intelligible in act, just as there are some arts that prepare the matter for a chief 
artesian.78
Aquinas understands Averroes to be saying that the universal forms present in a 
commonly shared potential intellect serve as the actuality of intelligible content in the 
thought of individual thinkers. According to Aquinas’s Averroes, in order for 
understanding and reflection to occur, the human soul must possess an ability to conjoin 
77 Motus est Averroes… ad ponendum intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit 
anima, esse separatum secundum esse a corpore, et non esse formam corporis. 
(Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 59, 13.415.15-19).
78 Dicit enim praedictus Averroes quod homo differt specie a brutis per 
intellectum quem Aristoteles vocat passivum, qui est ipsa vis cogitativa, quae est 
propria homini, loco cuius alia animalia habent quandam aestimativam naturalem. 
Huius autem cogitativae virtutis est distinguere intentiones individuales, et comparare 
eas ad invicem: sicut intellectus qui est separatus et immixtus, comparat et distinguit 
inter intentiones universales. Et quia per hanc virtutem, simul cum imaginativa et 
memorativa, praeparantur phantasmata ut recipiant actionem intellectus agentis, a quo
fiunt intelligibilia actu, sicut sunt aliquae artes praeparantes materiam artifici 
principali. (Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 60, 13.419.2-420.3)
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with the possible intellect through the production of a phantasm, because the possible 
intellect is itself a separate substance. Possession of this conjunctive capacity is the basis 
for rational activity in human beings, and, therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of 
human beings, according to Aquinas’s account of Averroes.79 
My concern in citing Aquinas’s understanding of Averroes is not to determine the 
accuracy of Aquinas’s depiction of Averroes’s position, so much as to draw attention to 
why Aquinas is opposed to this position. On the one hand, Averroes grants that since 
intellectual activity is immaterial, and since immateriality entails existence separate from 
matter, it would follow that any intellectual subject and agent must have an existence 
separate from matter. On the other hand, in order to consistently maintain that human 
beings have a rational nature, Averroes has to find a way to maintain that the activity of 
understanding and thought takes place in the human soul. This requires explaining how a 
79 For Averroes’s own expression of his position, see the following passage: “Just
as sight is not moved by colors except when they are in act, which is not realized 
unless light is present since it is what draws them from potency into act, so too the 
imagined intentions do not move the material intellect except when the intelligibles 
are in act, because it is not actualized by these unless something else is present, 
namely, the intellect in act. It was necessary to ascribe these two activities to the soul 
in us, namely, to receive the intelligible and to make it, although the agent and the 
recipient are eternal substances, on account of the fact that these two activities are 
reduced to our will, namely, to abstract intelligibles and to understand them. For to 
abstract is nothing other than to make imagined intentions intelligible in act after they 
were [intelligible] in potency. But to understand is nothing other than to receive these 
intentions. For when we found the same thing, namely, the imagined intentions, is 
transferred in its being from one order into another, we said that this must be from an 
agent cause and a recipient cause. The recipient, however, is the material [intellect] 
and the agent is [the intellect] which brings [this] about. We found that we act in 
virtue of these two powers of intellect when we wish; and nothing acts except through
its form; [so] for this reason it was necessary to ascribe to us these two powers of the 
intellect. The intellect which is responsible for abstracting and creating the intelligible
necessarily precedes in us the intellect which is to receive it” (Averroes 2009, De 
Anima, p. 351-2). 
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substance with separate existence can receive intelligible forms that are abstracted from 
hylomorphic compositions, and how the soul can acquire the intelligible form in the act 
of thinking. Hence, the separate existence of the potential (and agent) intellect leads 
Averroes to introduce the cogitative power, which allows him to maintain that the agent 
and potential intellect connect with the human soul and, therefore, serve as respective 
actualities of human understanding and reflection. However, Aquinas finds Averroes’s 
introduction of conjunction to be superfluous on account of the fact that Aquinas’s 
Avicennian and Ammonian inspired conception of hylomorphism does not entail that 
immateriality requires separate existence. That is to say, because Aquinas follows 
Avicenna in holding that substantial form plays the dual role of causing both existence 
and essential acts in matter, this has left open the possibility that a subsistent substance 
can also be considered a substantial form. Moreover, the form-essence distinction allows 
Aquinas to maintain that such a subsistent substance, considered in itself, would be a 
composition of essence and existence; however, as a substantial form, the subsistent 
substance would also be part of an essence that orders it to matter as an actuality of 
existence and essential properties. This provides Aquinas a perspective on the human 
intellective operations that was unavailable to Averroes, due to Averroes’s commitment to
form-essence identity and a single-role/essentialist conception of substantial form:80 
Aquinas can view the reliance of  human intellectual operation on the sensory and 
imaginative powers as evidence that it belongs to an essence that includes matter. Since, 
however, the human intellectual operation is immaterial and, therefore, cannot itself be 
80 See Galluzzo (2013, p. 199-217) for an extensive discussion of Averroes's 
account of hylomorphism.
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the act of a body or a power of a body, the only other option left is to treat it as a power of
the human soul, which would have per se existence on account of that operation, but 
which would also communicate that per se existence to the body on account of it being a 
substantial form. The intellectual human soul and the body would therefore have unitary 
rather than separate existence. Unsurprisingly, Aquinas draws on the potential intellect’s 
reliance on the sensory and imaginative faculties to argue that Averroes is mistaken in 
treating the potential intellect as having separate existence. In Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Chapter 60, Aquinas writes:
Whatever things are separate according to being also have separate operations, 
because things are for the sake of their operations, just as first act is for the sake 
of second act. Thus, Aristotle says in De Anima 1 that if some operation of the 
soul does not involve the body, then it is possible that the soul is separate. 
However, the operation of the possible intellect requires the body, for Aristotle 
says in De Anima 3 that the intellect can act through itself, namely, it can 
understand, when it has been made in act through a species abstracted from 
phantasms – which [phantasams] do not exist without a body. Therefore, the 
possible intellect is not altogether separate from the body. 
Again, whatever thing happens to have some operation according to nature 
has those natural attributes without which that operation cannot be 
completed. Thus, Aristotle proves in De caelo 2 that if the movement of the
stars were progressive like that of animals, then nature would have 
furnished them with organs of progressive movement. But the operation of 
the possible intellect is completed by bodily organs, in which there must be 
phantasms. Therefore, nature has united the possible intellect to bodily 
organs. Consequently, it is not separate from the body according to being.81
81 Quaecumque sunt separata secundum esse, habent etiam separatas operationes:
nam res sunt propter suas operationes, sicut actus primus propter secundum; unde 
Aristoteles dicit, in I de anima, quod, si aliqua operationum animae est sine corpore, 
quod possibile est animam separari. Operatio autem intellectus possibilis indiget 
corpore: dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus potest agere per 
seipsum, scilicet intelligere, quando est factus in actu per speciem a phantasmatibus 
abstractam, quae non sunt sine corpore. Igitur intellectus possibilis non est omnino a 
corpore separatus. 
Cuicumque competit aliqua operatio secundum naturam, sunt ei a natura 
attributa ea sine quibus illa operatio compleri non potest: sicut Aristoteles probat, in II
libro de caelo, quod, si stellae moverentur motu progressivo ad modum animalium, 
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Both objections emphasize that the pure incorporeal potentiality of the potential intellect 
naturally requires bodily operations of sensation and imagination in order to be 
actualized, even if the act of understanding is immaterial. Since, however, immateriality 
entails per se existence but not necessarily separate existence, Aquinas can treat the 
natural relationship between the potential intellect and the sensory faculties as a basis for 
maintaining that the intellectual powers must be powers in the human soul rather than 
separate, as Averroes did.  Thus, in keeping with the notion that the degree of intellectual 
potentiality is the specific difference among intellectual beings, Aquinas identifies the 
potential intellect as the specific difference of humanity: humans are distinct among 
material substances because they have a substantial form with an intellectual, immaterial 
act, whereas they are distinguished from other intellectual substances as a consequence of
the pure potentiality of their intellectual act.
3.4.2.3 Implications for the Soul Conceived as Form
The unique incorporeal potentiality of the human intellect also provides insight 
into why Aquinas’s conception of the soul as cause of the existence of the body must be 
distinguished from the Ammonian and Avicennian views that inspired it. We have just 
seen Aquinas argue that the potential intellect cannot be considered a separate substance, 
due to its natural dependence on prior acts of sensory and imaginative powers. Instead, in
order for the potential intellect to be in cooperation with the bodily operations required to
quod natura dedisset eis organa motus progressivi. Sed operatio intellectus possibilis 
completur per organa corporea, in quibus necesse est esse phantasmata. Natura igitur 
intellectum possibilem corporeis univit organis. Non est igitur secundum esse a 
corpore separatus (Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 60, 13.421.107-42.14).
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fulfill its act, Aquinas maintains that it must be treated as a power of the formal part of a 
complete nature that includes matter. That is to say, the potential intellect must be a 
power contained within a soul that has powers which act through a body and is 
consequently a substantial form. This account rejects the kind of separateness that led the 
Ammonian tradition to treat the soul as form as a teleiotēs, i.e., as a final cause of the 
body’s existence. 
Our exposition of the Ammonian tradition in Chapter 2 resulted in the following 
formulation of their interpretation of the soul as a form of the body:
Ammonian Interpretation (AI): The soul is a) the entelekheia/teleiotēs of the 
body, b) the final cause of the body, and c) has its being separate from the body, 
d) the soul is the entelekheia/teleiotēs of the body because it is the final cause of 
the body; and e) the soul has its being separate from the body because it is the 
final cause of the body.82
Moreover, we saw that the Ammonian interpretation implied the following two 
commitments:
 Form and Separate Being: The soul is a form of the body and a separate being.
Cause and Separate Being: The soul is the cause of the body’s existence and a 
separate being.83
The Ammonian treatment of the human soul as teleiotēs was motivated by their 
Neoplatonic commitment to the intellectual soul having separate existence from the body.
However, Aquinas’s admittance of the reality of incorporeal potentiality, together with his
82 See Chapter 2, p. 54.
83 See Chapter 2, p. 54.
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subsequent identification of the potential intellect as a power in the human soul, enables 
Aquinas to treat the soul as a formal cause and, therefore, the cause of the body’s 
existence while also retaining that existence intrinsically on account of its having an 
intellectual nature. As such, Aquinas’s position presents a modification of both the Form 
and Separate Being and Cause and Separate Being doctrines: the soul is a separate being 
only in the sense that its intellectual power requires per se existence, but it also 
communicates that same existence to the body as a substantial form. Since “separateness”
reduces to “possessing per se existence” for Aquinas, his modified form of the 
Ammonian commitments would be as stated as follows:
 Form and Separate Being1: The soul is a form of the body and possesses per se 
existence.
Cause and Separate Being1: The soul causes the body to have the soul’s per se 
existence.84
Aquinas can therefore maintain there is a sense in which the soul has being separate from 
the body without requiring that the soul is merely a final cause, or a form interpreted as 
teleiotēs, contra the Ammonian tradition.85
84 See Chapter 2, p. 54.
85 In Chapter 2, we saw that Avicenna had adopted the Ammonian conception of 
the soul in full, and thus conceived of the human soul as a substance with its own 
nature, separate from the body. Aquinas rejects Avicenna’s dualist conception of the 
soul body relation on account of his conception of intellectual abstraction: since 
sensation and imagination are essential to the process of sensible form being received 
into the potential intellect as an intelligible species, and sensation and imagination 
require a body, the intellectual soul and the body must be related by essence, opening 
the door for Aquinas’s treatment of the intellectual soul as a substantial form, which 
requires the modification to the Ammonian commitments.
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In the above section, we have seen that Aquinas argues, by way of eliminating 
competing theories, that the soul – an intellectual and, therefore, self-subsistent being – 
causes both the existence and actions of the body as its form. Although Aquinas rejects 
Averroes's view that the human intellectual operation belongs to a substance separate 
from the soul, arguing instead that the human intellectual operation is a power of the soul,
Aquinas nevertheless retains the ontological reality of incorporeal potentiality. On the one
hand, this enables Aquinas to argue that the soul has an act that is immaterial, and thus 
belongs to it alone. On the other hand, the potentiality of the human intellect is actualized
only by abstraction of intelligible species from a phantasm. Since the phantasm is the 
result of sensory activities, which are the acts of bodily organs, the human intellect 
requires a body to be actualized. By categorizing the incorporeal potentiality of human 
intellectual activity as a property of the soul, Aquinas is able to maintain that the soul is a 
species of intellectual substance without treating it as having a separate existence from 
the body. Aquinas's position is in agreement with the Ammonian position that the soul is a
cause and a separate being, but with important modifications. The soul is a separate being
only in the sense that it is per se subsistent as a consequence of its intellectual power. But
since it is also part of a complete nature, and its complete nature includes matter, it causes
the body to exist as a formal cause rather than as a final cause, or as a form interpreted as 
teleiotēs.
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3.5  Concluding Remarks
The next chapter shows that Aquinas’s mature works draw on the same Arabic-
Islamic and Neoplatonic principles as his early works when presenting and defending his 
conception of the soul as a subsistent intellectual substance and a substantial form. It 
should therefore be helpful to summarize how Aquinas used those principles in his early 
works. Generally, we saw Aquinas presents a conception of the human soul that shares 
more in common with the account of soul as a form and separate substance presented by 
the Ammonian tradition than it does with Aristotle's account. Moreover, we saw that 
Aquinas argue in favor of the form/essence distinction and against form/essence identity. 
This distinction plays an integral role in Aquinas’s defense of the view that the soul is 
both a subsistent substance and substantial form, against objections inspired by 
form/essence identity. Finally, in several works, Aquinas employs Averroes's arguments 
for the ontological reality of incorporeal potentiality when criticizing universal 
hylomorphism. The pure degree of incorporeal potentiality possessed by the human 
potential intellect enables Aquinas to establish an essential relationship between human 
intellectual operations and the body.
In the De Principiis Naturae, Aquinas presents an account of substantial form as 
“giver of esse”  that allows him to develop an account of soul that accords with elements 
of the Ammonian tradition such that the soul can have per se existence, which it 
communicates to the body. This preserves a degree of separability for the soul, without 
the implication that the body has its own distinct existence from the soul.
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In the representative passages from the Commentary on the Sentences, we saw 
Aquinas employ Avicenna's form/essence distinction as a way of understanding the 
Boethian quod est/quo est distinction. This is important because Aquinas uses the 
form/essence distinction as a framework for explaining how the concept of substantial 
form can pertain to an intellectual substance: the essence humanity encompasses a 
hylomorphic composition of body and soul such that the soul is ordered to the body as its 
act, yet the soul has its own act independent of the body and can exist without it while 
retaining its role as forma partis within the essence humanity. However, Aquinas presents
the objection that the soul must be exclusively either a substantial form or a separate 
intellectual substance. That is to say, since the existence of a substantial form consists in 
it being a principle of a hylomorphic composition, it cannot have existence separate from 
that composition, and therefore cannot be a substance in its own right. Likewise, the soul 
cannot be a substantial form if it has per se existence. In response to this, Aquinas draws 
on the Communicability of Being Doctrine: the human soul, which as an intellective act 
with per se existence, can give that existence to the body as a substantial form. 
In the De Ente et Essentia, we saw Aquinas maintain that the form-essence 
distinction and, ipso facto, Avicennian hylomorphism are philosophically defensible 
doctrines, against form/essence identity and the hylomorphism it entails. Moreover, we 
saw Aquinas uses Averroes’s argument for the reality of incorporeal potentiality as a 
central premise in his defense of the immateriality of the human intellect against 
universal hylomorphism. Aquinas closely follows Averroes when he draws on the degree 
of incorporeal potentiality in the human intellect to determine its place as the lowest 
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among intellectual beings. Aquinas consequently holds that the human soul occupies a 
unique place as both an intellectual substance (thus possessing per se existence) and a 
substantial form (thus having an essential relationship to matter). The human soul 
therefore has a nature such that the body shares in its existence by way of the soul’s role 
as a substantial form.
Finally, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas presents his view that the soul is 
an intellectual subsisting substance that causes the existence and actions of the body, and 
it does so as a substantial form. This appeared after Aquinas had criticized competing 
theories concerning the relationship between intellectual substances and the body. In the 
process of that criticism, Aquinas rejects Averroes's view that the human intellectual 
operation belongs to a substance separate from the soul, arguing instead that the human 
intellectual operation is a power of the soul. Nevertheless, Aquinas follows Averroes in 
holding that incorporeal potentiality is a genuine ontological category. This allows 
Aquinas to argue that the soul has a per se immaterial act. However, the soul’s 
ontological independence is tempered by the potentiality of the human intellect being 
actualized only by abstraction of intelligible species from a phantasm. That is, the human 
intellect requires a body to be actualized, because the phantasm is the result of sensory 
acts, which are acts of the body. Aquinas is able to hold that the soul is a species of 
intellectual substance without also having to treat it as having existence separate from the
body, because Aquinas classifies human intellectual activity as a power intrinsic to the 
soul. In light of this, we also see that Aquinas's position aligns with the Ammonian 
position that the soul is a cause and a separate being, but with the caveat that the soul’s 
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separateness consists only in its being per se subsistent, due to its intellectual power. 
However, as a forma partis within a complete nature that includes matter, it must also 
cause the body to have its existence. Therefore, unlike the Ammonian Interpretation, 
which views form as a teleiotēs and maintains that the soul causes the body as a final 
cause, Aquinas takes the soul to be the form precisely as a formal cause.
3.5.1  A Note on Bazan
It should be noted that the above exposition indicates that every principle Aquinas
used in the Summa Contra Gentiles to provide an explanation for how the soul could be 
both a subsistent substance and a substantial form, viz. the Communicability of Being 
Doctrine, a hylomorphism based on the form-essence distinction, and the reality of 
incorporeal potentiality, had already been introduced in De Principiis Nature, The 
Commentary on the Sentences, and De Ente et Essentia. Moreover, we saw that in the 
latter two works, Aquinas utilized those principles to provide explanations of the soul-
body relationship that mirrors the one he offered in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and to 
distinguish his position from theories of soul that are wedded to Aristotelian 
hylomorphism, universal hylomorphism, or some form of substance dualism. The 
continuity in employment of these principles throughout the early works of Aquinas 
contrasts sharply with Bazan’s judgment that Aquinas largely treated the soul as a 
complete intellectual substance separate from the body in The Commentary on the 
Sentences and De Ente et Essentia, but came to view the soul as a substantial form in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles and in later works. Bazan thinks Aquinas’s alleged change of 
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mind resulted from confronting Averroes’s view that intellect is separate and shared for 
all human beings.86 It may be the case that Aquinas’s analysis of Averroes’s position 
added to Aquinas’s extant conception of soul as subsistent substance and substantial 
form, but it did not fundamentally change it, since, as the above exposition has shown: 
• Aquinas had presented a conception of form as early as De Principiis Naturae 
which allowed him to maintain that a form can have per se existence, since form 
gives its existence to matter, and ipso facto the resulting composite.  
• Aquinas’s adoption of Avicennian hylomorphism in the Commentary on the 
Sentences and De Ente et Essentia enabled Aquinas to explain that something 
with per se existence can be related to the body as a form even in a separated 
state, since form is part of the essence, and thus retains its relation to matter even 
in its absence. 
• Aquinas’s presentation in the De Ente et Essentia concerning the reality of 
incorporeal potentiality and the peculiar intellectual nature of the human soul as 
dependent on abstraction of form from sensible substance for it to realize its 
activity requires that it have an essential relationship to the body. 
Aquinas uses the above principles to explain how it is possible for an intellectual 
substance to be a substantial form; the fact that Aquinas’s response to Averroes’s 
conception of intellect requires him to hold that the intellectual act must belong to a 
substantial form is not itself an explanation. Yet, as we have seen, Aquinas neither 
introduced any new principles nor combined the previously introduced principles in a 
new way, in the Summa Contra Gentiles. As such, there is no basis to maintain that 
86 See Chapter 1, p. 12-14.
147
Aquinas’s theory of soul in the Summa Contra Gentiles is different from what he 
presented in his earliest works, as Bazan has argued. In the next chapter, I shall turn to 
Aquinas’s mature works to show that he continues to draw on Avicennian hylomorphism, 
the Communicability of Being Doctrine, and the reality of incorporeal potentiality in just 
the same way as he did in his early works to explain how the soul can be both a subsistent
substance and a substantial form. The survey of Aquinas’s mature works in Chapter 4 will
provide a basis for providing comprehensive assessment of the interpretation of 
Aquinas’s ontology of soul offered by Bazan and others in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4 : HUMAN CONSTITUTION IN AQUINAS’S MATURE WORKS
This chapter provides a showcase of key texts from the mature works of Thomas 
Aquinas (ca. 1265-1273), which illustrate that Aquinas continued to employ Avicenna's 
form/essence distinction in articulating his conception of the relationship between the 
human soul and body, as well as defending his view that the soul is both a subsistent 
substance and substantial form, against objections inspired by form/essence identity. 
Moreover, in continuing to use the Communicability of Being Doctrine to defend the 
unity of the human person, Aquinas shows his commitment to a conception of soul that 
stems from the Ammonian tradition of interpreting Aristotle’s psychology. Finally, 
Aquinas continues to draw on both the ontological reality of incorporeal potentiality in 
his criticism of universal hylomorphism, as well as the extreme degree of incorporeal 
potentiality in the human potential intellect, to reject the notion that the human soul's 
subsistence requires it to have an existence altogether separate from the body.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to illustrate continuity between Aquinas’s 
early and mature works when reasoning that the soul is both a subsistent substance and 
substantial form. That is to say, the form-essence distinction, Communicability of Being 
thesis, incorporeal potentiality, and their ontological and epistemological entailments are 
a common thread running through Aquinas’s works. He draws on each on to argue or to 
allow for the possibility that the soul must possess per se existence on account of its 
intellectual nature, but also must be a form of a body on account of its type of intellectual
nature. This stands in contradiction to Carlos Bazan’s claim that Aquinas’s earlier works 
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present a philosophical anthropology closer to Platonism that is at odds with the largely 
Aristotelian philosophical anthropology presented in his mature works.87
4.1 The Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic Influence on Quaestiones Disputatae de 
Anima
This section provides a series of representative passages from Aquinas’s 
Questiones Disputate de Anima, which show that Aquinas continues to employ the 
form/essence distinction, Communicability of Being thesis, incorporeal potentiality, and 
the hierarchy of intelligible substances to account for the ontology of the human soul. 
Moreover, we shall see that Aquinas continues to interpret the Boethian quod est/quo est 
distinction according to the principles he inherited from Avicenna and Avicenna’s 
Neoplatonic predecessors.
4.1.1 How the Soul is Both a Form and a Determinate Particular
In the first question of the Questiones Disputate de Anima, Aquinas sets out to explain 
how the human soul can be treated as both a form and a hoc aliquid, or determinate 
particular. Since a determinate particular is something that subsists per se, but a form is a 
principle of a composition, and the composition itself is a determinate particular, 
Aquinas’s task is to respond to those who maintain that one determinate particular cannot 
itself be a principle of another determinate particular. This would require that the human 
soul cannot be a form if it is a determinate particular, or a determinate particular if it is a 
form. Likewise, either the human soul would be a principle of a hylomorphic 
87 See Chapter 1, p. 12-14 for a summary of Bazan’s position.
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composition only, which would preclude it from surviving bodily death since it would not
have per se subsistence, or it would be a determinate particular, and therefore have an 
accidental rather than an essential relationship to the body.  This mirrors the problem 
Aquinas addresses in Commentary on the Sentences, 1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2. arg 1 (see Chapter 3:
p. 97-104), wherein Aquinas is confronted with objections that the human soul cannot be 
a subsistent substance if it is a substantial form or vice versa, and thus can only be one or 
the other.  In that article, Aquinas argues that the intellectual nature of the human soul 
requires that it have per se existence, yet as a part of a hylomorphic essence it plays the 
role of both perfection of matter and the cause of its existence. Aquinas’s response in 
Questiones Disputate de Anima Q1 is in the same vein: “The soul is a determinate 
particular that can subsist per se, not as a thing having a complete species in itself, but as 
perfecting the human species as the form of the body. So it is simultaneously a form and a
determinate particular.” (Quaestiones Disputate de Anima,Q 1, c.o.).88 In unpacking his 
reply, Aquinas draws on Avicennian hylomorphism, the form-essence distinction, and the 
Communicability of Being doctrine in a manner consistent with his earlier works, which 
illustrates his commitment to the same conception of the human soul as a both a 
subsistent substance and substantial form presented in those works.
88 Anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se 
completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et sic 
simil est forma et hoc aliquid. (Questiones Disputate De Anima, 24.1.9.286-290).
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4.1.1.1 Incorporeal Potentiality Guarantees the Soul’s Immateriality and Relation to
a Body
In the Respondeo to Question 1, Aquinas draws on the incorporeal potentiality 
possessed by the human soul to establish that the soul is an immaterial substance, but, 
unlike other immaterial substances, it depends on reception of the forms of sensible 
substances. Since sensation takes place in bodily organs, human intellection thus requires 
being related to a body in order to be actualized. This entails two things.  First, the human
soul is not complete in its nature when apart from the body. Second, the human soul 
occupies the highest place among substantial forms and the lowest place among 
intellectual substances. Aquinas writes:
(16A) Above these [corporeal forms] ultimately are human souls, which have a 
similitude to superior substances also within the genus of cognition, because they 
are able to cognize immaterial things by intellection. (16B) Nevertheless, the 
intellect of the human soul differs from them [i.e. separate substances] in that it 
has to acquire immaterial cognition from material cognition, which is through  
sense. (16C) Therefore, in this way, from the human soul’s operation, its mode of 
existence can be known. For, insofar as it has an operation transcending material 
things, its existence is elevated above the body and does not depend on it. Yet, 
insofar as it is natural for it to acquire immaterial cognition from material things, 
it is manifest that it cannot be complete in its species apart from union with the 
body. (16D) For something is not complete in species unless it has that which is 
required for the proper operation of its species. (16E) If, therefore, the human 
soul, insofar as it is united to the body as a form, has existence elevated above the 
body it does not depend on, then it is manifest that it is constituted at the 
boundary dividing corporeal from separate substances. (Quaestiones Disputate 
De Anima, Q 1, c.o.)89
89 Super has autem ultimo sunt animae humanae, quae similitudinem habent ad 
superiores substantias etiam in genere cognitionis, quia immaterialia cognoscere 
possunt intelligendo. In hoc tamen ab eis differunt, quod intellectus animae humanae 
habent naturam acquirendi cognitionem immaterialem ex cognitione materialium, 
quae est per sensum. Sic igitur ex operatione animae humanae, modus esse ipsius 
cognosci potest. In quantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse 
suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipso; in quantum vero 
immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali est nata acquirere, manifestum est quod 
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 At 16A-B, Aquinas maintains that the human soul belongs to the species of immaterial 
substances because it possesses intellectual power. Yet, it is unlike all other intellectual 
substances, because its intellectual power is not inherently in act; rather, it relies on the 
senses gathering sensible content, which the agent intellect draws on to abstract 
intelligible forms that the potential intellect receives. At 16C, Aquinas draws his first 
conclusion, that  the immateriality of the intellect requires treating the intellectual soul as 
possessing per se existence. As such, it can be considered a hoc aliquid, like the separate 
substances. Nevertheless, its reliance on sensory content for its proper act also requires 
that it belongs to a nature that includes a body (via 16D). So, Aquinas’s second 
conclusion is that the soul is not complete in its nature unless it is united to the body. The 
intellectual soul is therefore of a peculiar nature, which includes both a corporeal and 
incorporeal aspect, setting it as the highest of corporeal forms and the lowest of 
intellectual substances, as Aquinas mentions at 16E.  
The reasoning in the above passages follow the same pattern as the reasoning 
Aquinas presented in De Ente et Essentia ( Chapter 3, p. 116-118, 13A-E) and the 
Summa Contra Gentiles (Chapter 3, p. 131, 15A-D). In each of those earlier works, 
Aquinas maintained that the soul stands at the precipice of corporeal and incorporeal 
substances as a result of having an intellectual nature with pure intellectual potentiality. 
Its intellectual nature requires that it be treated as immaterial, incorporeal, and possessing
complementum suae speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim 
aliquid est completum in specie, nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam 
operationem ipsius speciei. Si igitur anima humana, in quantum unitur corpori ut 
forma, habet esse elevatum supra corpus non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod 
ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta (Questiones 
Disputate De Anima, 24.1.10.319-341).
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per se existence, like other intellectual substances. Yet its pure incorporeal potentiality 
requires that it abstracts its cognitive content from the forms of sensible substances. 
Consequently, the intellectual soul requires an essential relation to a body. Likewise, 
Aquinas’s reason in in 16A-E for maintaining that the soul is not complete in its nature 
when not united to the body, and that it occupies a special place in the hierarchy of being,
hinges on the notion of the soul possessing pure incorporeal potentiality. We have seen in 
the previous chapter that Aquinas followed Averroes in his earlier works with regards to 
both the position that incorporeal potentiality is an ontological principle of intellectual 
substance and the implications of admitting the reality of incorporeal potentiality.  In light
of this we can say that Aquinas’s Averroes-inspired conception of the specific nature of 
the human soul is effectively the same in the Questiones Disputate de Anima as it is in the
De Ente et Essentia and the Summa Contra Gentiles.
The extreme degree of incorporeal potentiality is evidence for Aquinas that the 
human soul must be both a subsistent substance/hoc aliquid and a substantial form, but he
must still explain how it is possible for such a substance to be related to matter as a 
substantial form. In order to provide such an explanation, Aquinas utilizes the 
Communicability of Being Thesis and the Avicennian hylomorphism that follows from 
the form-essence distinction, just as he had done in earlier works.
4.1.1.2  The Soul Communicates its Existence to the Body
In the first objection to the view that the soul can be both a determinate particular 
and a substantial form, Aquinas argues that such a relationship would have to be 
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accidental. Since the soul would already possess existence, its existence would not 
consist in being a hylomorphic principle:
If the human soul is a determinate particular, it is subsisting and has complete 
existence per se. Whatever comes to something after complete existence comes to
it accidentally as whiteness and clothing for a human being. Thus, when the body 
comes into unity with the soul, it is accidental to it. Therefore, if the soul is a 
determinate particular, it is not the substantial form of the body (Quaestiones 
Disputate de Anima, Q 1, arg. 1).90
This objection states in its own way the issue that was raised by the objections Aquinas 
confronted in the Commentary on the Sentences (Chapter 2, p. 97-104), which drew on an
Aristotelian conception of hylomorphic and intellectual substance. That is to say, if the 
soul were a form of the body, it would be the principle of a hylomorphic composite, and 
thus have its existence through the composition. As such, it could not have per se 
existence separate from the body. On the other hand, if it does have per se existence, it 
would be a separate substance, and its conjunction with the body would involve a 
combination of two beings with their own distinct existences, and, consequently, their 
own distinct unities (See Chapter 2, p. 57). 
Aquinas draws on the Communicability of Being thesis in order to respond to the 
above objection:
Although the soul has a complete existence, it does not follow that the body is 
accidentally united to it, both because the same existence that belongs to the soul 
is shared with the body, so that there is one existence for the whole composite, 
and also because, even if  [the soul] can subsist per se, it still does not have a 
90 Si enim anima humana est hoc aliquid, est subsistens et habens per se esse 
completum. Quod autem advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter,
ut albedo homini et vestimentum. Corpus igitur unitum animae advenit ei 
accidentaliter. Si ergo anima est hoc aliquid, non est forma substantialis corporis 
(Questiones Disputate De Anima, 24.1.6.1-10).
155
complete species, but the body comes to it to complete the species (Quaestiones 
Disputate de Anima, Q 1, ad. 1).91
Aquinas’s notion of the soul as “giver of esse,” first presented in the De Principiis 
Naturae, and reiterated in the Commentary on the Sentences, De Ente et Essentia, and 
Summa Contra Gentiles, is at work in the above reply. That is to say, Aquinas maintains 
that form gives both existence and essential properties to matter, which was expressed in 
the Existential Priority of Substantial Form thesis:
EPSF: The existence of a sensible substance, the essential properties of that 
substance, and the accidents that inhere in it depend on substantial form causing 
matter to exist (Chapter 3, p. 89).
Since this is a characteristic of all forms, nothing about the notion of form as such 
precludes form from possessing per se existence and, thus, giving that existence to 
matter. This is precisely what Aquinas says above when he mentions that “it is the same 
existence that is communicated to the body by the soul,” which is effectively a 
restatement of the Communicability of Being thesis:
Communicability of Being: For any substantial form, if that substantial form has
per se existence, it causes the sensible substance to have that existence (via giving
existence to matter) (Chapter 3, p. 96).
The Communicability of Being thesis therefore allows Aquinas to maintain that the soul 
being a determinate particular (which, again, is another way of saying the soul has per se 
existence) does not entail that it has an accidental relationship to the body. As we have 
91 Licet anima habeat esse completum non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei 
accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicat corpori, 
ut sit unum esse totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non 
tamen habet speciem completam, sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei 
(Questiones Disputate De Anima, 24.1.10.342-349).
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seen, the Communicability of Being  thesis is Aquinas’s variation on both the Cause and 
Separate Being and Form and Separate Being theses, which formed the basis of the 
approach to the soul in the Ammonian tradition. Thus, the Questiones Disputate de 
Anima provides evidence that Aquinas continued to draw on Neoplatonic principles in the
development of his ontology of the human soul. In the next section, we will see Aquinas 
use the form-essence distinction to explain why the soul is not complete in its nature 
when in a disembodied state.
4.1.1.3  The Soul as Forma Partis
In the tenth objection of Question 1, Aquinas presents an argument that the soul cannot be
a form of the body if it continues to exist after the death of the body, since one thing
existing  in  separation  from  another  indicates  two  substances  related  to  one  another
accidentally, as opposed to two principles coming together to constitute one substance:
It was said that when the body corrupts, the soul remains a determinate particular 
and per se subsistent, but then the nature of form perishes in it. But on the 
contrary, whatever can be taken from something while its substance remains is in 
that thing accidentally. Therefore, if, when the soul remains after the body, the 
principle of form perishes in it, it follows that the nature of  form comes to it 
accidentally. But it is not united to the body for the human constitution except 
insofar as it is a form. Thus, [the soul] is united to the body accidentally, and, 
consequently, a human will be a being per accidens. Yet this is unacceptable 
(Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 1, arg. 10).92
92 Dicebat quod corrupto corpore anima remanet hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, 
sed tunc perit in ea ratio formae. Sed contra, omne quod potest abscedere ab aliquo, 
manente substantia eius, inest ei accidentaliter. Si igitur anima remanente post corpus,
perit in ea ratio formae, sequitur quod ratio formae conveniat ei accidentaliter. Sed 
non unitur corpori ad constitutionem hominis nisi prout est forma. Ergo unitur corpori
accidentaliter, et per consequens homo erit ens per accidens; quod est inconveniens. 
(Questiones Disputate De Anima, 24.1.12.417-420).
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This objection hinges on the notion that the soul as a form is identical to its essence. That 
is to say, if the soul is the whole essence, then one faces the following dichotomy: either 
the soul is an essence that has actuality in itself and, consequently, cannot be a form, 
since the form is an actuality of matter, or the soul is an essence that has actuality through
composition with matter, and, consequently cannot be a substance with per se existence. 
Aquinas’s response to this dichotomy is that the soul retains its essential relationship to 
matter even when it does not actualize it: “When the body is corrupted the nature that 
belongs to the soul as a form does not perish, even though it is not actually perfecting 
matter as a form” (Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 1, ad. 10).93 This implies that the 
soul retaining its essential relationship to matter in the absence of actualizing it depends 
on it belonging to a hylomorphic essence as a part, rather than constituting the whole 
essence. Another way of putting this is that the soul, as a form of the part, virtually 
remains a form of matter when separated from the body, since the form of the whole, i.e. 
the essence that it belongs to, orders it to actualize matter. Yet, in that separated state, it is
not complete in its nature, as we have seen Aquinas express above. As such, the notion 
that the soul can still belong to a hylomorphic essence even when separated from matter 
is dependent on a distinction between form and essence, such that form and matter are 
both parts of that essence. We saw in Chapter 3 that Aquinas adopted the form-essence 
distinction from Avicenna, as well as the hylomorphism that followed from it. Aquinas’s 
continued employment of reasoning about the human soul according to the form-essence 
distinction thus indicates his continued commitment to Avicennian hylomorphism.
93 Corrupto corpore non perit ab anima natura secundum quam competit ei ut sit 
forma; licet non perficiat materiam actu, ut sit forma. (Questiones Disputate De 
Anima, 24.1.10.319-341).
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 Aquinas again utilizes the form-essence distinction in Objection 13 to distinguish 
his own position from one motivated by form-essence identity. The objection reads as 
follows:
If the soul is the form of the body, it follows that the soul and body are one 
existence, for [just] one existence results from the union of matter and form. But 
there cannot be one existence for body and soul, since they are of diverse genera. 
For the soul is in the genus of incorporeal substance, while the body is in the 
genus of corporeal substance. Therefore, the soul is not able to be the form of the 
body (Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 1, arg. 13).94
Again, as with Objection 10, the assumption in Objection 13 is that form is identical with 
its essence: the soul is an incorporeal essence, and cannot be the form of a hylomorphic 
composition, because form is the actuality of matter, and, consequently, a corporeal 
essence. As such, the soul having an incorporeal essence requires that its existence is 
wholly separate and unrelated to anything corporeal. Again, like Objection 10, the 
reasoning following form-essence identity forces a dichotomy that Aquinas wants to 
avoid: either the soul is a form of the body and is, consequently, is a corporeal essence 
whose existence depends on it actualizing matter, or it is an incorporeal essence whose 
existence is not shared with a body. Aquinas’s response is that the soul and body will 
share the same existence if the soul is a form. “It is necessary that if the soul is the form 
of the body, then the soul and the body have one common existence, which is the 
existence of the composite (Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 1, ad. 13).95” This part of 
94 Si anima est forma corporis, oportet quod animae et corporis sit unum esse: 
nam ex materia et forma fit unum secundum esse. Sed animae et corporis non potest 
esse unum esse, cum sint diversorum generum; anima enim est in genere substantiae 
incorporeae, corpus vero in genere substantiae corporeae. Anima igitur non potest 
esse forma corporis. (Questiones Disputate DeAnima, 24.1.6.134-137).
95 Necesse est, si anima est forma corporis, quod animae et corporis sit unum 
esse commune, quod est esse compositi. Questiones Disputate De Anima, 
24.1.12.435-438).
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Aquinas’s response is in agreement with both the Communicability of Being thesis and 
the view that the existence of a hylomorphic composition just is the actuality of essential 
properties in matter. However, Aquinas must show that the soul’s essential incorporeality 
does not exclude it from being a form. In order to do this, Aquinas argues that the soul 
and body constitute parts that are reducible to a whole species: “Nor is this [relation of 
soul to body as form to matter] prevented by the fact that the soul and the body are of two
diverse genera. For neither the soul nor the body are in a species or genus except by 
reduction, as the parts are reduced to the species or genus of the whole” (Quaestiones 
Disputate de Anima, Q 1, ad. 13).96 That is to say, form is essentially related to matter 
because it is part of a hylomorphic essence that orders it to actualize the material part. 
The soul having an incorporeal act doesn’t preclude it from being a form of the part, and 
so it is possible that it is related to the body as a form.
4.1.2  Against Universal Hylomorphism
In Question 6 of the Questiones Disputate de Anima, Aquinas argues that the 
human soul cannot be a composite of form and matter. Aquinas draws on the reality of 
incorporeal potentiality possessed by the human soul and other intellectual substances to 
explain their composition and to distinguish them from God, who is purely actual. 
Aquinas follows the same line of reasoning in Question 6 as he did in earlier works. 
Moreover, just as he did in earlier works, Aquinas interprets the quod est/quo est 
96 Nec hoc impeditur per hoc quod anima et corpus sint diversorum generum: 
nam neque anima neque corpus sunt in specie vel genere, nisi per reductionem, sicut 
partes reducuntur ad speciem vel genus totius (Questiones Disputate De Anima, 
24.1.12.438-441).
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distinction in accord with the principles of his Neoplatonic and Arabic-Islamic 
predecessors.
4.1.2.1 Material Potentiality vs. Incorporeal Potentiality
In the Respondeo to Question 6, Aquinas argues that the difference in receptivity 
of the human soul and the receptivity of corporeal things requires that they have different 
potentialities; corporeal receptivity involves alteration in spatial location, whereas the 
receptivity of the soul separates essences from such alteration and from the substances 
altered in its cognitive act. Aquinas writes:
(17A) To receive, to be a subject, and the like do not belong to the soul and to 
prime matter according to the same nature. For prime matter receives something 
through change and motion. And since every change and motion is reduced to 
local motion as  primary and common, as is proved in the Physics 8, it follows 
that matter is present in only those things in which there is potency to place. 
However, those things are corporeal alone which are circumscribed by location. 
(17B) Therefore, according to what the philosophers have said about matter, 
matter is found only in corporeal things, unless someone wishes to take matter 
equivocally. (17C) However, the soul does not receive through motion and 
change, but, instead [receives] through separation from motion and from movable 
things. As it is said in Physics 3 that the soul comes to be knowledgeable and 
practically wise when at rest. Thus, the Philosopher also states in De Anima 3 that 
to understand is called being affected in a way different from the affection in 
corporeal things. (17D) Therefore, if anyone wishes to conclude the soul to be 
composed of matter because it receives or suffers affection, he is obviously 
deceived by an equivocation (Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 6, c.o.).97
97 Recipere et subiici et alia huiusmodi non secundum eamdem rationem 
conveniunt animae et materiae primae. Nam materia prima recipit aliquid cum 
transmutatione et motu. Et quia omnis transmutatio et motus reducitur ad motum 
localem, sicut ad primum et communiorem, ut probatur in VIII Physic.; relinquitur 
quod materia in illis tantum invenitur in quibus est potentia ad ubi. Huiusmodi autem 
sunt solum corporalia, quae loco circumscribuntur. Unde materia non invenitur nisi in 
rebus corporalibus, secundum quod philosophi de materia sunt locuti; nisi aliquis 
materiam sumere velit aequivoce. Anima autem non recipit cum motu et 
transmutatione, immo per separationem a motu et a rebus mobilibus: secundum quod 
dicitur in III Physic. quod in quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens. Unde etiam 
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At 17A, Aquinas maintains that prime matter is a kind of potentiality that, when 
actualized, always involves movement in space, and is therefore limited to spatial beings. 
Since every being that is disdended in spatial dimensions is corporeal, it follows that 
prime matter pertains to all and only corporeal beings as their mode of receptivity, as 
Aquinas remarks at 17B. This receptivity is unlike the receptivity of the human soul, 
which, Aquinas notes at 17C, takes in forms separated from motion and from corporeal 
things. As such, the soul has an immaterial, incorporeal receptivity, distinct in kind from 
the receptivity of prime matter. This distinction entails that one can only refer to the soul 
as having matter in an equivocal manner. Consistent with his earlier works, Aquinas 
follows Averroes in maintaining that the receptivity of intellect is its own ontological 
category as a basis for rejecting the notion that hylomorphic categories pertain to the 
intellect.98
4.1.2.2  A Restatement of Boethius’s Quod Est/Quo Est Distinction
At a later point in the Respondeo to Question 6, Aquinas provides an 
interpretation of the quod est/quo est distinction that accords with his earlier 
interpretation in the Commentary on the Sentences:
(18A) It is not excluded that act and potency are in the soul, for potency and act 
are found not only in mobile things, but are also found in immobile things; and 
they are more common, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 8, because matter 
philosophus dicit, III de anima, quod intelligere dicitur pati alio modo quam sit in 
rebus corporalibus passio. Si quis ergo concludere velit animam esse ex materia 
compositam per hoc quod recipit vel patitur, manifeste ex aequivocatione decipitur 
(Questiones Disputate De Anima, 24.1.49.142-164). For a corollary passage in 
Averroes’s Long Commentary on De Anima, see (Averroes 2009, p. 331-332), and see 
Taylor’s remarks on p. xciv.
98 See Chapter 2, p. 78-82.
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is not in immobile things. (18B) But how act and potency amay be found in the 
soul in this way must be considered by proceeding from material to immaterial 
things. (18C) For we find three things in substances composed of matter and 
form: matter, form, and existence itself. (18D) The principle of this is form, for 
matter participates existence from the fact that it receives form. Therefore, 
existence in this way follows upon form istelf. (18E) Nevertheless, a form is not 
its own existence, since it is a principle of it. And although matter does not attain 
existence except through form, nevertheless a form, insofar as it is form, does not 
require matter for its existence, since existence follows upon the form itself. (18F)
But, it requires that matter, when it is a form, such that it does not subsist per se. 
Therefore, nothing prohibits some form from having existence separate from 
matter and existence is in a form such as this. For the essence of form compares to
existence as potency to proper act. 
(18G) And so both potency and act are found in per se subsistent forms, insofar as
existence itself is the act of the subsistent form, which is not its own existence. 
(18H) However, if there is a thing which is its own existence, which is proper to 
God, potency and act are not there, but pure act. (18I) And here it is that Boethius 
says in De Hebdomadibus that in those things that come after God, existence 
(esse) and that which is (quod est), or, as some say, that which is (quod est) and 
that by which it is (quo est) differ. For existence itself is that by which a thing is, 
just as running is that by which someone runs. (18J) Since, therefore, the soul is a
per se subsistent form, there is able to be a composition of act and potency in it, 
i.e., existence and that which is, but no composition of form and matter 
(Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 6, c.o.).99 
99 Non tamen excluditur quin in anima sit actus et potentia; nam potentia et actus
non solum in rebus mobilibus, sed etiam in immutabilibus inveniuntur, et sunt 
communiora, sicut dicit philosophus in VIII Metaph., cum materia non sit in rebus 
immobilibus. Quomodo autem in anima actus et potentia inveniantur sic 
considerandum est ex materialibus ad immaterialia procedendo. In substantiis enim ex
materia et forma compositis tria invenimus, scilicet materiam et formam et ipsum 
esse. Cuius quidem principium est forma; nam materia ex hoc quod recipit formam, 
participat esse. Sic igitur esse consequitur ipsam formam. Nec tamen forma est suum 
esse, cum sit eius principium. Et licet materia non pertingat ad esse nisi per formam, 
forma tamen in quantum est forma, non indiget materia ad suum esse, cum ipsam 
formam consequatur esse; sed indiget materia, cum sit talis forma, quae per se non 
subsistit. Nihil ergo prohibet esse aliquam formam a materia separatam, quae habeat 
esse, et esse sit in huiusmodi forma. Ipsa enim essentia formae comparatur ad esse 
sicut potentia ad proprium actum. 
Et ita in formis per se subsistentibus invenitur et potentia et actus, in quantum 
ipsum esse est actus formae subsistentis, quae non est suum esse. Si autem aliqua res 
sit quae sit suum esse, quod proprium Dei est, non est ibi potentia et actus, sed actus 
purus. Et hinc est quod Boetius dicit in Lib. de hebdomadibus quod in aliis quae sunt 
post Deum, differt esse et quod est; vel, sicut quidam dicunt, quod est et quo est. Nam
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At 18A, Aquinas restates the conclusion that we saw him draw earlier, viz. that the human
soul does not possess potency and act in the way that corporeal substances possess it, but 
instead has an immaterial composition of potency and act. Aquinas’s illustration of the 
kind of composition possessed by the human soul runs from 18C to 18H, and begins with
his conception of form as found in hylomorphic composites, as stated in 18B. Just as 
Aquinas had presented in the De Principiis Naturae and the Commentary on the 
Sentences, at 18C-D he again presents hylomorphic compositions as compositions of 
matter, form, and existence, such that form gives its existence to matter.  Moreover, 
Aquinas states at 18E that since existence is a principle distinguishable from form, there 
is nothing about the notion of form as such that requires it to have existence only through 
actualization of matter. Thus, at 18F Aquinas remarks that forms without per se existence
requires actualization of matter, whereas a form with per se existence is not a 
hylomorphic composition itself, but is a composition of form and existence, such that 
form is in potency to receive existence. This is all consonant with EPSF and the 
Communicability of Being thesis (see p. 6-7, above). Moreover, Aquinas uses the form-
existence distinction to interpret Boethius’s quod est-quo est distinction, and to 
distinguish the soul (and other intellectual substances) from God. Again, this accords with
Aquinas’s analysis of the simplicity and composition of the soul in the Commentary on 
the Sentences (Chapter 2, p. 97-104).
ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit. Cum igitur anima sit 
quaedam forma per se subsistens, potest esse in ea compositio actus et potentiae, id 
est esse et quod est, non autem compositio materiae et formae (Questiones Disputate 
De Anima, 24.1.50-51.221-257).
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4.1.3  The Relationship between the Human Soul and Angels
In Question 7, Aquinas distinguishes intelligible substances based on the degree of their 
actuality and potentiality. The greater their actuality, the greater their likeness to God, 
who is a pure actuality. The human soul has pure intellectual potentiality, and so has a 
greater likeness to God than corporeal substances, but is distinguishable from other 
intellectual substances insofar as it depends on sensory activity to abstract intelligible 
species, and therefore must be essentially united to a body. Aquinas’s analysis mirrors the
account he presents in the Commentary on the Sentences, as well as the De Ente et 
Essentia. Aquinas writes:
(19A) In immaterial substances, the order of diverse grades of species is noted, 
not by a comparison to matter, which they do not have, but according to a 
comparison to the Prime Agent, which must be most perfect. Thus, the first 
species is more perfect than the second, to the extent that it is more similar to the 
Prime Agent. And the second is less than the perfection of the first species, and so
on until the last of them. (19B) However, the highest perfection of the Prime 
Agent consists in that He has every kind of goodness and perfection in one simple
thing. Thus the nearer an immaterial substance will have been to the Prime Agent,
the more it has more perfect goodness in its own simple nature, and the less it 
requires inherint forms for its perfection. (19C) This is produced gradually down 
to the human soul, which occupies the lowest grade [in theses intellectual 
substances], just as prime matter in the genus of sensible things. (19D) Hence, 
[the soul] does not have intelligible perfections in its own nature, but is in potency
to intelligibles, just as prime matter is to sensible forms. (19E) Hence, to perform 
its proper operation, it needs to be made in act from intelligible forms, by 
acquiring them through its sensory powers from external things. (19F) And since 
the sense operation is through a bodily organ, from the condition of its own nature
it belongs to it that a body is united to it  and that it is part of the human species, 
not having a complete species in itself (Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, Q 7, 
c.o.).100
100 In substantiis vero immaterialibus ordo graduum diversarum specierum 
attenditur, non quidem secundum comparationem ad materiam, quam non habent, sed 
secundum comparationem ad primum agens, quod oportet esse perfectissimum. Et 
ideo prima species in eis est perfectior secunda, utpote similior primo agenti; et 
secunda diminuitur a perfectione primae et sic deinceps usque ad ultimam earum. 
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In the Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas had argued that the order of created 
substances depends on their proximity and likeness to God, who is a pure actuality (see 
Chapter 3, p. 100). Aquinas uses this similar reasoning in the De Ente et Essentia 
(Chapter 3, p. 115-125). Likewise, at 19A-B, Aquinas maintains that intelligible 
substances occupy a closer proximity to God based on the actualization of their 
intellectual nature. Since the human soul is in complete potential to understand, it 
occupies the lowest place within the genus of intelligible substances, as Aquinas states at 
19C. But a pure potential  for intellectual act requires receiving something from outside 
of it in order to be in act, and consequently, Aquinas thinks that the human soul depends 
on receiving intelligible species through abstraction from sensible forms, as he argues at 
19D-E. Since the soul needs sensation and, ipso facto, a body, it is therefore unique 
among intellectual substances since it must be united to a body to fulfill its intellectual 
nature, which Aquinas concludes at 19F. 
We have seen that Aquinas’s position concerning the hierarchy of intelligible 
substances and the place of the human soul in that hierarchy is founded on Averroes’s 
reasoning in the Long Commentary on De Anima. Since Aquinas is effectively restating 
Summa autem perfectio primi agentis in hoc consistit, quod in uno simplici habet 
omnimodam bonitatem et perfectionem. Unde quanto aliqua substantia immaterialis 
fuerit primo agenti propinquior, tanto in sua natura simplici perfectiorem habet 
bonitatem suam et minus indiget inhaerentibus formis ad sui completionem. Et hoc 
quidem gradatim producitur usque ad animam humanam, quae in eis tenet ultimum 
gradum, sicut materia prima in genere rerum sensibilium; unde in sui natura non habet
perfectiones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad 
formas sensibiles. Unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum 
intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum 
operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione suae naturae competit ei
quod corpori uniatur, et quod sit pars speciei humanae, non habens in se speciem 
completam. (Questiones Disputate De Anima, 24.1.60.293-321).
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the same reasoning in Question 7 as that he had presented in previous works, we can 
conclude that his view in the Questiones Disputate de Anima continues this commitment 
to certain Averroeian principles.
4.2 The Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic Influence on Quaestiones Disputatae de 
Spiritualibus Creaturis
Although the Questiones Disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis is concerned 
principally with angelic substances, Aquinas nevertheless draws on incorporeal 
potentiality to argue against the universal hylomorphist thesis that all created substances 
are compositions of form and matter. Moreover, Aquinas uses the Communicability of 
Being thesis to argue that the human soul can be a spiritual substance (i.e., an intellectual 
being, possessing existence per se) and a form of the body.
4.2.1  Incorporeal Potentiality Precludes Intellectual Substances from Being 
Compositions
In the following passage, Aquinas argues that created spiritual substances possess 
a potentiality distinct in kind from the material potentiality of corporeal substances:
(20A) All spiritual substances are intellectual. However, the potency of each 
individual thing is such as its perfection is found to be, for a proper act requires its
own proper potency. (20B) However, the perfection of any intellectual substance, 
insofar as it is of this sort, is intelligible insofar as it is in the intellect. (20C) 
Therefore, it is necessary that such a potency in spiritual substances is 
proportionate to the reception of an intelligible form. (20D) However, the potency
of prime matter is not of this type, for prime matter receives form by contracting it
to individual existence. (20E) But an intelligible form is in the intellect without a 
contraction; for in this way the intellect understands any given intelligible insofar 
as its form is in it. (20F) However, the intellect understands the intelligible chiefly
according to a common and universal nature, and thus the intelligible form is in 
the intellect according to nature of its own commonality. (20G) Therefore, an 
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intellectual substance is not made receptive of form by reason of prime matter, but
rather through some opposite nature. (20H) Thus, it comes to be manifest that in 
spiritual substances prime matter, which of itself is free of all species, cannot be a 
part of it (Quaestiones Disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis, A 1, c.o.).101
At 20A, Aquinas draws on the notion that all spiritual substances have an intellectual 
perfection, followed by a statement that a potency is perfected by its proper act. At 20B, 
Aquinas states the already familiar notion that intellectual substances are perfected by 
receptivity of intelligible perfection, and thus the potentiality of intellectual substances 
must be appropriate to its proper act. Aquinas’s reasoning at 20D-G parallels his 
argument against universal hylomorphism in the De Ente et Essentia (Chapter 3, p. 110-
115), but more strongly follows Averroes’s position that intellectual potentiality is its own
category of incorporeal passivity because intellectual potency receives universal form, it 
cannot be in the same category as prime matter, which receives form under 
particularizing conditions. It should be helpful to compare the passages, side-by-side:
101 Omnes enim spirituales substantiae intellectuales sunt. Talis autem est 
uniuscuiusque rei potentia, qualis reperitur perfectio eius; nam proprius actus 
propriam potentiam requirit: perfectio autem cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae, in 
quantum huiusmodi, est intelligibile prout est in intellectu. Talem igitur potentiam 
oportet in substantiis spiritualibus requirere, quae sit proportionata ad susceptionem 
formae intelligibilis. Huiusmodi autem non est potentia materiae primae: nam materia
prima recipit formam contrahendo ipsam ad esse individuale; forma vero intelligibilis 
est in intellectu absque huiusmodi contractione. Sic enim intelligit intellectus 
unumquodque intelligibile, secundum quod forma eius est in eo. Intelligit autem 
intellectus intelligibile praecipue secundum naturam communem et universalem; et 
sic forma intelligibilis in intellectu est secundum rationem suae communitatis. Non 
est ergo substantia intellectualis receptiva formae ex ratione materiae primae, sed 
magis per oppositam quamdam rationem. Unde manifestum fit quod in substantiis 
spiritualibus illa prima materia quae de se omni specie caret, eius pars esse non potest 
(Questiones Disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis, 24.2.13.333-356).
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20D) Now the potency of prime matter is 
not of this [intellectual] type, for prime 
matter receives form by contracting it to be
individual. 
(20E) But an intelligible form is in the 
intellect without any type of contraction; 
for thus the intellect understands each 
intelligible as its form is in it. 
(20F) Now the intellect understands the 
intelligible according to a common and 
universal nature, and thus the intelligible 
form is in the intellect according to reason 
of its own commonality. 
(20G) Therefore, an intellectual substance 
is not made receptive of form by reason of 
prime matter, but  moreso through a 
character which is the opposite.
(3C) The reason why that nature {of 
material intellect} is something which 
discerns and knows
while prime matter neither knows nor 
discerns, is because prime matter receives 
diverse forms, namely, individual and 
particular forms, while this [nature] 
receives universal forms. 
(3D) From this it is apparent that this 
nature is not a determinate particular nor a 
body nor a power in a body. For if it were 
so, then it would receive forms inasmuch 
as they are diverse and particular…  
(3E) For this reason, if that nature which is 
called intellect receives forms, it must 
receive forms by a mode of reception other 
than that by which those matters receive 
the forms whose contraction by matter is 
the determination of prime matter in them. 
(3F) For this reason it is not necessary that 
it be of the genus of those matters in which 
the form is included, nor that it be prime 
matter itself.
At 20D, Aquinas denies that the intellectual potency is in the same category as prime 
matter, because the latter involves contraction of the form in the individual. Averroes uses
precisely this language of contraction of form as well, at 3E. Moreover, at 20F Aquinas 
maintains that the mark of intellectual receptivity that distinguishes it from the receptivity
in prime matter is due to the form being  understood as “common and universal,” which 
is precisely the basis that Averroes presents at 3C. Finally, Aquinas (at 20G) and Averroes
(at 3F) both draw the conclusion that prime matter and the receptivity of intellectual 
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substances are opposing categories of receptivity. In light of the above parallels between 
Aquinas’s and Averroes’s reasoning, it should be clear that Aquinas's rejection of the 
universal hylormorphist view that prime matter extends to spiritual substances at 20H is 
based on Averroes’s conception of incorporeal potentiality as the determinate 
characteristic of intellectual substances.102
102 Aquinas presents nearly the same reasoning in a long passage in the De 
Substantiis Separatis, which is worth citing in full:
Since it is an inherent property of matter to receive insofar as it is of this sort, if 
the matter of spiritual and corporeal substances were the same, then it is necessary
that the mode of reception is the same for both. Yet the matter of corporeal things 
receives the form in a particular way, that is, not according to the common nature 
of form. Nor does corporeal matter have this insofar as it is subject to dimensions 
or corporeal form, because corporeal matter also receives the corporeal form itself
individually. Thus it is manifest that this belongs to such matter from the very 
nature of matter, which receives form in the weakest way, because it is the lowest 
[reality]. For reception is produced according to the mode of the recipient. In 
virtue of this, it especially falls short of complete reception of form according to 
the totality itself by receiving it in a particular way. Now it is manifest that every 
intellectual substance receives the intelligible form according to its totality, or 
otherwise it would not be able to know it in its totality. For it is thus that the 
intellect understands a thing insofar as the form of that thing exists in it. It 
remains therefore that if there be some matter in spiritual substances, it is not the 
same as the matter of corporeal things, but much more exalted and sublime, so 
that it receives form according to its totality. 
In virtue of the preceding considerations above, it comes to be manifest 
that to the extent that something is higher among beings to the extent that it has a 
greater share in the nature of existence. However, it is manifest that since being is 
divided by potency and act, act is more perfect than potency and has more of the 
nature of existence. For we do not say simply that which is in potency is existing, 
but only that which is an act. Therefore, it is necessary that what is higher among 
beings is more close to act, however that which is lowest among beings, is nearer 
potency. Therefore, since the matter of spiritual substances is not able to be the 
same as corporeal matter, but is much higher as has been shown, it is necessary 
that it is far distant from corporeal matter according to the difference of potency 
and act.
According to the opinion of Aristotle and Plato, corporeal matter is pure 
potency. Therefore, it remains that the matter of spiritual substances is not pure 
potency but is something being in act, existing in potency. I do not say, however, 
“being in act” as if  it were a composition of act and potency, because either it 
would proceed to infinity or it would be necessary to arrive at something that 
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4.2.2  The Existential Unity of Soul and Body
In addition to using the reality of incorporeal potentiality to reject universal 
hylomorphism, Aquinas also draws on the incorporeal potentiality possessed by the 
human soul to maintain that it is unique among spiritual substances insofar as it must 
would be a being only in potency. Since it is the last among beings, and 
consequently, is not able to receive except weakly and particularly, it is not able to
be the prime matter of a spiritual and intellectual substance.  It remains therefore 
that the matter of a spiritual substance is a being in act, such that it is act or 
subsisting form, just as the matter of corporeal things is called a being in potency 
because it is the very potency which is subject to forms (De Separatis Substantiis 
Separatis, Ch 7).
Cum recipere sit proprium materiae inquantum huiusmodi, si sit eadem 
materia spiritualium et corporalium substantiarum, oportet quod in utrisque sit 
idem receptionis modus. Materia autem corporalium rerum suscipit formam 
particulariter, idest non secundum communem rationem formae. Nec hoc habet 
materia corporalis inquantum dimensionibus subiicitur aut formae corporali, quia 
etiam ipsam formam corporalem individualiter materia corporalis recipit. Unde 
manifestum fit quod hoc convenit tali materiae, ex ipsa natura materiae, quae quia
est infima, debilissimo modo recipit formam: fit enim receptio secundum modum 
recipientis. Et per hoc maxime deficit a completa receptione formae, quae est 
secundum totalitatem ipsius particulariter ipsam recipiens. Manifestum est autem 
quod omnis substantia intellectualis recipit formam intellectam secundum suam 
totalitatem; alioquin eam in sua totalitate intelligere non valeret. Sic enim 
intellectus intelligit rem secundum quod forma eius in ipso existit. Relinquitur 
igitur quod materia, si qua sit in spiritualibus substantiis, non est eadem cum 
materia corporalium rerum, sed multo altior et sublimior, utpote recipiens formam
secundum eius totalitatem.
Adhuc ultra procedentibus manifestum fit quod tanto aliquid in entibus est 
altius, quanto magis habet de ratione essendi. Manifestum est autem quod cum 
ens per potentiam et actum dividatur, quod actus est potentia perfectior, et magis 
habet de ratione essendi: non enim simpliciter esse dicimus quod est in potentia, 
sed solum quod est actu. Oportet igitur id quod est superius in entibus, magis 
accedere ad actum; quod autem est in entibus infimum, propinquius esse 
potentiae. Quia igitur materia spiritualium substantiarum non potest esse eadem 
cum corporalium materia, sed longe altior, ut ostensum est; necesse est ut longe 
distet a corporalium materia, secundum differentiam potentiae et actus. 
Corporalium autem materia est potentia pura, secundum sententiam 
Aristotelis et Platonis. Relinquitur igitur quod materia substantiarum spiritualium 
non sit potentia pura, sed sit aliquid ens actu, in potentia existens. Non autem sic 
171
“touch” a body for fulfillment of its potentiality. The human soul has per se existence, 
like other spiritual substance. However, unlike spiritual substances, its touching the body 
consists in its being related to the body as a form. Aquinas again draws on the 
Communicability of Being thesis to explain how the soul can be both a subsistent 
substance and a substantial form:
(21A) The most perfect of forms, namely, the human soul, which is the end of all 
natural forms, has an operation exceeding all matter, which does not take place 
through a corporeal organ; namely, to understand. (21B) And because the 
existence of a thing is proportioned to its operation, as has been said, since 
something operates according as it is a being, it is necessary that the existence of 
the human soul exceeds corporeal matter, and is not totally comprehended by it, 
but nevertheless in some way is touched by it. (21C) Thus, insofar as it surpasses 
the existence of corporeal matter, having the power to subsist and to operate per 
se, the human soul is a spiritual substance; but inasmuch as it is touched by matter
and shares its own existence to it, it is the form of the body. (21D) It is touched by
corporeal matter for the reason that the highest point of the lowest order always 
touches the lowest point of the highest, as Dionysius makes clear in De Divinis 
Nominibus 7. (21E) For this reason, the human soul, which is the lowest in the 
order of spiritual substances, can share its own existence with the human body, 
which is the most dignified, such that from the soul and the body, as from form 
and matter, one thing results. (21F) But if a spiritual substance were a composed 
of matter and form, it would be impossible for it to be a bodily form because it is 
the nature of matter that it is not in another, but that it is itself the first subject 
(Questiones Disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis).103 
dico ens actu, quasi ex potentia et actu compositum; quia vel esset procedere in 
infinitum, vel oporteret venire ad aliquid quod esset ens in potentia tantum: quod 
cum sit ultimum in entibus, et per consequens non potens recipere nisi debiliter et 
particulariter, non potest esse prima materia spiritualis et intellectualis substantiae.
Relinquitur ergo quod spiritualis substantiae materia ita sit ens actu, quod sit actus
vel forma subsistens; sicut et materia corporalium rerum ita dicitur ens in 
potentia, quia est ipsa potentia formis subiecta (De Substantiis Separatis, 
40D.52.19-90).
103 Perfectissima autem formarum, id est anima humana, quae est finis omnium 
formarum naturalium, habet operationem omnino excedentem materiam, quae non fit 
per organum corporale, scilicet intelligere. Et quia esse rei proportionatur eius 
operationi, ut dictum est, cum unumquodque operetur secundum quod est ens; oportet
quod esse animae humanae superexcedat materiam corporalem, et non sit totaliter 
comprehensum ab ipsa, sed tamen aliquo modo attingatur ab ea. In quantum igitur 
supergreditur esse materiae corporalis, potens per se subsistere et operari, anima 
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At 21A, Aquinas states that the human soul is classified as a spiritual substance, since it 
has an intellectual operation. Consequently, the soul has per se existence, since the 
existence of a thing accords with its proper activity, as Aquinas remarks at 21B. However,
since the soul occupies the lowest place among intellectual species (see 21D), and is 
consequently in pure potentiality for reception of intelligible species (though Aquinas 
doesn’t say it explicitly in the passage), the actualization of its intellectual potential takes 
place through prior bodily operations, i.e. sensation. The human soul therefore must have 
an essential relationship to a body; that is, it must be related to the body as a form, as 
Aquinas states at 21C. However, since the soul has per se existence as a consequence of 
its intellectual nature, the Communicability of Being thesis applies, i.e. the human soul 
causes the human being to exist by giving existence to the body. Aquinas is therefore 
drawing on the Communicability of Being thesis and the incorporeal potentiality 
possessed by by the human soul to explain its unique ontological role, and his 
explanation is consistent with his employment of these principles in earlier works.
humana est substantia spiritualis; in quantum vero attingitur a materia, et esse suum 
communicat illi, est corporis forma. Attingitur autem a materia corporali ea ratione 
quod semper supremum infimi ordinis attingit infimum supremi, ut patet per 
Dionysium VII cap. de Divin. Nomin.; et ideo anima humana quae est infima in 
ordine substantiarum spiritualium, esse suum communicare potest corpori humano, 
quod est dignissimum, ut fiat ex anima et corpore unum sicut ex forma et materia. Si 
vero substantia spiritualis esset composita ex materia et forma, impossibile esset quod
esset forma corporalis: quia de ratione materiae est quod non sit in alio, sed quod ipsa 
sit primum subiectum. (Questiones Disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis, 24.2.29-
30.296-322).
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4.3  The Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic Influence on the Commentary on De Anima
In several places in the Commentary on De Anima, Aquinas’s uses the 
Communicability of Being thesis, the form-essence distinction, and incorporeal 
potentiality of intellectual substances respectively to interpret aspects of Aristotle’s theory
of the soul. This provides evidence that Aquinas’s perspective on Aristotle’s 
hylormorphism and the ontological status of the soul was influenced by Arabic-Islamic 
and Neoplatonic thought.
4.3.1  The Communicability of Being Doctrine & The Form-Essence Distinction
Aquinas’s comments on De Anima Book 2, Chapter 1 distinguish between 
hylomorphic substances, separate intellectual substances, and the human soul by drawing 
on the sense in which each are determinate particulars. In doing so, Aquinas repeats his 
commitment to the view that the human soul is a subsistent substance despite belonging 
to a nature that orders it to matter as a substantial form:
(23A) Matter is that which is not as such a determinate particular, but is only in 
potency to be a determinate particular. However, form is that according to which a
determinate particular is in act. But the composite substance is that which is a 
determinate particular. For that is said to be a determinate particular, which is 
complete in existence and in species. This only pertains to the composite in 
material things. (23B) For although separate substances are not compounds of 
matter and form, nevertheless they are a determinate particular, since they are 
subsisting in act and complete in their own nature. (23C) However, the rational 
soul, can be called a determinate particular to the extent that it can be subsisting 
per se. Yet because it does not have a complete species, but is more a part of a 
species, “determinate particular” does not altogether belong to it. (Commentary 
on De Anima, Book 2, Chapter 1, Lecture 1).104
104 Materia quidem est, quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in potentia 
tantum ut sit hoc aliquid. Forma autem est, secundum quam iam est hoc aliquid in 
actu. Substantia vero composita est, quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc 
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At 23A, we see Aquinas again present the conception of hylomorphic substance that he 
first presented in the De Principiis Naturae: whereas matter is nothing more than the 
potentiality to become a determinate particular, form causes matter to have actual 
existence,105 which is the existence of the composite substance. By contrast separate 
intellectual substances are determinate particulars without having a composition of form 
and matter. Rather, they have are subsistent substances and are complete in their nature, 
as Aquinas remarks at 23B. Finally, at 23C, Aquinas contrasts the human soul with both 
hylomorphic and separate intellectual substances by maintaining that it’s shares 
characteristics in common with both hylomorphic and intellectual substances. On the one 
hand, the soul has per se existence, like the separate intellectual substances, and so can be
called a determinate particular. Nevertheless, attributing determinate particularity to the 
aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie; et hoc 
convenit soli substantiae compositae in rebus materialibus. Nam substantiae 
separatae, quamvis non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sunt tamen hoc aliquid, 
cum sint subsistens in actu et completae in natura sua. Anima autem rationalis, 
quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se 
subsistens. Sed quia non habet speciem completam, sed magis est pars speciei, non 
omnino convenit ei quod sit hoc aliquid (Commentary on De Anima, 45.69.98-113).
105 Also see Aquinas’s comments later on in Commentary on De Anima, Book 2, 
Chapter 1, Lecture 1: 
It should be known that the difference between accidental form and substantial 
form is that accidental form does not make a being act simply speaking, but only 
makes a being act in such and such way (for example, as large or white or 
something else of this sort). However, the substantial form gives it existence, 
simply speaking. Thus, the accidental form comes to occur in a subject preexisting
in act. However, the substantial form does not require a subject preexisting in act, 
but something existing in potency already, namely prime matter. //  Sciendum 
autem est quod haec est differentia formae substantialis ad formam accidentalem, 
quod forma accidentalis non facit ens actu simpliciter, sed ens actu tale vel 
tantum, ut puta magnum vel album vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Forma autem 
substantialis facit esse actu simpliciter. Unde forma accidentalis advenit subiecto 
iam praeexistenti actu. Forma autem substantialis non advenit subiecto iam 
praeexistenti in actu, sed existenti in potentia tantum, scilicet materiae primae.  
(Commentary on De Anima, 45.71.242-251)
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soul must be qualified due to its being only part of a complete nature. In light of previous 
passages, one an infer here that Aquinas means that the soul belongs to a hylomorphic 
essence, and is consequently a forma partis (in accord with the form-essence distinction 
and Avicennian hylomorphism), which communicates its existence to the body (in accord 
with the Communicability of Being thesis). 
4.3.2  Incorporeal Potentiality
Aquinas’s comments on De Anima Book 2, Chapters 3 and 5 categorize 
receptivity of form into three distinct kinds of potencies - material, sensible, and 
intellectual – drawing on distinctions and reasoning that correspond with Averroes’s 
argument for the reality of incorporeal potentiality. In Aquinas’s comments on Chapter 3, 
he writes:
(24A) Every potency is so called in relation to a proper act, and an operative 
potency is so called in relation to an act that is its operation. The potencies of the 
soul are operative, for [the soul] is such that it is potency for form. Thus it is 
necessary that the diversity of potencies correspond to the diverse operations of 
the soul. The operation of the soul is an operation of a living thing. (24B) Since, 
therefore, the proper operation of anything befits it according as it has existence, 
because everything is operating insofar  as it is a being, it is necessary to consider 
the operations of the soul according as it is found in living beings. The inferior 
living things of this sort whose act is the soul, which is now under discussion, 
have existence in two ways: one, material, in which they accord with other 
material things, and the other, immaterial, in which they somehow share in 
common with the superior substances. (24C) However, there is this difference 
between these two divisions of existence, because, insofar as it is material 
existence, which is contracted to matter, any given thing is only this which it is, 
just as this stone is nothing more than this stone. But according to immaterial 
existence, which is amplified and in some way infinite insofar as it is not 
restricted to matter, a thing is not only that which it is, but is in some way other 
things. Thus all things in some way are in the higher immaterial substances, as in 
universal causes. (24D) But such immaterial existence has two grades in these 
inferior beings. There is the complete immateriality, namely intelligible existence.
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For in the intellect things both exist without matter, and without individuating 
material conditions, and apart from a bodily organ. (24E) However, sensible being
is half way between the two. For in sensation the thing has existence without 
matter, but not without individuating material conditions, nor absent a bodily 
organ. (24F) For sensation is of particulars, but intellection is of universals. In 
reference to these two modes of existence, the philosopher says in Book 3 that the
soul is somehow all things. (Commentary on De Anima, Book 2, Chapter 3, 
Lecture 5).106
At 24A, Aquinas argues that the operative potencies of the soul are distinguishable by 
examination of the soul’s activities, because potencies are determined by their proper 
acts. However, at 24B, Aquinas remarks that a consideration of activities consists in 
consideration of their mode of existence, of which there are two: either as en-mattered or 
as free from matter. At 24C, Aquinas highlights the difference between the two modes of 
existence: en-mattered acts are restricted and particularized, whereas immaterial acts are 
106 Omnis potentia dicatur ad actum proprium, potentia operativa dicitur ad actum 
qui est operatio. Potentiae autem animae sunt operativae, talis enim est potentia 
formae; unde necesse est secundum diversas operationes animae, accipi diversitatem 
potentiarum. Operatio autem animae, est operatio rei viventis. Cum igitur unicuique 
rei competat propria operatio, secundum quod habet esse, eo quod unumquodque 
operatur inquantum est ens: oportet operationes animae considerare, secundum quod 
invenitur in viventibus. Huiusmodi autem viventia inferiora, quorum actus est anima, 
de qua nunc agitur, habent duplex esse. Unum quidem materiale, in quo conveniunt 
cum aliis rebus materialibus. Aliud autem immateriale, in quo communicant cum 
substantiis superioribus aliqualiter. Est autem differentia inter utrumque esse: quia 
secundum esse materiale, quod est per materiam contractum, unaquaeque res est hoc 
solum quod est, sicut hic lapis, non est aliud quam hic lapis: secundum vero esse 
immateriale, quod est amplum, et quodammodo infinitum, inquantum non est per 
materiam terminatum, res non solum est id quod est, sed etiam est quodammodo alia. 
Unde in substantiis superioribus immaterialibus sunt quodammodo omnia, sicut in 
universalibus causis. Huiusmodi autem immateriale esse, habet duos gradus in istis 
inferioribus. Nam quoddam est penitus immateriale, scilicet esse intelligibile. In 
intellectu enim res habent esse, et sine materia, et sine conditionibus materialibus 
individuantibus, et etiam absque organo corporali. Esse autem sensibile est medium 
inter utrumque. Nam in sensu res habet esse sine materia, non tamen absque 
conditionibus materialibus individuantibus, neque absque organo corporali. Est enim 
sensus particularium, intellectus vero universalium. Et quantum ad hoc duplex esse, 
dicit philosophus in tertio huius, quod anima est quodammodo omnia (Commentary 
on De Anima, 45.88.44-83).
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universal in character. Aquinas’s correlation of materiality-particularity and 
immateriality-universality corresponds directly with Averroes’s characterization of the 
difference between form received in prime matter vs form received in the potential 
intellect in the Long Commentary on De Anima. It will be helpful once again to cite the 
pertinent passage in the Long Commentary: “(3C) The reason why that nature {of 
material intellect} is something which discerns and knows while prime matter neither 
knows nor discerns, is because prime matter receives diverse forms, namely, individual 
and particular forms, while this [nature] receives universal forms. (Chapter 2, p. 61-62).” 
Aquinas’s remark at 24C has therefore effectively reduced Aristotle’s distinction of the 
potencies of soul to Averroes’s distinction between form as particularized and form as 
universal. Since form received in prime matter is particularized and form received in 
intellect is universal, Aquinas follows Averroes in drawing the conclusion that material 
and immaterial receptivity belong to distinct categories, as his remarks at 24F illustrate. 
Aquinas’s concern in Chapter 3 is with explicating Aristotle’s account of 
sensation, so he distinguishes intellection and sensation based on their degree of 
immateriality. Since intellectual acts exist without matter and, consequently, do not 
operate through a bodily organ, any intellectual potency must receive form in a universal 
manner, as Aquinas states at 24D. By contrast, at 24E, Aquinas argues that sensation is 
immaterial in the sense that its sensory events involve receptivity of form without that 
form determining prime matter so as to constitute a determinate particular. Yet its 
immateriality is qualified insofar as sensory events involve bodily organs and insofar as 
the form received still carries with it particularizing conditions. Aquinas’s distinction 
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between material, sensory, and intellectual receptivity therefore depends on Averroes’s 
distinction of the particularity or universality involved in the receptivity of form.107
107 Aquinas’s reasoning in his commentary on De Anima, Book 2, Chapter 
5 draws the same distinction between sensory and intellectual receptivity as 
Chapter 3, though he provides different reasoning:
The sense is a power in a bodily organ. The intellect is an immaterial power, 
which is not the act of some bodily organ. Now, whatever is received in 
something is through the mode of [the recipient]. But cognition is produced by the
fact that the cognized is in some way in the cognizer, namely, according to 
similitude. Now what cognizes in act is itself the cognized in act. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the sense power receives a similitude of that thing sensed in a 
corporeal and material way. However, the intellect receives a similitude of that 
which is understood in an incorporeal and immaterial way. Now the individuation 
of common nature in corporeal and material things is from corporeal matter, 
contained under determinate dimensions. Yet the universal is through abstraction 
from such matter and individuating material conditions. Therefore, it is manifest 
that the similitude of a received thing in sense represents the thing insofar as it is 
singular; however, the received thing in intellect, represents the thing according to
a universal nature. That is why sense cognizes singulars, and intellect cognizes 
universals, and the sciences are about these [universals]. (Commentary on De 
Anima, Book 2, Chapter 5, Lecture 12).  // Sensus est virtus in organo corporali; 
intellectus vero est virtus immaterialis, quae non est actus alicuius organi 
corporalis. Unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. Cognitio 
autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet 
secundum similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu, est ipsum cognitum in actu. 
Oportet igitur quod sensus corporaliter et materialiter recipiat similitudinem rei 
quae sentitur. Intellectus autem recipit similitudinem eius quod intelligitur, 
incorporaliter et immaterialiter. Individuatio autem naturae communis in rebus 
corporalibus et materialibus, est ex materia corporali, sub determinatis 
dimensionibus contenta: universale autem est per abstractionem ab huiusmodi 
materia, et materialibus conditionibus individuantibus. Manifestum est igitur, 
quod similitudo rei recepta in sensu repraesentat rem secundum quod est 
singularis; recepta autem in intellectu, repraesentat rem secundum rationem 
universalis naturae: et inde est, quod sensus cognoscit singularia, intellectus vero 
universalia, et horum sunt scientiae. (Commentary on De Anima, 45.115.72-94).
The operative principle in the above passage is “whatever is received in something is 
through the mode of the recipient,” which Aquinas appears to have developed from 
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4.4 The Form/Essence Distinction in Aquinas's Commentary on the Metaphysics108
As with Aquinas's consideration of the form-essence distinction in Chapter 2 of 
De Ente et Essentia, Book 7, Lecture 9 in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics 
provides strong evidence that Aquinas understood both the Aristotelian and Avicennian 
his study of the Liber De Causis (See: Aquinas 1996, p. xxvi; p. 74, n. 1): Since form 
received in the senses is particularized in some way and particularization implies 
materiality and corporeality, sensory receptivity must involve matter and the body. By
contrast, the form received in the intellect is universal and, consequently immaterial. 
Therefore, since the recipient determines the mode of existence of the form received, 
the intellect must be free of all matter and corporeality. 
The conclusion that Aquinas draws in the above passage – i.e. the sense capacity is a 
bodily act and the intellectual capacity is an immaterial act -  is the same as 
Averroes’s conclusion in text 3A-H (see Chapter 2, p. 61-62). Though it is beyond the
scope of the presentation, it is worth noting that the basis for Aquinas’s conclusion is 
that the particularity or universality of form is explained in terms of the potentiality 
that it is received into, whereas Averroes’s conclusion hinges on the Diversity Thesis 
(see Chapter 2, p. 64-65), which requires that a potentiality receives its nature from 
the form it receives, and therefore is either particular-corporeal or universal-
incorporeal on account of form. Deborah Black has noted that in Averroes’s mature 
works, he explicitly rejects the notion that the particularity or universality of form 
could be explained by appeal to its recipient, since such an appeal would violate the 
Aristotelian commitment to the priority of form/act over matter/potency. Black 
writes:
Averroes explicitly rejects his earlier assumption that we can explain intentional 
being simply by appealing to the special nature of the patient receiving the 
intention. That account of intentionality was based on the principle that a mere 
difference in the nature of the recipient is sufficient to account for a difference in 
the nature of the reception itself. Averroes, then, is effectively rejecting the maxim
that ―whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. To 
attribute the uniqueness of intentional change to the peculiar nature of the 
recipient—whether the recipient is viewed as soul-in-general (as in the Epitome), 
spiritual matter, or some particular type of soul (sense versus intellect)—is to 
reverse the order of priority between form and matter. Matter is for the sake of 
form, and form has explanatory and causal priority within an Aristotelian 
framework (Black 2011, p. 173).
It may be possible that Aquinas had read Averroes’s Diversity Thesis in text 3A-H as an
expression that “whatever is received in something is through the mode of the recipient,”
but this possibility and the difference between the two principles is the subject of another
study. 
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positions concerning the form-essence distinction, and that he continued to opt for the 
Avicennian position in his late works. Aquinas begins his discussion on the form-essence 
relation with a consideration of form-essence identity:
(26A) There are two opinions concerning the definition of things and their 
essences. Some say that the total essence of a species is form itself; for instance 
the total essence of a human is his soul. (26B) And because of this they claim that 
according to reality (secundum rem) the form of the whole (forma totius), which 
is signified by the word humanity, is the same as the form of the part (forma 
partis), which is signified by the word soul, but that they differ only according to 
reason (secundum rationem). (26C) For the form of the part is called such insofar 
as it perfects matter and makes it to be in act; however; the form of the whole is 
called such insofar as it gathers in virtue of itself the whole composite [which is 
included] in its species. (26D) And from this they hold that no material parts are 
given in the definition which indicates species, but only the formal principles of 
the species (Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book 7, Lecture 9).109
Aquinas's depiction of this “first opinion” aligns well with the elements of Aristotelian 
Hylomorphism1  presented in Chapter 2 (p. 37). Specifically, 26A and 26B express the 
form/essence identity thesis in the technical terminology of forma partis and forma totius,
the meanings of which are explained in 26C. And 26D indicates, as mentioned in the 
previous section, that a consequence of adopting the form/essence identity thesis is that 
essential definitions of sensible substances are taken to signify form without reference to 
matter. 
108 The Latin text for all Commentary on the Metaphysics citations are from the 
Marietti edition, Aquinas 1935.
109 Quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum essentias duplex est opinio. Quidam 
enim dicunt, quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia 
hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt, quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius
quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine 
animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum 
quod perficit materiam, et facit eam esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod
totum compositum per eam in specie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt, quod nullae partes 
materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia 
speciei (Aquinas 1935, 1467, p. 358).
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Despite the first option having a strong match with Aristotle's own remarks 
regarding the relationship between form and essence, Aquinas argues against it, claiming 
that Aristotle could not have maintained a form/essence identity thesis, since natural 
substances would then be indistinguishable from mathematical objects. Aquinas writes,
But this [first option] seems to be contrary to the intention of Aristotle. For he 
says in Book 6 that natural things have sensible matter in their own definition, and
in this they differ from mathematical [objects]. Now it cannot be said that natural 
substances are defined through that which does not pertain to their essence. For 
substances do not have definition from addition; only accidents have this. Thus, it 
follows that sensible matter is part of the essence of natural substances, not only 
insofar as it pertains to individuals, but also insofar as it pertains to species. For 
definitions are given to species, not individuals. (Commentary on the 
Metaphysics, Book 7, Lecture 9)110
As we have seen, this is opposed to remarks by Aristotle that clearly propose that form 
and essence are identical in sensible substances. A full account of the minor puzzle that 
Aquinas raises here is beyond the scope of the present project.111 For our current 
purposes, it should suffice to note that Aquinas rejects the form-essence identity thesis 
and its corollary framework for hylomorphism because he thinks it doesn't square away 
with other aspects of Aristotle's thought. Instead, Aquinas endorses (both for himself and 
for Aristotle) the Avicennian interpretation of the form/essence relation and the 
hylomorphic framework it implies.
110 Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim superius in sexto, 
quod res naturales habent in sui definitione materiam sensibilem, et in hoc differunt a
mathematicis. Non autem potest dici, quod substantiae naturales definiantur per id 
quod non sit de essentia earum. Substantiae enim non habent definitionem ex 
additione, sed sola accidentia, ut supra est habitum. Unde relinquitur quod materia 
sensibilis sit pars essentiae substantiarum naturalium, non solum quantum ad 
individua, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsas. Definitiones enim non dantur de 
individuis, sed de speciebus (Aquinas 1935, 1468, p. 358).
111 For discussion of Aquinas's argument that the form/essence distinction is 
Aristotle's position, see Galluzzo 2007, p. 456-61. For discussion on the difference 
between Aquinas's gloss on Aristotle and Aristotle's position, see Maurer 1951.
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Hence there is the other opinion, which Avicenna follows. According to this 
position the form of the whole, which is the quiddity of the species, differs from 
the form of the part just as the whole differs from its part; for the quiddity of a 
species is composed from matter and form, but not from this individual matter and
this individual form. It is an individual, such as Socrates or Callias, that is 
composed of these. This is the position of Aristotle in this chapter (Commentary 
on the Metaphysics, Book 7, Lecture 9).112 
Again, as with the selection from the De Ente, Aquinas has faithfully presented 
Avicenna's hylomorphic model and claimed it as his own. 
4.5 The Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic Influence on the Summa Theologiae
In the Summa Theolgiae, Aquinas continues to utilize the form/essence 
distinction, Communicability of Being thesis, incorporeal potentiality, and the hierarchy 
of intelligible substances to account for the ontology of the human soul. Just as in his 
earlier works and in the Questiones Disputate De Anima, Aquinas often does so in the 
context of replies to objections that express a traditional Aristotelian position. This 
provides Aquinas the opportunity to contrast his position with an Aristotelian position that
would preclude that the soul can be both a substantial form and a subsistent intellectual 
substance. Moreover, it illustrates Aquinas’s commitment to principles from Arabic-
Islamic and Neoplatonic sources, which allow him to develop his contrasting thesis.
112 Unde est alia opinio, quam sequitur Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma totius,
quae est ipsa quidditas speciei, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam 
quidditas speciei, est composita ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex 
hac materia individua. Ex his enim componitur individuum, ut Socrates et Callias. Et
haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo (Aquinas 1935,1469,,p.358-359).
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4.5.1  The Form-Essence Distinction
The following section highlights two passages in the Summa Theologiae in which 
Aquinas indirectly implies the form-essence distinction in his response to objections that 
the soul cannot be both a subsistent substance and also be related to a body by its essence.
4.5.1.1  The Hand-Soul Analogy
Aquinas entertains a plethora of objections to his depiction of human nature in the
Summa Theologiae. One of the most common draws on the Aristotelian hylomorphic 
framework to claim that being a substantial form and being a simple substance are 
mutually exclusive: since the existence of a substantial form is derivative upon its being a
constituent part of a determinate particular hylomorphic composition, substantial form 
will simply cease to be once the composition dissolves.113 Recall that Aristotelian 
hylomorphism1 states that for any sensible substance it is a composition of matter and 
form, it is what it is by way of its essence, and its essence is its form. There is no 
principle separate from form which determines the hoc aliquid to be, so when the hoc 
aliquid ceases to be, the ultimate principle of its being will have ceased to be. In contrast, 
if the hoc aliquid is a simple form, it will be self-constituted and so can exist indefinitely. 
But already being complete itself, it cannot enter into substantial union with another. Any 
sort of union it enjoys will have to be accidental. This is the sort of reasoning that appears
at Summa Theolgiae 1a, q. 75, a. 2, obj. 1:
113 These objections are essentially the same as those that Aquinas presented in 
his Commentary on the Sentences. See Chapter 2, p. 97-104.
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It seems that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which is 
subsistent is called a hoc aliquid. However, the soul is not a hoc aliquid, but [hoc 
aliquid] is composed from a soul and a body. Therefore, the soul is not subsistent 
(ST 1a, q. 75, a. 2, obj. 1).114 
By being limited to the framework of Aristotelian hylomorphism, the objection can only 
treat the soul as a substantial form of a subsistent composite being, which precludes at the
outset the position Aquinas wants to maintain. Yet Aquinas has the option of reasoning 
about the ontological status of the human soul within an Avicennian framework, and he 
makes use of this when he replies to the previously quoted objection. Aquinas states,
Hoc aliquid can be taken in two ways: (27A) one way, as anything which is 
subsistent; and the other way, as being complete in the nature of some species. 
(27B) The first way excludes the inherence of accidents or material forms; (27C) 
the second way excludes imperfection of a part as well. (27D) Thus, a hand can 
be called a hoc aliquid according to the first way, but not according to the second 
way. (27E) Therefore, since the human soul is a part of the human species, it can 
be called hoc aliquid according to the first way as subsisting, but not the second 
way, for in this way the composition of soul and body is called a hoc aliquid (ST 
1a, q. 75, a. 2, ad. 1).  115 
In 27A, Aquinas lays out two types of subsistence, one of which is supposed to apply 
generally to anything that can be called subsistent, while the other is limited to beings 
whose essential parts are in act. Let us call the former “general subsistence” and the latter
114 Videtur  quod  anima  humana  non  sit  aliquid  subsistens.  Quod  enim  est
subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex
anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens (Summa Theologiae, 5.196).
115 Hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente, 
alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit 
inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam 
imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non 
secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici 
hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim 
compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid (Summa Theologiae, 5.196).
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“essential subsistence.” 27B lays out the conditions under which a thing could not be said
to have general subsistence:
General Subsistence: For any being, it has general subsistence if and only if it is 
not a material form or it is not an accident.
Under the general sense of subsistent, parts which have esse, even if they are temporarily 
separated from the whole to which they belong, can be said to be hec aliqua. If such parts
belong to a whole that has the potential to be whole once again, they remain parts of some
greater essence. To the extent that the parts are separated from that whole, they can be 
said to subsist (i.e. they are existing on their own), but their existence will nevertheless be
incomplete so long as they remain separated. General subsistence includes essential 
subsistence as well, the conditions of which Aquinas lays out in 27C: 
Essential Subsistence: For any being, it has essential subsistence if and only if it 
has general subsistence and it has every perfection which completes its nature.
Thus, all beings with essential subsistence will have general subsistence and will be able 
to be called hec aliqua in the more general sense. But more properly, since they are 
beings which possess every part required to actualize their essence, they are hec aliqua in
the stronger sense of being a primary substance. The example at 27D attempts to make 
this clear: a hand might continue to exist for some time separated from a body while 
retaining the potentiality to be incorporated once again into the whole. It can be called a 
hoc aliquid because it is a part ordered to a greater whole, but it is not a being complete 
in its own nature and so is not called a hoc aliquid in the strict sense.116
116 For an alternative interpretation of Aquinas's hand example, see (Pasnau 
2002a, p. 229): “Aquinas is thinking of a hand as a bodily part plus the relevant 
portion of the soul -  the part of the soul that lets the hand function. The mere bodily 
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Until this point, the proponent of Aristotelian hylomorphism1 might not find 
anything to complain about in distinguishing between the general and essential senses of 
subsistence. The crux of Aquinas's argument, and, indeed, the point at which it becomes 
apparent that Aquinas is rejecting the framework that gave force to the objection, comes 
at 27E, where he states that the human soul is a part of (and not identical with) the human
nature or essence, such that when separated from the body the human soul is capable of 
being called a hoc aliquid in the first sense (because it subsists) but not in the second 
sense (because it is separated from those other parts that realize the essence to which it 
belongs). Calling the human soul a part in this way can only make sense within the 
framework of Avicennian hylomorphism. 
4.5.1.2  Bodily Resurrection
We have seen in the previous two chapters and in earlier sections of this chapter 
that Aristotelian Hylomorphism1 requires a substantial form be united to matter, and, 
further, that subsistent intellectual substances be treated as separate forms. This entails 
that the human soul could not be treated as both a substantial form and separate 
intellectual substance from the perspective of Aristotelian hylomorphism1, thereby 
part, severed from the soul, is not a hand at all, except in an equivocal sense. The 
hand can be called a particular thing, then, because it is neither an accident nor a 
material form. It is neither of these things, because it is not a form at all, but a 
subsistent part of a larger complete substance.” However, taken this way, the example 
fails as an analogy for understanding the human soul's subsistence. First, the human 
soul is a form which is part of the human being, whereas the hand is not; second, the 
human soul, unlike a hand, does not depend on another for its persistent subsistence. 
The analogy seems to work only if one considers the hand as a part which can exist on
its own (albeit, only temporarily), be incomplete in its nature when separated, and 
have the potentiality to be reincorporated into its complete nature.
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putting in jeopardy both the possibility for the continued existence of the soul after 
corruption of the body and the possibility of bodily resurrection. Aquinas therefore has an
incentive to oppose Aristotelian hylomorphism1, since he is theologically committed to 
both the immortality of the human soul and the doctrine of bodily resurrection.117 It 
should be unsurprising, then, to see Aquinas present an objection to the view that the 
human soul cannot be a substantial form, and ipso facto cannot have an essential 
relationship to matter, if it is a principle of intellectual activity. This would preclude the 
soul being united to a body as a form (i.e. if it is united to the body at all, it would be 
accidental), and therefore denies that there would be any reason to expect that the soul 
plays an essential role in resurrection of the body. Aquinas writes:
That which is in some thing according to itself is always in it. But to be united to 
matter belongs to form according to itself. For form is not united through 
something accidental, but through its own essence is the act of matter. Otherwise, 
composition from matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but 
accidentally. Therefore, a form is not able to be without proper matter. But the 
intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above, does not 
remain  united to the body when the body corrupts. Therefore, the intellectual 
principle is not united to the body as its form. (ST 1a, Q76, A1, arg. 6)118
Aquinas replies to this with an argument from analogy; just as, for instance, air has
a natural inclination to rise above water or earth when air is trapped below the 
117 It should be noted that the doctrine of bodily resurrection is a reasonable 
expectation in light of his conception of the ontology of the human soul and the 
teleological notion that things seek fulfill their nature. Aquinas’s philosophical 
commitments therefore do not simply provide a context for arguing that this article of 
faith is not contrary to reason, but also assigns precise conceptual content to it.
118 Id quod inest alicui rei secundum se, semper inest ei. Sed formae secundum se 
inest uniri materiae, non enim per accidens aliquod, sed per essentiam suam est actus 
materiae; alioquin ex materia et forma non fieret unum substantialiter, sed 
accidentaliter. Forma ergo non potest esse sine propria materia. Sed intellectivum 
principium, cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra ostensum est, remanet corpori non unitum,
corpore corrupto. Ergo intellectivum principium non unitur corpori ut forma. (Summa
Theologiae, 5.208).
188
surface, so also the human soul has a natural inclination to be united to the body 
when in a disembodied state:
To be united to the body belongs to the soul according to itself, just as it belongs 
to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains 
light, when removed from its proper place, nevertheless retaining an aptitude and 
an inclination to its proper place; so the human soul maintains existence in itself 
when made separate from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to
be united to the body (ST 1a, Q76, A1, ad. 6).119
What is noteworthy for our purposes is what Aquinas must presuppose in order for 
the analogy to work, viz., that the soul must be a part of a hylomorphic nature, 
even if it is a subsistent substance on account of being the principle of intellectual 
activity. As we have seen in the previous subsection and throughout the last two 
chapters, the notion that the soul is a part of a hylomorphic nature comes from 
Avicennian hylomorphism. Aquinas’s response thus signals a rejection of 
Aristotelian hylomorphism1 in a way that leaves open a reasonable expectation for 
bodily resurrection (i.e., the soul’s re-information of the matter to which it is 
essentially related).
4.5.2  Incorporeal Potentiality in Intellectual Substances
Just as Aquinas had argued for the reality of incorporeal potentiality and utilized 
incorporeal potentiality to critique universal hylomorphism, Aquinas continues to follow 
the same strategy in the Summa Theologiae. Aquinas follows essentially the same 
119 Secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se convenit 
corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus leve manet quidem leve cum a loco proprio 
fuerit separatum, cum aptitudine tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima 
humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et 
inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem. (Summa Theologiae, 5.210).
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Averroean strategy in the Summa Theologiae to establish incorporeal potentiality as its 
own category of being, distinct from material potentiality, material actuality, and 
immaterial actuality. Moreover, Aquinas continues to follow Averroes in distinguishing 
between intellectual substances based on the degree to which their incorporeal 
potentiality is actualized. Since the incorporeal potentiality of human intellect is in pure 
potential to receive intelligible species from sensible form, the human intellect is 
essentially related to the body, which allows Aquinas to reject a Platonic dualist account 
of the human soul despite maintaining that its intellectual nature requires it be a 
subsistent substance.
4.5.2.1 The Reality of Incorporeal Potentiality
There are several instances in the Summa Theolgiae in which Aquinas draws on 
the reality of incorporeal potentiality to establish the nature of intellectual creatures as 
non-hylomorphic, against universal hylomorphism. For instance, in the Treatise on 
Angels, Aquinas writes: 
The operation of each thing is according to the mode of its substance. However, to
understand is a completely immaterial operation. This is apparent from its object, 
by which any act receives its species and nature, since something is understood 
insofar as it is abstracted from matter, because forms in matter are individual 
forms, which the intellect does not apprehend in this way. Thus it is required that 
every intellectual substance is altogether immaterial. (ST 1a, Q50, A2, c.o.).120
120 Operatio enim cuiuslibet rei est secundum modum substantiae eius. Intelligere 
autem est operatio penitus immaterialis. Quod ex eius obiecto apparet, a quo actus 
quilibet recipit speciem et rationem, sic enim unumquodque intelligitur, inquantum a 
materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales formae, quas intellectus 
non apprehendit secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod omnis substantia 
intellectualis est omnino immaterialis (Summa Theolgiae 5.6).
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Aquinas’s reasoning in the above passage is consistent with the argument that we had 
seen Aquinas previously present in his Commentary on De Anima, and which closely 
follows the logic of Averroes’s Diversity Thesis in passage 3A-H: materiality implies 
particularity/individuation, and vice versa; intellectual understanding is an abstraction of 
form from its particularizing, individuated conditions (i.e., understanding requires 
universality of form); but universality, being the opposite of particularity, also implies the
opposite of materiality. Intellectual acts therefore must be immaterial, and belong to a 
category of beings distinct from hylomorphic compositions.
The previous passage highlights how intellectual creatures in general have an 
immaterial nature on account of their intellectual act. Aquinas addresses that this 
specifically applies to the human soul in his Treatise on Human Nature. For instance, in 
response to the question of whether the soul could be treated as a hylomorphic substance, 
Aquinas writes that it cannot, precisely on account of its having an intellectual nature:
(28A) It is manifest that anything that is received into something is received 
according to the mode of the recipient. (28B) Now something is cognized to the 
extent that its form is in the cognizer. But the intellectual soul cognizes something
in its nature absolutely. For instance, it cognizes a stone absolutely insofar as it is 
a stone. Therefore, the form of a stone absolutely is in the intellectual soul 
according to the proper formal nature. (28C) Therefore, the intellectual soul is an 
absolute form, not something composed of matter and form. (28E) For if the 
intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be 
received into it as individuals, and so it would not cognize except as singularly, 
just as it occurs in the sensitive powers, which receive forms in a corporeal organ, 
since matter is the principle of individuation of forms. (28F) It follows, therefore, 
that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance cognizing forms 
absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form (ST 1a, Q75, A5, 
c.o.).121
121 Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per 
modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in 
cognoscente. Anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute, 
puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, 
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At 28A, Aquinas lays out the operative principle that enables him to determine the nature 
of the potential intellect: since objects received are received in accord with the mode of 
the receiver, whatever one says about about the nature of the object received must pertain 
to the nature of the receiver. Aquinas’s comments at 28B amount to the claim that 
intellectual cognition involves reception of form absolutely. Thus, at 28C, Aquinas 
concludes that the intellectual soul is an absolute form.122 Aquinas initially describes an 
absolute form as being form not composed with matter, but at 28E, he explains why this 
is so: the recipient would receive the forms under particularizing/individuating conditions
were the recipient to have material potentiality. Again, as with the previous passages from
the Treatise on Angels and in the Commentary on De Anima (see passage 24A-F, above), 
Aquinas has associated materiality with particularity/individuation, which stands in 
contrast to immateriality/universality, such that the absence of particularity implies 
universality and, consequently, immateriality. Thus intellectual receptivity involves a 
potentiality distinct from matter. Since every receptivity of particularized form involves a
body, the intellectual potentiality is also incorporeal. Of course, as we have seen, this is 
also Averroes’s strategy for establishing the reality of incorporeal potentiality, the only 
difference being that Aquinas has used the “mode of the recipient” principle in place of 
secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva. Anima igitur 
intellectiva est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Si 
enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, formae rerum 
reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in
potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali: materia enim est 
principium individuationis formarum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et 
omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione 
formae et materiae. (Summa Theologiae 5.202)
122 It is worth noting that Aquinas’s describes the human soul as an absolute form 
in In Sent. 1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 2., as well. See Appendix I.
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Averroes’s Diversity Thesis.123 Aquinas thus makes explicit that the reality of incorporeal 
potentiality entails the rejecting the view that the soul (or any other intellectual creature) 
is a hylomorphic composition.
123 See n. 19, above for brief discussion of the “mode of the receiver” principle in 
relation to Averroes’s Diversity Thesis. Also, consider Aquinas’s reply to the 
following objection in the same article as passage 28A-F:
It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is 
opposed to actuality. But all such things that are in actuality participate in the 
Prime Act, which is God. Through this participation all things are good, being, 
and living, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius in The Book of Divine 
Names. Therefore, whatever things are in potentiality participate of the first 
potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Since, therefore, the 
human soul is in some sense in potentiality, which is apparent from the fact that 
man sometimes has understanding in potentiality, it seems that the human soul 
participates in primary matter as part of itself (ST 1a, Q75, A5 arg. 1). //  Videtur 
quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Potentia enim contra actum 
dividitur. Sed omnia quaecumque sunt in actu, participant primum actum, qui 
Deus est; per cuius participationem omnia sunt et bona et entia et viventia, ut 
patet per doctrinam Dionysii in libro de Div. Nom. Ergo quaecumque sunt in 
potentia, participant primam potentiam. Sed prima potentia est materia prima. 
Cum ergo anima humana sit quodammodo in potentia, quod apparet ex hoc quod 
homo quandoque est intelligens in potentia; videtur quod anima humana participet
materiam primam tanquam partem sui (Summa Theologiae 5.201-202).
The Prime Act is the universal principle of all acts, because It is infinite, virtually 
precontaining all things in itself, as Dionysius says. Thus it is participated to 
things not as a part of themselves, but according to diffusion of processions. Since
potentiality is receptive of act, it is necessary that it is proportionate to act. The 
acts received, which proceed from the Prime Infinite Act and are participations of 
it, are diverse. Thus there  cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, just 
as there is one act, just as there is one act influencing all participated acts, 
otherwise the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the 
Prime Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the 
receptive potentiality of prime matter, as is apparent from the diversity of 
recipients. For prime matter receives individual forms, yet intellect receives 
absolute forms. Thus potentiality existing in the intellectual soul does not show 
that the soul is composed of matter and form (ST 1a, Q75, A5, ad. 1). //  Primus 
actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, virtualiter in 
se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars,
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4.5.2.2 The Hierarchy of Intellectual Substances
Just as Aquinas had argued in previous works that the human soul is the lowest of 
intellectual substances on account of the fact that it is in pure potentiality to receive 
intelligible species of sensible substances, Aquinas presents the same position in the 
Summa Theologiae. For instance, concerning the distinction between the manner in 
which the soul and the angels understand, Aquinas writes in his Treatise on Angels:
(29A) Lower intellectual substances, namely, human souls - have an intellective 
potency not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them through the
fact that they receive intelligible species from things. In the higher spiritual 
substances, namely, the angels, the intellectual potency is naturally complete 
through intelligible species, in so far as they have intelligible species belonging 
naturally to them, so as to understand all things which they can cognize naturally. 
(29B) This is apparent from the mode of existence of such substances. The lower 
spiritual substances, that is, souls, have a existence affiliated with body, in so far 
as they are the forms of bodies. Consequently, from their very mode of existence 
it belongs to them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies and through 
bodies, otherwise they would be united with bodies in vain. (29C) The higher 
substances, namely, the angels, are completely free from bodies, immaterially 
subsistent, and in intelligible existence. Consequently, their intelligible perfection 
sed secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva 
actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo
actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest 
esse potentia una quae recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes 
actus participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam activam primi
actus. Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva 
materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit 
formas individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde talis 
potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod anima sit composita ex 
materia et forma (Summa Theologiae 5.202).
The objection presents the standard universal hylomorphist view that any receptive 
nature participates to some degree or another in prime matter. However, Aquinas’s 
reply to this appears to coincide with Averroes’s comment at 3G that diverse forms 
cause the diversity of their recipient. First, Aquinas mentions that potentiality is 
proportionate to act, and thus the diversity of acts requires there to be a diversity of 
potentialities. But this appears to contrast with the “mode of the recipient” principle, 
which prioritizes the recipient as an explanans for the form being material/particular 
or immaterial/universal/absolute.
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follows from an intelligible outflowing, from which they received from God the 
species of cognizable things together with their intellectual nature (ST 1a, Q55, 
A2, c.o.).124
At 29A, Aquinas maintains that the human soul is such that it requires reception of form 
from something outside of its nature in order to fulfill its act of understanding. By 
contrast, the angelic intellects already contain their intellectual objects by nature. At 29B, 
Aquinas cites the human soul as having to rely on sensible bodies and sensory activities, 
which rely on the body, in order for its intellectual act to come to fruition. That is, since 
there is no intelligible object inherent in the human soul, its intelligibility is naturally in 
pure potential, and therefore must receive its formal content from without. As such, the 
completion of human understanding relies on abstracting intelligible species from 
sensible content, which in turn requires that the soul be essentially related to a body. This 
contrasts with Aquinas’s description of the angels, who possess intelligible species 
inherently. Just as with previous passages, Aquinas appears to be repeating Averroes’s 
position in the Long Commentary on De Anima when i) distinguishing the human 
intellect from other separate intellects on the basis that its peculiar incorporeal 
124 Inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam
intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc 
quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantiis 
spiritualibus superioribus, idest in Angelis, naturaliter completa est per species 
intelligibiles, inquantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia 
intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt. Et hoc etiam ex ipso modo essendi 
huiusmodi substantiarum apparet. Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet 
animae, habent esse affine corpori, inquantum sunt corporum formae, et ideo ex ipso 
modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus, et per corpora suam perfectionem 
intelligibilem consequantur, alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur. Substantiae vero 
superiores, idest Angeli, sunt a corporibus totaliter absolutae, immaterialiter et in esse 
intelligibili subsistentes, et ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per 
intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum 
intellectuali natura. (Summa Theolgiae 5.56)
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potentiality requires abstraction of form from sensible content, therefore requiring an 
essential relationship to the body, and ii) ranking the human intellect as the lowest among
intellectual substances on account of its possessing a pure potentiality to receive 
intelligible species.125
Aquinas returns to a comparison between human and angelic intellectual 
understanding in his Treatise on Human Nature, where he explicitly states what the 
receptivity of intellectual form in the human intellect via abstraction from material 
particulars requires. As such, the human intellect must be essentially related to the body, 
contra the Platonic view that the human intellect cognizes separate forms, and is 
therefore a substance altogether separate from the body. Aquinas writes,
(30A) The power of cognition is proportionate to the cognized. Therefore, the 
proper object of the angelic intellect, which is completely separate from a body, is
an intelligible substance separate from a body, and through this it cognizes 
intelligible material. (30B) However, the proper object of the human intellect, 
which is conjoined to the body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal 
matter; and through this it ascends from the natures of visible things to some 
cognition of invisible things. (30C) Now this kind of nature is such that it exists in
some individual, which is not separate from corporeal matter, just as the nature of 
a stone is that which is in this particular stone, and concerning the nature of a 
horse that it is in this particular horse, and so on concerning others.  Thus, the 
nature of a stone or other material thing cannot be cognized completely and truly, 
except insofar as that is cognized as existing in a particular. (30D) Now we 
apprehend the individual through sense and imagination. Therefore it is necessary 
that the intellectual act understands its proper object, that it turns to phantasms to 
examine the universal nature existing in the particular. (30E) But if the proper 
object of our intellect were a separate form, or if the natures of sensible things 
were not subsistent in particulars, according to the Platonists, it would not be 
necessary that our intellect turns to phantasms whenever it understands. (ST 1a, Q 
84, A 7, c.o.).126 
125 See: ST 1a, Q 76, A5, c.o. (Summa Theolgiae 5.228); 1a, Q 79, A2, c.o. 
(Summa Theolgiae 5.259-260); 1a, Q 89, A1, c.o. (Summa Theolgiae 5.370-371).
126 Potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, 
qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a 
corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. Intellectus 
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At 30A, Aquinas restates his position on angelic intellects, which he first presented in the 
Treatise on Angels: the angelic intellects are acts of separate substances, and therefore 
have separate intellectual forms as their proper object. At 30B, Aquinas contrasts this 
with the proper object of  human intellectual cognition, which is an act of a soul that is 
the substantial form of a body, and therefore cognizes essences of bodily beings. At 30C, 
Aquinas presents the reason why this entails that human intellectual cognition is unlike 
the angelic intellects insofar as it must be part of an essence that includes a body: since 
the proper objects of human intellect are material forms, they are individuated. Aquinas 
takes this to mean that cognition of such forms cannot occur in completeness without 
there also being some awareness of their existing as individuals. Since, however, the 
intellect receives forms absent all matter and particularizing conditions, complete 
cognition will require prior and/or concurrent awareness of the essences of material forms
via the sensory and/or imaginative faculties. Thus, at 30D, Aquinas remarks that the 
intellect “turns to phantasms to examine the universal nature existing in the particular.”  
As such, the completion of human intellect depends on bodily cognition of the forms of 
autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive 
natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam 
in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae
est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali, sicut de 
ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in 
hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci
non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens.
Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est 
ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad 
phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem. Si autem 
proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata; vel si naturae rerum 
sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos; non oporteret 
quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata (Summa 
Theologiae 5.325).
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hylomorphic substances, and ispo facto, must be essentially related to a body. Aquinas 
thus concludes at 30E that the nature of human intellection requires a rejection of 
Platonism. Since Aquinas’s account in the above passage concerning the human 
intellect’s dependence on the body for abstraction of intelligible form is the same as that 
which we saw Averroes present (see Chapter 2, p. 79-82), one can conclude that Aquinas 
has again adopted a position of Averroes to reject a Platonic dualist conception of the 
relationship between the soul and the body.
4.5.3  The Communicability of Being Doctrine
Just as in Aquinas’s previous works, in the Summa Theologiae he draws on the 
Communicability of Being doctrine as a way to explain how the human being can have 
unified being despite the soul’s subsistence, and he does so in response to objections that 
insist on treating substantial formality and substantial subsistence as mutually exclusive. 
For instance, in the Treatise on Human Nature, Aquinas presents the following objection: 
“That which has existence per se is not united to the body as its form, because a form is 
that by something exists, and so the existence itself of a form is not the form according to
itself. But the intellectual principle has existence according to itself and is subsistent. 
Therefore it is not united to the body as its form” (ST 1a, Q 76, A 1, arg. 5).127 This is 
consistent with objections presented in previous works, which treat the soul as either 
having per se existence (i.e. subsistence) or as having existence only through its being the
127 Id quod per se habet esse, non unitur corpori ut forma, quia forma est quo 
aliquid est; et sic ipsum esse formae non est ipsius formae secundum se. Sed 
intellectivum principium habet secundum se esse, et est subsistens, ut supra dictum 
est. Non ergo unitur corpori ut forma (Summa Theologiae 5.208).
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principle of a substance, but not both. However, Aquinas’s thesis rejects the notion that a 
substantial form cannot be subsistent substance on the basis that the soul communicates 
its per se existence to the body, and thus the body shares in the same being as the soul:
The soul shares that existence in which it subsists with corporeal matter, and from
this and the intellectual soul there results a unity, such that the existence of the 
whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This does not happen with other
forms that are not subsistent. Because of this, the human soul retains existence in 
itself after destruction of the body; however, this is not so for other forms (ST 1a, 
Q 76, A 1, arg. 5).128
Aquinas’s reply to this objection to his ontology of soul is therefore the same as in 
previous works. Since we have seen that the Communicability of Being doctrine is 
effectively Aquinas’s variation on the Ammonian conception of soul, one can claim with 
confidence that Aquinas’s mature works reflect the same degree of Neoplatonic influence 
found in his earlier works. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The next and final chapter explores the consequences of treating Aquinas’s thesis 
that the soul is both a subsistent substance and a substantial form from the perspective of 
his Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic sources. I will return to the issues raised in Chapter 1,
concerning interpretations of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology offered by recent 
historians of philosophy and analytic philosophers. The aim will be to draw on the work 
done in this chapter and the previous two chapters on the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic 
128 Anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua 
et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam 
ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter 
hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem aliae formae 
(Summa Theologiae 5.210).
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roots of Aquinas’s ontology of soul, in order to augment the interpretations of other 
scholars when possible and correct them when necessary. Before doing so, however, it 
should be helpful to remind the reader how Aquinas employed in his mature works those 
principles he found in the Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic sources. First, we saw that 
Aquinas continued to employ Avicenna's form/essence distinction in articulating his 
conception of the relationship between the human soul and body while also responding to
objections inspired by form/essence identity. Second, Aquinas continued to use the 
Communicability of Being Doctrine to defend the unity of the human person, showing 
allegiance to the conception of soul that stems from the Ammonian tradition of 
interpreting Aristotle’s psychology. Lastly, Aquinas continued to draw on the ontological 
reality of incorporeal potentiality in his criticism of universal hylomorphism, as well as 
the absolute degree of incorporeal potentiality in the human potential intellect in rejecting
the notion that the human soul's subsistence requires a Platonic conception of human 
nature.
In the Questiones Disputate de Anima, Aquinas employed the form/essence 
distinction, Communicability of Being thesis, incorporeal potentiality, and the hierarchy 
of intelligible substances to account for the ontology of the human soul. Moreover, he 
continued to interpret the Boethian quod est/quo est distinction according to the 
principles he inherited from Avicenna and Avicenna’s Neoplatonic predecessors.
In the Questiones Disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Aquinas draws on 
incorporeal potentiality to argue against the universal hylomorphist thesis that all created 
substances are compositions of form and matter. Moreover, Aquinas uses the 
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Communicability of Being thesis to categorize the human soul as both a spiritual 
substance and a form of the body. Insofar as it is an has an intellectual act and is per se 
subsistent, it is a spiritual substance. However, its intellectual activity requires that it have
an essential relationship with a body, and so also must be a form.
In Aquinas’s Commentary on De Anima, Aquinas draws on the Communicability 
of Being thesis, the form-essence distinction, and incorporeal potentiality of intellectual 
substances respectively in offering an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the 
intellectual soul. As such, this supports the thesis that Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic 
principles influenced Aquinas’s reading of Aristotle’s hylormorphism and the ontological 
status of the soul.
In Aquinas’s Commentary on Metaphysics, we saw Aquinas address issues 
concerning form-essence distinction versus form-essence identity, and that he presented 
arguments explicitly in favor of the latter. This provides evidence that Aquinas had a clear
understanding of the differences between the Aristotelian and Avicennian positions 
concerning the form-essence distinction, and that he continued to opt for the Avicennian 
position in his late works. Just as we saw in Chapter 3 that Aquinas had argued for the 
form-essence distinction on its own philosophical merits in the De Ente et Essentia, 
Aquinas again faithfully presented Avicenna's hylomorphic model in the Commentary on 
Metaphysics and adopted it as his favored position. 
Finally, we saw that Aquinas employed the form/essence distinction, 
Communicability of Being thesis, incorporeal potentiality, and the hierarchy of 
intelligible substances in the Summa Theologiae in presenting his account of the soul as a
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subsistent substance and substantial form. We saw that Aquinas’s presentation of these 
principles is consistent with his earlier works and other mature works, which supports the
claim that Aquinas was committed to the principles from Arabic-Islamic and Neoplatonic 
sources late in his career. Moreover, since Aquinas’s use of these Arabic-Islamic and 
Neoplatonic principles to justify his thesis that the soul is both a subsistent substance and 
substantial form is consistent throughout his career, it is safe to conclude that there is no 
substantial change to Aquinas’s ontology of soul between his early and mature works.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION – AQUINAS’S PHILOSOPHICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY: WHAT IT IS & WHAT IT IS NOT
At the end of the first chapter, I briefly discussed that Aquinas had inherited from 
the Aristotelian conception of psychology three statements that were seemingly at odds 
with one another:
1. The soul is a first act of an organic body, which entails that the soul is 
related to the body as form to matter.
2. The actuality of intellect is not the actuality of a body or a bodily organ.
3. The intellect is a power of the human soul.
Because (1) treats the soul as the principle of a hylomorphic composition and (2) denies 
that intellect could be such a principle, a combination of (1) and (2) would require that a) 
the intellect is separate from the human soul. However, taking (2) and (3) together would 
place the intellect in the human soul and therefore seem to require that b) the soul be 
treated as a substance separate from the body. This leaves one the task of explaining the 
soul-body relation: is the relation accidental or still somehow essential; how do the two 
substances interact; etc.? A combination of (1) and (3) would require that c) intellect be 
treated as the power of some act, which is the act of an organic body. However, one must 
account for intellect having per se actuality, which, presumably unlike the soul, implies 
that the intellect’s existence does not depend on the body. Aquinas held all three 
statements, which committed him to the view that the soul as a form is the act of an 
organic body, and thus a principle of a hylomorphic substance, yet has an intellectual 
power that is not the act of an organic body. In other words, Aquinas was in some sense 
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committed to (a-c). As the objections in his articles attest, he was acutely aware of the 
conceptual difficulty involved in showing that (a-c) are compatible. To add to the 
difficulty, Aquinas also inherited from the prior Scholastic tradition, the Christian 
tradition of scriptural interpretation in the Latin West, and the doctrines of Catholic 
teaching, the view that the human soul is an individual substance that has per se 
existence, yet has an essential relationship to the body. The soul conceived as an 
individual substance was important for its ties to belief in the soul’s immortality, and the 
soul’s essential relationship to the body was important for the belief in bodily 
resurrection. Since Aquinas was committed to showing that the Catholic position was not 
in conflict with Aristotelian psychology, he expressed the Catholic position in Aristotelian
nomenclenture, i.e., that the soul is a subsistent substance (and, therefore, a hoc aliquid in
a certain sense), as well as a substantial form (and, therefore, is essentially related to a 
body). To this extent, the Aristotelian texts and the Latin Christian tradition that preceded 
Aquinas were the source for the issues concerning the ontology of the human soul and its 
relationship to the body, which we had seen Aquinas address in the previous two 
chapters. However, the previous three chapters have shown that Aquinas’s attempt to 
resolve the aporia laid out above drew heavily on Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic 
sources. 
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5.1  The Importance of the Form-Essence Distinction and Avicennian 
Hylomorphism
First, we saw that Aquinas followed Avicenna in distinguishing form from essence
in hylomorphic substances, such that the soul serves as part of the essence humanity in 
the capacity of form, i.e. as the actuality of an organic body. Adopting the form-essence 
distinction and the subsequent conception of hylomorphism that follows from it, allowed 
Aquinas to treat the human soul as a substantial form, despite the soul also being a 
subsistent substance on account of its having an intellectual act. That is to say, the human 
soul, like all other substantial forms of hylomorphic substances, are part of an essence 
that order them to matter. In general, the acts of substantial forms are material acts, and 
require a body. Thus, the acts of substantial forms incidentally corrupt along with the 
corruption of the body, and so the substantial forms cease to exist when the the bodies 
they actualize cease to exist. Yet, the human soul is unlike other substantial forms insofar 
as it is also the source of intellectual activity, which is immaterial and, therefore, a per se 
activity. The human soul’s possession of intellect thus demonstrates that it is to be 
included among intellectual substances, and should be treated as more than merely a 
substantial form. Like the other intellectual substances, the human soul is also subsistent. 
Yet again, since form and essence in hylomorphic substances are distinct on Aquinas’s 
account, he can maintain that the human soul is still a part of a hylomorphic essence in its
disembodied state, and thus it retains its potentiality to actualize the body as a substantial 
form. The form-essence distinction and the Avicennian hylomorphism that follows from 
it consequently removes the conflict between i) the human soul being a subsistent 
205
substance on account of it being a source of intellectual activity and ii) it being a 
substantial form of the body. That is to say, Avicennian hylomorphism allows Aquinas to 
combine (2) and (3), above, without denying (1). 
The above account of the human soul as a per se subsistent part of a hylomorphic 
substance  provided Aquinas a new perspective on the traditional conception of human 
soul as a hoc aliquid: it is called such to the extent that its intellectual nature guarantees it
has per se existence and thus natural immortality. However, unlike other intellectual 
substances who are complete in their natures simply through engagement in intellectual 
activity, and thus hec aliqua in the strictest sense, the human soul is complete in its nature
only when it engages in its other essential acts (i.e. sensory and nutritive acts), which 
require a body. The disembodied human soul is therefore a hoc aliquid only in the weaker
sense of having subsistence. As a substantial form, the human soul is part of a 
hylomorphic essence that orders it to a body, and the unity of these two constitutes a hoc 
aliquid complete in its nature. The incomplete nature of the soul in its disembodied state 
indicates that it retains its essential relation to the body, which Aquinas uses to argue that 
bodily resurrection (i.e., the soul once again actively resuming its role as a substantial 
form the body) is a reasonable expectation.129
5.2 The Importance of the Communicability of Being Doctrine and the Ammonian 
Interpretation
Second, we saw that Aquinas was influenced by Neoplatonic commentators on 
Aristotle through the works of Avicenna in maintaining that the soul can have its own 
129 See Chapter 4, p. 185-186.
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existence distinct from the body and yet also be the formal cause of the body. The 
Neoplatonic commentators of the Ammonian tradition ultimately viewed the soul and 
body as distinct substances, and re-conceived the soul as a formal cause of the body in 
terms of teleiotēs/final causality. These are positions that Aquinas would have rejected. 
Nevertheless, we saw in our discussion of the work of Robert Wisnovsky in Chapter 2 
that the Ammonian tradition affected the translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s 
psychological works such that it became natural for Avicenna and other Islamic/Arabic 
thinkers to treat the soul as both a form of the body and a separate substance. Since 
Aquinas’s own reading of Aristotle’s works were aided by the commentary of Avicenna, 
it is my contention that the Ammonian interpretation had its influence on Aquinas, and 
this can be seen in what I have called the Communicability of Being Doctrine. Briefly, 
the Communicability of Being Doctrine maintains that a substantial form having per se 
existence will cause matter to share that same existence. This enables Aquinas to avoid 
attempts to maintain that the hylomorphic nature of the soul requires denial that the soul 
can have per se existence or that the soul having per se existence precludes the possibility
of it being a substantial form. Since the human soul shares its per se existence with 
matter, the hylomorphic composition constitutes a substantial unity. Even if the body 
corrupts on account of the dissolution of its elemental mixture, the soul nevertheless 
retains the existence shared by both principles of the composition. As with the form-
essence distinction, the Communicability of Being doctrine is intended to provide a 
perspective of the soul-body relation that enables Aquinas to maintain (1-3) together 
without the pain of contradiction.
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5.3 The Importance of Incorporeal Potentiality
At the end of Chapter 2, I listed a series of positions from Averroes’s Long 
Commentary on De Anima that Aquinas adopted in for his own account of the nature of 
human intellection. First, Aquinas followed Averroes in thinking that Aristotle's 
discussion of intellectual receptivity in De Anima 3.4 as an introduction of a new 
category of being, viz. incorporeal potentiality, as distinct from the material actuality of 
substantial form, the material potentiality of prime matter, and the incorporeal actuality of
active thought. Second, Aquinas adopted the position that reception of form in the human 
intellect involves something that is wholly characterized by incorporeal potentiality, viz. 
the potential intellect. As we saw, Aquinas drew directly on Averroes’s reasoning for the 
reality of incorporeal potentiality to argue against the doctrine of universal hylomorphism
and in favor of the immateriality of intellect. Aquinas’s insistence on human intellect 
possessing an immaterial potentiality is an indispensable aspect of  Aquinas's conception 
of the soul as a subsistent substance. 
Third, Aquinas followed Averroes that the potential intellect has the highest 
degree of incorporeal potentiality/weakest degree of incorporeal actuality among 
intellectual substances. Since it doesn’t possess any actual thought intrinsically, its 
actualization depends on abstraction of the forms of objects external to it, viz. the forms 
of hylomorphic substances. Accordingly, Aquinas sees a gradation of intellectual 
substances based on their degree of having actualized incorporeal potentiality. Since the 
human intellect is in pure potential for thought and depends on abstraction of the forms of
hylomorphic substance for it to think, it occupies the lowest place among intellectual 
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substances. The place of the intellectual substance in this hierarchical gradation is 
indicative of the kind of being it is, as it sits at the precipice of both the bodily and 
intellectual realms in a nature that unites them. This unified nature is evidenced by 
Aquinas’s position that the abstractive process begins with the receptivity of the form in 
the senses and is further refined until it terminates in the illumination of the form in the 
imagination, and which results in reception of the form in the potential intellect. Since 
both the presence of images and their formation require a body, Aquinas has a basis for 
rejecting the view that the human soul must be a substance altogether separate from the 
body on account of its being the source of the intellectual power. Aquinas’s adoption of 
Averroes’s account of abstraction requires that human intellection depends on the body 
for its cognitive content. As such, the human intellect is the kind of intellect that requires 
an essential relationship to a body, precluding the Platonism that would seem to follow 
from the soul’s intellectual nature and per se existence. To put another way, the 
abstractive nature of human intellect requires that (2-3) above must go with (1).
5.4 The Indispensability of Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic Principles to Aquinas’s 
Ontology of Soul
Over the course of the past two chapters, we have seen that Aquinas was 
consistent throughout his career in maintaining the form-essence distinction, the 
Communicability of Being Doctrine, the reality of incorporeal potentiality, and the place 
of human intellect as the lowest of intellectual substances, which required an abstractive 
account of intellection that leaves the soul essentially related to the body. He used these 
principles to answer objections to his ontology of soul, critique rival theories, and 
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elaborate on his explanation of how the soul can be both a subsistent substance and a 
substantial form. Several things follow from Aquinas’s commitment to the above 
principles. First, since Aquinas adopted these principles from Arabic/Islamic sources, one
must conclude that the Arabic/Islamic and (indirectly) Neoplatonic thinkers contributed 
to Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotelian hylomorphism and psychology. Second, since 
these principles provide a fundamental framework for Aquinas’s account of the ontology 
of soul, one can conclude that his account remained the same throughout his career.  
Finally, since these principles are an indispensable part of Aquinas’s account, they 
provide a vantage-point from which one might assess contemporary presentations of 
Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. It is with the above conclusions in mind that I 
return to evaluate the positions offered by “Latin Christian Interpretation” (LCI) and the 
“Aquinas as Aristotelian” (AAA) thinkers introduced in Chapter 1. 
5.5 An Assessment of the Latin Christian Interpretation
The common feature of LCI accounts of Aquinas’s conception of human nature is 
that they treat it from the perspective of the Scholastic task of explaining how the soul 
can be both a hoc aliquid and a substantial form. For instance, Anton Pegis maintains that
Aquinas had re-stated the Augustinian conception of the soul in the technical language of 
Aristotelian science. Richard Dales treats Aquinas as being the first thinker in the 
Scholastic tradition to develop a properly Aristotelian explanation of the soul as hoc 
aliquid and substantial form, as a result of Aquinas having greater access to the works of 
Aristotle than those who preceded him. Finally, Bazan has argued that Aquinas loosely 
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used Aristotelian terminology to express a quasi-Platonic view of the human soul that 
resembled the positions of his Scholastic predecessors and peers. However, Bazan thinks 
that the Averroist controversy forced Aquinas to sharpen his understanding of the 
implications of treating the human soul as a substantial form, such that afterwards, 
Aquinas’s position became closer to Aristotle’s and thereby deviated from the Scholastic 
tenancy to combine Platonist conception of the soul with Aristotelian terminology in an 
eclectic mix. This section provides a summary of the above views and a provides a brief 
assessment in light of the the work done in the previous three chapters.
5.5.1  Anton Pegis
We saw in Chapter 1 that Anton Pegis found the works of Aristotle and Augustine 
to be the primary sources for Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. According to Pegis, 
Augustine's spiritual conception of human personhood provided the content of Aquinas's 
conception of human nature, whereas Aristotle's hylomorphic account of substance 
provided Aquinas with a framework for expressing his Augustinianism in a way that 
avoided the pitfalls of Platonic dualist accounts. Pegis thus concluded that Aquinas's 
Augustinian conception of human nature expressed in Aristotelian language provided a 
truly novel perspective on philosophical anthropology that would have been alien to the 
Aristotelian commentators. That is to say, the issue of how the human soul could be seen 
as both a hoc aliquid and a subsistent substance simply would not have been taken up by 
any Aristotelian commentator prior to Aquinas because it was a unique question for those 
who were interested in wedding Augustinian anthropology with Aristotelian 
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hylomorphism. Since the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic commentators were almost 
certainly unaware of Augustinianism and concerned with different problems, Pegis 
treated them as unimportant sources for Aquinas's solution, except perhaps as presenting 
rival positions. For instance, in Chapter 1, we saw Pegis's paint Avicenna as being an 
occasionalist and Platonic about the the relationship between the soul and body, and thus 
incapable of offering any perspective on how the unity of the human person might be 
expressed in Aristotelian terms (Pegis 1963, p. 28-29; Pegis 1976, p. 188). Similarly, we 
saw that Pegis interpret Aquinas’s treatment Averroes’s philosophical anthropology to be 
“essentially Platonic, but which is defended by appeal to the authority of Aristotle.” 
(Pegis 1976, p. 162). Because Pegis treats Avicenna and Averroes to be Platonists about 
human nature, and because Pegis sees Aquinas’s project as attempting to express the 
unity of the human person within an Augustinian anthropology, Pegis dismissed the 
Arabic/Islamic philosophers as major sources for Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. 
Pegis is correct that Aquinas was concerned with providing an account of how the 
human soul could be seen to have per se existence and yet also have an essential 
relationship to a body, that he inherited this concern from Augustine and his Augustinian 
predecessors, and that his proposed solution employed the framework of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism. However, Pegis is simply incorrect to treat the Arabic/Islamic 
philosophers as providing positions that Aquinas could critique and use as a point of 
contrast to his own position. Though Aquinas does ultimately reject Avicenna’s dualistic 
view of the soul and Averroes’s treatment of the human intellect as a substance separate 
from the human soul, the previous three chapters have shown that Avicenna, Averroes, 
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and Neoplatonic commentators (through the medium of Avicenna) offered perspectives 
that Aquinas selectively incorporated into his ontology of soul. Moreover, we saw that 
these principles offered decisive interpretations of the Aristotelian framework that 
precluded other possible interpretations (e.g. the form-essence distinction as opposed to 
form-essence identity) or were re-interpretations of that framework which were at odds 
with Aristotle’s own positions (e.g. Aquinas’s Ammonian-inspired Communicability of 
Being Doctrine). These principles therefore influenced the content of Aquinas’s 
explanation of how the human soul could be treated as a substantial form and also a 
subsistent substance. As such, it is inaccurate to maintain that Augustinianism and 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism determined the content of Aquinas’s ontology of soul. The 
Arabic/Islamic was at least as important an influence. The Augustinian  influence 
determined what Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology must maintain, whereas Aquinas 
employed the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic principles discussed in previous chapters to
explain what those precepts meant. These principles were therefore indispensable to the 
development of Aquinas’s ontology of soul and its relationship to the body.
5.5.2  Richard Dales
The summary of Richard Dales’s account of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology
in Chapter 1 revealed that Dales sees it as the consequence of Aquinas having carefully 
worked through the unsuccessful attempts of his predecessors in resolving textual 
conflicts in Aristotle’s works and in reconciling Aristotle’s hylomorphism with the 
Scholastic conviction that the soul is both hoc aliquid and substantial form. In effect, 
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Dales's interpretation of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology treats Aristotle and the 
Scholastic tradition as Aquinas’s formative sources. For instance, Avicenna receives no 
mention in Dale’s exposition of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology, and Averroes is 
only treated as a figure of opposition for Aquinas on the issue of the unity of intellect for 
all humans and its separation from the human soul. Although Dales does not deny that 
Aquinas drew on the Arabic/Islamic sources, his lack of consideration of their role in 
Aquinas’s solution is a significant drawback in providing a complete account of 
Aquinas’s ontology of soul, since the present work has shown how the Arabic/Islamic and
Neoplatonic sources provided Aquinas with principles indispensable to his position.
5.5.3  Carlos Bazan
Finally, we saw in Chapter 1 that B. Carlos Bazan thinks that the young Aquinas 
interprets the soul as hoc aliquid and substantial form in a dualistic manner, such that the 
soul is a separate intellectual substance and its relation to the body as a form is 
downplayed. Bazan thus maintains that the philosophical anthropology contained in 
Aquinas’s early writings is generally the same as his “ecletic Aristotelian” peers, who 
conceived of the human soul as hoc aliquid to imply that it must be a substance in its own
right, and its role of form was seen as causing the body to possess certain perfections. It 
is worth citing again Bazan’s conception of Aquinas’s ontology of soul in his early works:
 At the beginning of his career, Thomas also held [with the eclectic Aristotelians] 
that the human soul was form and substance: “anima rationalis praeter alias 
formas dicitur esse substantia, et hoc aliquid, secundum quod habet esse 
absolutum, et quod distinguitur; quia anima potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet 
secundum quod est substantia, et secundum quod est forma” (In Sent. II, d. 19, q. 
1, a. 1 ad 4m)  The notion of hoc aliquid in this text is still imprecise and when 
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Thomas discusses its meaning he points out other theoretical implications of the 
notion (universal hylomorphism and individuation). At this stage of development 
of his philosophical anthropology, Thomas has not yet reached the level of 
precision that will be found later in his Questions on the Soul (Bazan 1997, p. 12).
However, Bazan thinks that Aquinas made a decisive shift away from the dualistic 
account of human nature in his early works after encountering Averroes's doctrine that all 
human beings share in a singular separate intellect. Bazan argues that Aquinas began to 
pay closer attention to the implications of treating the human soul as a substantial form, 
which he then used to combat the Averroean account of intellect, Again, it is worth 
revisiting Bazan’s account of Aquinas’s purported change of view that occurred in the 
middle of his career:
It is in the course of his refutation of Averroes's doctrine that Thomas fully 
realizes that in order to justify how a particular human being, who is a composite 
of body and soul, is the subject of an intellectual operation, he has to consider him
or her the subject of an intellectual being, for second acts (operations) depend 
upon first act (being). But the principle of being in composite substances is their 
substantial form; consequently, if human beings think, it is because their 
substantial form is intellectual in nature. The essence of the human soul is then to 
be a substantial form. It is in his confrontation with Averroes that Thomas realizes
that the conception of the soul as a complete intellectual substance is 
fundamentally flawed and leads to an inconsistent view of human nature. It is in 
this confrontation that he also realizes that being essentially "intellectual" is not 
necessarily synonymous with being a complete intellectual substance, because a 
co-principle of a substance, like the human soul, or even an accident of a 
substance, like the intellectual power (potentia intellectiva), can also be 
intellectual by nature. Thomas's critique of Averroes in the Summa contra 
Gentiles is the catalyst of his new conception of the soul and sets the framework 
for the important series of psychological works that he later writes in Italy before 
returning to Paris in 1269 (Bazan 2012, p. 163-164).
Over the course of this dissertation, I have shown that Aquinas adopts a handful of 
principles from Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources, which are indispensable to 
Aquinas’s framework for explaining how the human soul can be both a substantial form 
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and a subsistent substance. Moreover, Aquinas consistently employs these principles 
throughout his career. On Bazan’s account, Aquinas began his career thinking of the soul 
as one thing (i.e., as a pure intellectual substance) and ended it thinking differently of the 
soul (i.e., as a substantial form with an intellectual power). To be sure, Aquinas 
sometimes describes the soul as a separate substance like the angels in his early works, 
whereas no such descriptions appear in his later works. However, this and similar 
descriptions are by themselves no indication that Aquinas had substantively revised his 
position mid-career. For instance, in the opening lines of De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4, 
Aquinas remarks that he intends to embark on the study of “essence in separate 
substances, namely in the soul, the intelligences, and the first cause” (43.375.1-3). This 
seems to imply that the soul is a naturally separate substance, like the angels. However, 
such an interpretation is precluded by Aquinas’s remarks at the end of De Ente et 
Essentia, Chapter 4:
Because it [i.e. the human soul] has more potency among other intelligible 
substances, it follows that the human soul is in such proximity to material things 
that a material thing is drawn to it to participate in its existence, such that from 
soul and body results one existence in one composition, yet, so far as this 
existence is the soul’s existence, it is not dependent on the body.130
As we have seen, Aquinas is drawing on the place of the human soul within the hierarchy 
of intelligible substances to distinguish its nature from the nature of the angelic beings. 
Since the human intellect is such that it is in pure potential to receive its intelligible 
object, it relies on receptivity of form from the sensible world for actualization of its 
130 Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia,
ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad 
participandum esse suum, ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in 
uno composito, quamvis illud esse, prout est animae, non sit dependens a corpore (De
Ente, Chapter 4, 43.377.186-192).
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cognition. Moreover, since sensation is a bodily process, a body must belong to the 
human soul by its essence. In other words, the human soul is an intellectual substance 
that relies on the process of abstraction of intelligible form from sensible substances. But 
the notion that the human soul is the lowest of intellectual substances such that its 
intellectual act requires abstracting form from sensible substances comes directly from 
Averroes’s Long Commentary on De Anima.131 The principles of Aquinas’s ontology of 
soul therefore provide conceptual content to Aquinas’s description of the soul as a 
separate substance. As we have seen, Aquinas’s commitment to Averroean principles, as 
well as the form-essence distinction/Avicennian hylomorphism, and the Ammonian-
inspired Communicability of Being Doctrine remained the same throughout his career. 
Contra Bazan, then, one can justifiably infer that Aquinas’s ontology of the soul is, at its 
core, the same in his early works as in his later works. 
5.5.4  A Summary Assessment of the Latin Christian Interpretation
On each of the above views, the Latin Scholastic tradition is seen as the 
predominant influence on Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. I do not intend to deny 
the importance that this tradition had in framing the issues that Aquinas had faced: 
certainly, his aim was to provide an account of how the soul could be both a hoc aliquid 
and a substantial form, and his theological commitments oriented his argumentation to 
conclusions that were, at minimum, open to the possibility of the soul’s immortality and 
of bodily resurrection. Nevertheless, we saw that Aquinas’s solution to these issues, and 
his arguments both for the immortality of the soul and the possibility of bodily 
131 See Chapter 2, p. 75-78, and Chapter 3, p. 115-125.
217
resurrection rely heavily on principles derived from Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic 
sources. Moreover, Aquinas often reinterpreted traditional Scholastic principles as 
expressions of Arabic/Islamic principles. For instance, we had seen him gloss the quod 
est/quo est distinction in terms of the form-essence distinction in the Commentary on the 
Sentences and in other works. Addressing the influence that the Arabic/Islamic and 
Neoplatonic sources had on Aquinas’s solution to the issues he faced, which I have called
a “Source Based Contextualist” approach (SBC), therefore helps fill gaps left by LCI and 
corrects errors in interpretation left by those gaps.
5.6  An Assessment of the Aquinas as Aristotelian Approach
The common feature of Thomistic scholarship that takes the AAA approach is that
they treat Aquinas's conception of human nature by analyzing his arguments with 
contemporary philosophical devices. However, such interpretations are generally part of a
larger project of assessing Aquinas’s theory of human nature for its utility in addressing 
issues in philosophy of mind, and other fields. This generally results in an interpretation 
of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology that is ahistorical; since argument analysis and 
assessment is what matters, Aquinas’s sources are given little or no consideration, with 
the exception of Aristotle. Such interpretations leave the impression that Aquinas’s 
philosophical anthropology is the result of his directly reading the texts of Aristotle and 
following those texts through to their logical implications. 
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5.6.1 Robert Pasnau
 In the first chapter, we saw that although Pasnau acknowledges other intellectual 
traditions had influenced Aquinas’s thought, he nevertheless sees Aristotle’s works as an 
indispensable source for Aquinas’s conception of human nature. Consequently, Pasnau 
interprets Aquinas's arguments concerning the soul’s subsistence as the logical outcome 
of thinking through Aristotle’s remarks about hylomorphism and the human soul.132 
Aquinas’s hylomorphism is characterized by what Pasnau calls ‘reductive actualism;’  
hylomorphic substances are “bundles of actuality unified by organization around a 
substantial form” (Pasnau 2002, p. 131). On Pasnau’s reading of Aquinas’s works, 
‘matter’ is taken “to be shorthand for a certain kind of actuality, actuality in motion,” 
(Pasnau 2002, 136), rather than an addition to actuality in constituting a hylomorphic 
substance. Pasnau thinks this enables one to interpret aspects of Aquinas’s thought that 
132 For instance, in the opening discussion of the human being as a 
hylomorphic substance in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Pasnau 
remarks:
As Aquinas understands Aristotle, the question What is a human being? should be
analyzed as the question of what makes this material stuff be human. The general 
line of reply that Aristotle proposes (and Aquinas accepts) is that it is form, in the 
ultimate analysis, that makes the matter be what it is (p. 34-35). 
Even concerning Aquinas's position that the soul is naturally immortal, Pasnau 
maintains that Aquinas was following Aristotle's view on human psychology to its 
logical conclusion: 
Aquinas believes that the relationship between the human soul and the human 
body is fundamentally the same as all form-matter relationships. Soul actualizes 
body, with  respect to both existence and the various operations of life. The only 
distinctive feature of this relationship in the human case is that the rational soul 
has an operation that surpasses matter, an operation that need not (and indeed 
cannot) be performed by the human body... Far from being an embarrassment to 
this hylomorphic analysis, his conclusions about the rational soul's status are an 
immediate consequence of the analysis (p. 72).
219
are difficult to understand regarding human nature and to solve issues in contemporary 
philosophy of mind.133 Pasnau’s position therefore either implies or explicitly maintains 
three positions that are problematic and/or incomplete in light of the consideration of the 
Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic influence on Aquinas’s ontology of soul in Chapters 2-4:
1. It is possible to provide a sufficient account of Aquinas’s conception of 
hylomorphism and the subsistence of the human soul by treating Aristotle’s works
as his sole source.
2. The form-matter relation is a relation of an ordering actuality to a cluster of 
subordinate actualities.
The remainder of this section will evaluate (1-2), in light of the conclusions drawn from 
Chapters 2-4.
Concerning (1), it should be apparent that Aquinas’s conception of hylomorphism 
was heavily influenced by Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic principles. First, we saw that 
Aquinas makes a real distinction between form and essence, such that essence is 
understood to cause the composition of form and matter in hylomorphic substances. 
Rather, form and matter are understood to be parts of hylomorphic essences. Aquinas 
followed Avicenna in interpreting Aristotle’s remarks on hylomorphism in accord with 
the form-essence distinction. This Avicennian perspective on Aristotelian hylomorphism 
afforded Aquinas an explanation of how the human soul is able to remain of the human 
essence in a disembodied state: it is a part of a complete essence that lacks its other part. 
133 See Pasnau 2002: “Much of what goes by the name ‘nonreductive’ in 
contemporary philosophy of mind is compatible with how I understand Aquinas’s 
account” (p. 133).
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Moreover, he relies on the form-essence distinction in his reasoning that that bodily 
resurrection is a reasonable expectation. 
Second, we saw that Aquinas conceives of form as the “giver of esse” to matter. I 
argued in Chapter 2 that Aquinas follows Avicenna in maintaining that God causes form 
to exist, and uses form as an instrument to cause matter to exist, thereby bringing about 
the existence of a sensible substance.134 This is distinct from Aristotle’s conception of 
form, which holds that there is nothing more to the existence of a sensible substance than 
substantial form determining matter to bear essential properties. Thus, on the Aristotelian 
view, substantial form and matter are said to have existence only insofar as they are 
principles of sensible substances. This difference lends Aquinas the possibility of 
adopting the Communicability of Being Doctrine, viz. if a substantial form has per se 
existence, it causes the sensible substance to have that existence (via giving existence to 
matter). Since, on Aquinas’s account, the human soul’s intellectual nature implies that it 
has per se existence despite also being a substantial form, the Communicability of Being 
Doctrine applies to it. Thus the human soul can reasonably be treated as both a subsistent 
substance (on account of its having per se existence) and a substantial form (on account 
of its causing matter to exist and bear essential properties). 
Third, Aquinas follows Averroes in taking the potential intellect to be 
characterized by incorporeal potentiality, which is a category of substance distinct from 
corporeal actuality (i.e., substantial form), incorporeal actuality (i.e. actualized 
intellect/separate form), and corporeal potentiality (prime matter). Averroes uses the 
introduction of incorporeal potentiality to rank separate intellectual substances in a 
134 See Chapter 2, p. 31-38.
221
hierarchy based on the the degree to which their potential for understanding has been 
actualized. We saw in Chapters 3 and 4 that Aquinas followed Averroes in this regard. 
Moreover, despite their disagreement about whether human intellect was to be treated as 
a power of the soul or a substance separate from the soul, Aquinas and Averroes both 
treated the human intellect as the lowest of intellectual substances as a consequence of 
having pure incorporeal potentiality. Accordingly, Aquinas follows Averroes in 
maintaining that the human intellect requires that its proper object, form, be received via 
abstraction from sensible substance. Since the process of abstraction requires sensation, 
and sensation requires a body, the nature of the human intellect is such that it is 
essentially related to body. Aquinas’s Averroean perspective on the reality of incorporeal 
potentiality, the place of the human intellect in the hierarchy of intellectual substances, 
and the process of intellectual reception thus enable Aquinas to allow for the human soul 
to be treated as a substance while also requiring a body.
Each of the above-mentioned principles that have come from Arabic/Islamic or 
Neoplatonic sources are indispensable to Aquinas’s ontology of soul. That is to say, an 
understanding of each of these principles are necessary to provide a complete account of 
Aquinas’s conception of the relationship between the soul and body and the soul’s 
subsistence. To the extent that one neglects consideration of these principles, one runs the
risk of misrepresenting Aquinas’s positions, or, of misrepresenting the reasoning behind 
Aquinas’s position even if one properly represents it. Pasnau’s ‘reductive actualist’ 
account of Aquinas’s conception of hylomorphism and of the soul as a subsistent form 
runs such a risk, precisely because it treats consideration of Aristotle’s works alone as 
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sufficient the philosophical source for interpreting Aquinas’s theory of human nature. 
This will be apparent after analyzing Pasnau’s interpretations of Aquinas’s positions from
the vantage-point of reductive actualism in light of what has been concluded in Chapters 
2-4 of the present work.
Pasnau believes that reductive actualism – i.e., the view that matter is related to 
form as a cluster of subordinate actualities to a superordinate actuality – captures 
Aquinas’s conception of hylomorphism and can explain difficult to interpret passages 
covering Aquinas’s claims about form and about human nature.  For instance, we have 
seen Aquinas argue in various works that matter requires form to exist, but form can exist
without matter; thus there is no impediment to maintaining that a substantial form might 
be subsistent. Pasnau cites the following passage as an example:
The relationship of matter and form is discovered to be such that form gives 
existence to matter. Therefore, it is impossible that matter exists without some 
form. However, it is not impossible that some form exists without matter. For 
form does not have a dependence on matter in its essence. But if some forms are 
found that can exist only in matter, this is so insofar as they are distant from the 
first principle, which is the First act and pure.135
Regarding the above passage and passages like this, Pasnau writes: 
Matter is not something that a form is literally joined to, or that it somehow 
dwells within. In other words, to say that a form “exists only in matter” is not to 
ascribe a relational property to that form, but to characterize that form’s intrinsic 
character. So understood, it is neither incoherent nor obscure to claim that a form 
can exist independently of matter. A subsistent form has a less deficient mode of 
being; it is not a material form, but this is not to say that it can magically free 
itself from some material substratum. (Pasnau 2002, p. 138).
135 Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat esse 
materiae. Et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma. Tamen non est 
impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia. Forma enim non habet in eo quod est 
forma dependentiam ad materiam. Sed si inueniantur alique forme que non possunt 
esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum quod sunt distantes a primo principio 
quod est actus Primus et purus.(De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 4, 43.376.45-50).
223
According to Pasnau, this perspective has the advantage of placing Aquinas's 
hylomorphic account of human nature in the category of many contemporary non-
reductive approaches to the mind-body problem. Since matter is conceived as a cluster of 
actualities organized by form rather than an altogether different sort of thing than form, 
and the soul is a substantial form, this avoids the problem of mind-body interaction 
without denying the reality of either the mental or corporeal. In other words, Pasnau is 
concerned with showing that a reductive actualist reading succeeds in denying that 
Aquinas conceives of matter as a type of stuff that is altogether different from the stuff of 
form, yet exists alongside form and somehow interacts with it, despite phrasing in the De
Ente that, when read literally, present matter as a substance capable of containing form. 
Pasnau is setting a task for Aquinas’s claim that form gives existence to matter 
that it is not designed to address. First, I do not mean to deny that Aquinas’s remarks in 
the De Ente passage above and related passages preclude treating matter as a substance in
its own right. We have seen that the SBC approach has offered an account of Aquinas’s 
conception of matter that precludes treating matter as a substance.136 Additionally, it 
makes clear that substantial form has existential and essential priority, which Pasnau is at 
pains to emphasize.137 Yet, the SBC approach does not involve treating matter as a bundle
of actualities. Rather, we have seen that Aquinas views matter as a potentiality for 
substantial existence. This position appears as part of the ‘existential essentialist’ 
framework he derives from the work of Avicenna, in which God causes matter to exist by 
136 See Chapter 3, p. 85-96.
137 It is unclear how reductive actualism makes sense of this priority, seeing as 
Aquinas’s conception of the role of form is not directly derivable from Aristotle’s 
conception of form. See Chapter 3, p. 90-92.
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giving existence to form.138 The conclusion to draw from this is that matter is an 
irreducible category that belongs to corporeal being, not that matter is a bundle of 
actualities organized by form. Such an account is extraneous and unsupported by the 
broader context that Aquinas’s Arabic/Islamic sources provide. 
The above conclusion also hints at how Aquinas can maintain that a substantial 
form can both be a form for a body and continue to exist after corruption of the body. 
Since matter is a potential for substantial existence, existence properly belongs to form. 
Consequently, if the existence of a substantial form is per se, it will cause matter to have 
existence, as all forms do, despite its capability of existing after bodily corruption. 
Throughout the previous chapters, we have seen Aquinas repeatedly offer the above 
reasoning, which he always grounded in principles derived from Arabic/Islamic and 
Neoplatonic sources, viz. by drawing on the form-essence distinction, the 
Communicability of Being Doctrine, and the degree of incorporeal potentiality of human 
intellect. These arguments were to establish logical harmony between the notions that the 
human soul A) is a substantial form and B) possesses per se existence as a consequence 
of its intellectual nature, a harmony that is impossible on a straightforward reading of the 
hylomorphism and account of separate substances presented in Aristotle’s works. On the 
contrary, Pasnau frames Aquinas’s solution as a way around having to treat the soul-body 
as identical or as two substances interacting with one another; since the soul is a 
superordinate actuality that gives actuality to the actualities subordinate to it, it is possible
that the superordinate can exist without the subordinate. But this is to confuse Aristotle’s 
notion that form, considered as such, need not be a substantial form, with the stronger 
138 See Chapter 3, p, 88, n. 39
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notion that a substantial form can have per se existence. The former follows from 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism; the latter does not. In order to argue for the latter, then, 
Aquinas needed to present argumentation that goes beyond Pasnau’s synopsis, and the 
principles from Aquinas’s Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources provided the key 
premises in that argumentation.
Pasnau’s reductive actualist reading also provides an incomplete account of 
Aquinas’s solution to the so-called “mind-soul problem.”139 Pasnau summarizes the mind-
soul problem as follows: “[Aquinas] needed the rational soul to give shape to the body, to
give rise to the body’s nutritive operations, to be the inner principle behind sensation, and
at the same time to be immaterial. How can the soul do all of those things and yet be 
immaterial?” (Pasnau 2003, p. 212).  Pasnau finds Aquinas’s solution rest in a distinction 
between substantial form and its powers. Pasnau writes, 
In its own right, the soul is a substantial form, whose essence is unknown or at 
least hidden. What we can know of the soul is what we can observe of its 
operations, which leads us to infer that the soul has certain powers. These powers 
“flow” from the soul’s essence, but they are not that essence. Hence the human 
soul gives rise to our ability to digest food, which is as physical a process as 
anything in nature. But the human soul also gives rise to our capacity for thought, 
which all agreed is not a physical process. Since Aquinas distinguished the soul 
and its powers, he saw no difficulty in reconciling these roles (Pasnau 2003, p. 
212).140
Pasnau is correct to highlight that the distinction between the soul and its powers are 
crucial for Aquinas’s position that there is no logical contradiction involved in holding 
that the soul has an incorporeal act and yet is also a substantial form of the body. Since 
the powers are different from the soul and also from one another, the problem of 
139 See (1-3) on page 1 of the current chapter (p. 204).
140 Also see Pasnau 2008, p. 12-15.
226
identifying the material with the immaterial and vice versa simply doesn’t arise. 
However, this does not solve the problem by itself. In order to complete the account, 
Aquinas must explain how it would be possible for a substantial form to possess both 
corporeal and incorporeal powers. Since substantial forms are generally material forms – 
i.e., their existence is limited to the existence of their hylomorphic composition – and 
incorporeal powers have per se existence, how could a substantial form be per se 
existent? In previous chapters, we saw that this question required Aquinas to adopt a 
conception of hylomorphism that allowed him to treat form as part of a hylomorphic 
essence such that it could retain is role as form even absent its actualization of matter (via
the form-essence distinction and Avicennian hylomorphism), and also envision 
substantial form as capable of having a per se activity and existence (via the 
Communicability of Being Doctrine and related considerations).  However, Aquinas is 
faced with the first issue of why the human intellect would belong to the soul as its 
power. The Averroean conception of human intellect as characterized by pure incorporeal 
potentiality, provided such an answer: Since pure intellectual potentiality requires 
reception of its intelligible object from without, it is dependent on abstraction of 
intelligible form from sensible substance, and since sensation is a bodily act, the human 
intellect had to be a power of a being essentially ordered to a body as a substantial form. 
Thus, again, we see that Aquinas’s Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources are necessary 
to provide a complete account of Aquinas’s position.
In light of the above considerations, we can conclude that Aquinas's arguments 
cannot be treated as the result of Aquinas directly engaging Aristotle's works. To the 
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contrary, the Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic commentary heavily impacted Aquinas’s 
reading of the Aristotelian corpus, his framing of the problems, and the principles he 
employed to solve those problems. The lack of consideration of theses sources in 
Pasnau’s studies of Aquinas significantly limit their interpretive power. 
5.6.2 Eleonore Stump
Like Pasnau, Eleonore Stump sees Aquinas’s theory of the soul-body relationship 
as an outgrowth of working out the logical conclusions of Aristotle's remarks about 
hylomorphism and the soul, and as a valuable resource for addressing issues in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. Moreover, Stump acknowledges that Aquinas’s 
account of the human person must reconcile the Christian notion that the human person is
at once a material object subject to bodily corruption and continues to exist after bodily 
death on account of the soul’s immortality (Stump 2003, p 192). So, as Stump sees it, 
Aquinas’s fundamental task is to explain how an immortal soul fits in to the framework 
of Aristotelian hylomorphism. According to Stump, Aquinas’s investigation:
consists in arguing that the human soul is the highest in the rank ordering of all 
the forms configuring material objects, because, unlike material forms, it has an 
operation (namely, intellective cognition) which surpasses the capacities of matter
altogether, and the lowest in the rank ordering of subsistent forms able to exist 
independently of matter. Consequently, in the ranking of forms, the human soul is 
located right at the boundary between the material and the spiritual. For this 
reason, the soul partakes of some of the features of the spiritual world, but it is 
also able to be in contact with matter, so that the body informed by the soul is the 
highest in the order of material objects (Stump 2003, p. 205).
We have seen that the place of the soul within the hierarchy of intellectual substances and
subsistent forms plays a role in Aquinas’s explanation of how the human soul can be both
a substantial form and a subsistent substance. However, we have seen that Aquinas’s 
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treatment of the soul as sitting at the precipice of the material and immaterial was the 
result of following the Averroean conception of incorporeal potentiality to its logical 
conclusion, and using this category to distinguish species of intellectual substances. Since
the human soul is the weakest of intellectual substances, it requires reception of 
intelligible form from an external, sensible object, and, consequently, must be essentially 
related to a body as a form. Yet this required Aquinas to adopt a view of form that 
deviated from Aristotle’s in important ways. First, Aquinas opted for an Avicennian 
reading of Aristotelian hylomorphism that follows from the form-essence distinction. 
Second, Aquinas had to present form as a “giver of esse” such that it would align with the
Communicability of Being thesis, which is Aquinas’s remix of the Ammonian approach 
to the soul.  Therefore, contra Stump, Aquinas’s solution to the issue of how an 
incorporeal, subsistent substance can also be a substantial form for the body includes 
more principles than the place of the soul in the ontological hierarchy, and those 
principles themselves involved important modifications and deviations from Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism. 
Stump’s own estimation of Aquinas’s explanation of how the soul can be treated 
as a subsistent intellectual substance and a substantial is that it is outdated and thus “not 
likely to be persuasive to contemporary readers” (Stump 2003, p. 205). So, in order to 
extract value from Aquinas’s account for addressing issues in contemporary philosophy 
of mind, Stump turns to contemporary philosophical devices to offer an updated 
interpretation of Aquinas’s position. As we saw in Chapter 1, Stump orients her reading 
of  Aquinas’s ontology of soul around two of Aquinas’s central claims:
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a) Human beings are composites of form and matter.
b) The subject of mental activity belongs to the whole human being.
According to Stump, both (a) and (b) require commitment to two other claims:
c) The subject of mental activity is a material substance,
d) Mental activity can be an object of study for the natural sciences.
Since Aquinas’s account of human nature is implicitly committed to (c) and (d), this 
precludes substance dualism, which Stump characterizes as holding that “the mind is not 
composed of matter and that scientific investigation of the brain cannot teach us anything 
about the mind” (Stump 2003, p. 212). Rather, Stump thinks that Aquinas's endorsement 
of (b) implies that “mental states will be implemented in the matter of the body” (Stump 
2003, p. 213), and thus Aquinas’s perspective shares something in common with 
physicalist accounts of mind.  However, Stump also claims that Aquinas’s position aligns 
with dualism insofar as he treats the soul as capable of existing after bodily death on 
account of its capacity of thought being incorporeal. As such, Aquinas’s position resists 
easy placement into the categories of contemporary philosophy of mind. 
Stump finds Aquinas’s position to be in company with contemporary theories that 
defy the supposed physicalism/dualism dichotomy. For instance, Stump finds a close 
comparison between Aquinas’s conception of the soul as a subsistent substance and 
substantial form, and the functionalist perspective offered by Richard Boyd, who 
maintains that mental states are configurational states realized in some substrate, whether 
that substrate is material or non-material. Stump writes:
Boyd’s mental phenomena, like Aquinas’s soul, are configurational; like the soul 
in Aquinas’s account, mental phenomena on Boyd’s view have no essential 
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compositional properties. Furthermore, both Boyd and Aquinas agree in 
supposing that it is possible for what is purely configurational to exist on its own 
apart from any material composition and to function in that condition. For both of 
them, then, it is possible that there be functioning, disembodied mental states 
(Stump 2003, p. 214).
Stump’s position that Aquinas's philosophical anthropology can be restated within
the framework of contemporary philosophy of mind is misguided. Aquinas’s ontology of 
the human soul resists being classified as a dualism or physicalism not because it 
purportedly shares something in common with each in a logically consistent way. Rather, 
it resists such categorization because it was never constructed to address the issues that 
dualists and physicalists consider. In particular, treating Aquinas’s solution as a viable 
contemporary alternative to the dualist/physicalist dichotomy requires ignoring Aquinas's 
remarks about intellect as an actuality without being an actuality of a body or a bodily 
organ, thus having its own existence (per se esse) unconditioned by the body. This is 
precisely what Stump does: “Although Aquinas mistakenly supposes that the intellect is 
tied to no particular bodily organ, he nonetheless holds that the intellectual soul is the 
form constituting the human body as a whole. On his view, therefore, mental states will 
be implemented in the matter of the body” (Stump 2003, p. 213).  If one takes “mental 
states” in the above-cited passage to be co-extensive with what Aquinas refers to as 
“intellectual operations,”  Stump’s reasoning seems to presuppose that the intellectual 
operation is identical with the soul in order to draw the conclusion that intellectual 
operations are operations involving actualization of matter: 
1. The soul and its operations are identical.
2. The soul is the form of the body.
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3. Therefore, the soul’s operation’s are operation’s of the body (via 1 and 2).
4. Human intellectual operations are operations of the soul.
5. Therefore, human intellectual operations are operations of the body (via 4 and 5). 
However, we have seen in the previous sub-section that Aquinas distinguishes between 
the soul and its operations. In fact, Pasnau found this to be the basis for Aquinas to 
maintain coherently that the soul can at once be a substantial form and a subsistent 
substance; since the soul causes its operations, but is distinct from them, there is no 
conflict in maintaining that the soul has both immaterial and material operations. As such,
Aquinas would deny (1). Therefore, neither (3) nor (5) can be soundly inferred. 
On the other hand, one might work backwards from rejecting Aquinas’s claim that
human intellectual operations are not acts of any bodily organ to the conclusion that they 
must inform matter like the other operations of the soul. Such an approach has the 
advantage that one need not deny the distinction between the soul and its operations. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that the supra-organic operation of the intellectual power is a 
key premise, without which one cannot make sense of Aquinas’s reasoning that the 
human soul is subsistent. That is to say, Aquinas concludes that the human soul has per 
se esse precisely because an incorporeal intellectual power belongs to the human soul. 
Aquinas’s commitment to the Averroean notion that the human intellect possesses pure 
incorporeal reality requires that it be non-bodily in nature. Thus the feature of Aquinas’s 
account that Stump thinks he shares with contemporary dualist accounts of mind depends
on his commitment to the essential incorporeality of the human intellectual operation. 
The Thomistic conception of mental states therefore cannot be compared to a 
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functionalist perspective that would treat intellectual operations as implementable in 
either neural stuff or immaterial stuff. Thus, Aquinas must offer an explanation of the 
unity of the human person that looks different from the one Stump has presented. 
On Stump’s account of Aquinas’s view, the person is a unity because its form 
guarantees that its configuration is the same, regardless of whether it configures matter or
is an immaterial configuration. However, we have seen in previous chapters that the 
human soul gives its esse to matter since it is a substantial form. The soul’s having 
existence per se follows from it having an intellectual operation, but it is the same 
existence that the soul communicates to the body that it also has per se. The body is 
therefore not a being separate from the soul, even if the soul can exist separate from the 
body. But in order for Aquinas to explain adequately the above conception of the unity of 
the human person, he must draw on principles from Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic 
commentary tradition, which all extend beyond and elaborate on Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism in their own respective ways.
5.6.3 Anthony Kenny
The final representative of the AAA approach I would like to consider, Anthony 
Kenny, argues against Aquinas's theory of human nature because it ultimately conflicts 
with the Aristotelian framework that Aquinas uses to his account. In Chapter 1, we saw 
Kenny argue that the soul cannot itself be treated as a supposit or primary 
substance/subject if it is also supposed to be a form of the body.  It is worth re-citing 
Kenny’s statement of the issue in full:
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There are serious philosophical difficulties in the identification of soul with form; 
or, to put the point in another way, it is not clear that the Aristotelian notion of 
'form', even if coherent in itself, can be used to render intelligible the notion of 
'soul' as used by Aquinas . . . Aquinas believed that the human soul was immortal 
and could survive the death of the body, to be reunited with it at final resurrection.
Hence, by identifying the soul with the human substantial form he was committed
that the form of a material object could continue to exist when that object had 
ceased to be. (Kenny 1993, p. 28).
Kenny thinks that Aquinas is mistaken to draw such conclusions from Aristotelian 
hylomorphism because Aquinas maintains at the same time that the soul is a concrete, 
subsistent substance, and a form of the body, which is an abstract principle of concrete 
entities. Thus Kenny argues that Aquinas’s account of the human soul is contradictory, 
since something cannot both be concrete and abstract (Kenny 1993, p. 145). In light of 
the investigation of Aquinas’s theory of human nature in Chapters 3-4 and their 
grounding in Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources in Chapter 2, it should be apparent 
that the framework for Aquinas's theory of human nature is not drawn fundamentally 
from Aristotle. Aquinas’s conception of form is not simply that it is an actuality of the 
body. Rather, a substantial form is a “giver of esse.” That is to say, substantial form 
causes prime matter to exist and to bear essential properties. Moreover, form is seen to be 
a part of the essence of a sensible substance. This enables Aquinas to treat of substantial 
form as more than an abstract principle necessary to account for motion. Indeed, 
Aquinas’s framework allows for legitimate exploration of whether a subsistent, concrete 
entity might cause the body to exist and also be essentially related to the body. Thus, 
contra Kenny, to dismiss Aquinas’s query as a mistaken one because it is not a legitimate 
query within the framework of Aristotle’s hylomorphism is to confuse Aristotle’s 
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hylomorphism with Aquinas’s Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic influenced conception of 
hylomorphism.
5.6.4 Summary Remarks on the “Aquinas as Aristotelian” Approach
We have seen that the above proponents of the AAA approach share the view that 
Aquinas’s theory of human nature can be adequately interpreted by assessing his 
arguments in light of the conception of hylomorphism that emerges from Aristotle’s 
works. The AAA approach considered Aquinas’s conception of the soul and its 
relationship to the body in isolation from any influence of Aquinas’s Arabic/Islamic and 
Neoplatonic sources. As a consequence, each of the AAA approaches above led to 
anachronistic, incomplete, and/or misleading depictions of Aquinas's philosophical 
anthropology. We have seen in this section that an SBC approach to interpreting 
Aquinas’s theory of human nature corrects and completes the interpretations offered by 
the AAA proponents. Thus, a proper analysis and assessment of Aquinas's philosophical 
anthropology, as well as evaluations of its value for contemporary philosophical issues, 
requires consideration of how the principles Aquinas derived and developed from 
Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources shaped Aquinas’s arguments.
5.7  The Value of the Source Based Contextualist Approach
Throughout the course of this dissertation, my focus has been to provide an 
account of Aquinas’s conception of the relationship between the soul and body from the 
perspective of the sources  that he employed to develop his position. We have seen in this 
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chapter that this “SBC” approach contrasts in important ways from the LCI and AAA 
approaches taken by other recent scholarship on Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. 
While the LCI interpreted Aquinas’s account from the vantage-point of the issues he 
inherited from his Scholastic predecessors, and the AAA approach was concerned with 
assessing Aquinas’s arguments in relation to Aristotle’s hylomorphism, I have argued that
one cannot provide a complete account of Aquinas’s solution without considering it 
within the context of his Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources. As important as an 
understanding of the issues Aquinas faced may be, I believe that this study supports the 
stronger claim that consideration of the sources that inform Aquinas’s solution should 
take priority in the interpretative process, since these sources provide the principles that 
ultimately determine the philosophical import of Aquinas’s position. Moreover, initial 
emphasis on considering Aquinas’s solution within the context of his sources provides a 
historical perspective that helps guard against the tendency to provide anachronistic 
interpretations and assessments. These advantages provide good reason for future 
expositions, analyses, and assessments of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology to 
incorporate an SBC approach or draw on SBC oriented scholarship.
The present work has focused on Aquinas’s employment of Arabic/Islamic and 
Neoplatonic sources in determining the arguments and meaning of Aquinas’s position that
the soul is both a subsistent substance and substantial form. As such, it is concerned with 
a sub-set of the sources that influenced Aquinas. Therefore, the current work should not 
be taken as arguing that the SBC approach is limited only to consideration of 
Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources on Aquinas. As indispensable as those sources 
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were for Aquinas, he was undoubtedly influenced by sources from the Byzantine Greek 
world, for instance, and from his Scholastic peers, even if to a lesser extent. Nevertheless,
study into these other sources should serve to compliment the current study by further 
contexualizing Aquinas’s position within its appropriate historical context and to deepen 
our understanding of the meaning of Aquinas’s conclusions.
The SBC approach has value for Thomistic scholarship beyond issues of 
philosophical anthropology. That is to say, there is nothing unique about Aquinas’s 
consideration of the relationship between the soul and body that limited Aquinas from 
drawing on sources outside the Scholastic tradition and the Aristotelian corpus in 
developing his position. Aquinas’s well-recognized distinction between existence and 
essence has its foundations in the works of Avicenna, for instance. Given that this 
distinction is important both for Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of God and for his
account of God’s nature, an SBC approach would be invaluable in providing an accurate 
exposition of Aquinas’s rational theology and for assessment of his philosophy of 
religion. This would contrast with approaches that treat Aquinas’s conception of existence
from the vantage-point of post-Fregean logic, which run a high risk of presenting an 
anachronistic account or critique of Aquinas’s positions. Since an SBC approach provides
the advantage of increases accuracy of interpretation by placing Aquinas’s views within 
the context of the sources he draws on for his arguments, future studies of Aquinas would
benefit from employing it.
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APPENDIX: Thomas Aquinas on the Simplicity of the Soul
From In Sent. 1 d. 8, q. 5, a. 2141
Utrum anima sit simplex
Ad secundum sic proceditur: 
1. Videtur quod anima sit simplex. Sicut 
enim dicit philosophus, anima est forma 
corporis. Sed ibidem dicit, quod forma 
neque est materia neque compositum. Ergo 
anima non est composita.
2. Praeterea, omne quod est compositum, 
habet esse ex suis componentibus. Si igitur 
anima sit composita, tunc ipsa in se habet 
aliquod esse, et illud esse nunquam 
removetur ab ea. Sed ex conjunctione 
animae ad corpus relinquitur esse hominis. 
Ergo esse hominis est esse duplex, scilicet 
esse animae, et esse conjuncti: quod non 
potest esse, cum unius rei sit unicum esse.
3. Praeterea, omnis compositio quae 
advenit rei post suum esse completum, est 
sibi accidentalis. Si igitur anima est 
composita ex suis principiis, habens in se 
esse perfectum, compositio ipsius ad 
corpus erit sibi accidentalis. Sed 
compositio accidentalis terminatur ad 
unum per accidens. Ergo ex anima et 
corpore non efficitur nisi unum per 
accidens; et ita homo non est ens per se, 
sed per accidens.
Whether the Soul is Simple?
We proceed to the second article:
OBJECTIONS:
1. It seems that the soul is simple. For just 
as the Philosopher says in De Anima II, the 
soul is the form of the body. He also says 
there that the form is neither matter nor a 
composite. Therefore, the soul is not a 
composite.
2. Further, everything that is composite has 
existence from its components. If, 
therefore, the soul were a composite, then it
would have a certain existence in itself, and
that existence would never be removed 
from it. But from the conjunction of the 
soul to the body, that existence that is the 
existence of the human being remains. 
Therefore, in a human being existence is 
two, namely an existence of the soul and an
existence of the conjunct. But this cannot 
be, since there is one existence of one 
thing. 
3. Further, every composition that comes to
a thing after it as a complete existence is 
accidental to it. If, therefore, the soul is a 
composition from its principles, having 
perfect existence in itself, its composition 
with the body will be accidental to it. But 
an accidental composition is terminated to 
unity accidentally (per accidens). 
Therefore, only an accidental unity (unum 
per accidens) is brought about from soul 
141 See: Aquinas (1929, pp. 227-232).
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4. Contra, Boetius: nulla forma simplex 
potest esse subjectum. Sed anima est 
subjectum et potentiarum et habituum et 
specierum intelligibilium. Ergo non est 
forma simplex.
5.  Praeterea, forma simplex non habet esse
per se, ut dictum est, art. praec., in corp. 
Sed illud quod non habet esse nisi per hoc 
quod est in altero, non potest remanere post
illud, nec etiam potest esse motor, quamvis 
possit esse principium motus, quia movens 
est ens perfectum in se; unde forma ignis 
non est motor ut dicitur 8 Physic. Anima 
autem manet post corpus, et est motor 
corporis. Ergo non est forma simplex.
6. Praeterea, nulla forma simplex habet in 
se unde individuetur, cum omnis forma sit 
de se communis. Si igitur anima est forma 
simplex, non habebit in se unde 
individuetur; sed tantum individuabitur per 
corpus. Remoto autem eo quod est causa 
individuationis, tollitur individuatio. Ergo 
remoto corpore, non remanebunt animae 
diversae secundum individua; et ita non 
remanebit nisi una anima quae erit ipsa 
natura animae.
(I): Respondeo dicendum, quod hic est 
duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod 
anima est composita ex materia et forma; 
quorum etiam sunt quidam dicentes, 
eamdem esse materiam animae et aliorum 
corporalium et spiritualium. Sed hoc non 
videtur esse verum, quia nulla forma 
and body. So a human being is not a being 
through itself (ens per se), but accidentally 
(per accidens).
4. On the contrary, Boethius says in De 
Trinitate that no simple form can be a 
subject. But the soul is a subject of powers,
habits, and intelligible species. Therefore, 
the soul is not a simple form. 
5. Further, a simple form does not have 
existence through itself, as was said. But 
that which does not have existence except 
through the fact that is in another cannot 
remain after that [other thing ceases to 
exist], nor can it be a mover, although it 
can be the principle of motion, because a 
mover is a perfect being in itself. Thus the 
form of fire is not a mover, as said in 
Physics VIII. However, the soul remains 
after the body and is a mover of the body. 
Therefore, it is not a simple form.
6. Further, no simple form has in itself 
what is needed to be individuated, since 
every form is of itself common. If, 
therefore, the soul is a simple form, it will 
not have what is needed to be individuated.
But it will be individuated through the 
body alone. However, when that which is 
the cause of individuation is removed, 
individuation is destroyed. Therefore, the 
body being removed, diverse souls will 
accordingly not remain individual. So only 
one soul will remain, which will be the 
nature of soul.
 SOLUTION:
(I): I respond, one should say that there are
two opinions in this regard. For some say 
that the soul is a composition from matter 
and form, of which some are accustomed to
say that the matter of the soul and of other 
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efficitur intelligibilis, nisi per hoc quod 
separatur a materia et ab appendentiis 
materiae. Hoc autem non est inquantum est
materia corporalis perfecta corporeitate, 
cum ipsa forma corporeitatis sit 
intelligibilis per separationem a materia. 
Unde illae substantiae quae sunt 
intelligibiles per naturam, non videntur 
esse materiales: alias species rerum in ipsis 
non essent secundum esse intelligibile. 
Unde Avicenna dicit, quod aliquid dicitur 
esse intellectivum, quia est immune a 
materia. Et propterea materia prima, prout 
consideratur nuda ab omni forma, non 
habet aliquam diversitatem, nec efficitur 
diversa per aliqua accidentia ante adventum
formae substantialis, cum esse accidentale 
non praecedat substantiale. Uni autem 
perfectibili debetur una perfectio. Ergo 
oportet quod prima forma substantialis 
perficiat totam materiam. Sed prima forma 
quae recipitur in materia, est corporeitas, a 
qua nunquam denudatur, ut dicit Comment.
Ergo forma corporeitatis est in tota materia,
et ita materia non erit nisi in corporibus. Si 
enim diceres, quod quidditas substantiae 
esset prima forma recepta in materia, adhuc
redibit in idem; quia ex quidditate 
substantiae materia non habet divisionem, 
sed ex corporeitate, quam consequuntur 
dimensiones quantitatis in actu; et postea 
per divisionem materiae, secundum quod 
disponitur diversis sitibus, acquiruntur in 
ipsa diversae formae. Ordo enim nobilitatis
in corporibus videtur esse secundum 
ordinem situs ipsorum, sicut ignis est super
aerem; et ideo non videtur quod anima 
habeat materiam, nisi materia aequivoce 
sumatur. 
(II): Alii dicunt, quod anima est composita 
ex quo est et quod est. Differt autem quod 
corporeal and spiritual things are the same. 
But this does not seem to be true, because 
no form is made intelligible except through
the fact that it is separated from matter and 
the additional aspects of matter. This is not 
inasmuch as corporeal matter is perfected 
by corporeality, since the form corporeality
is itself intelligible through separation from
matter. Thus those substances that are 
intelligible by nature do not seem to be 
material; otherwise the species of things in 
them would not be intelligible according to 
esse. Thus Avicenna says in Metaphysics 
III, Chapter 8, that something is said to be 
intellective because it is immune from 
matter. Therefore, when prime matter is 
considered stripped of all form, it doesn't 
have any diversity, but is made diverse 
through certain accidents prior to the 
advent of substantial form, even though 
accidental esse does not precede substantial
esse. Yet, one perfection is owed to one 
perfectible. Therefore it is necessary that 
the first substantial form perfects all matter,
that is corporeality, from which it is never 
stripped, as the Commentator says in 
Physics I. Therefore, the form of 
corporeality is in all matter, and so there 
will not be matter except in bodies. For if 
you were to say that the quiddity of 
substance were the first form received into 
matter, even then the same thing will arise, 
because matter doesn't have division from 
the quiddity of substance, but from 
corporeality, from which follows the 
dimensions of quantity in act. And 
afterwards, through the division of matter, 
according to which it is disposed to diverse
situations, diverse forms are acquired in it. 
For the order of nobility in bodies is seen to
be according to the order of their situation, 
just as fire is above air. So it does not seem 
that the soul has matter, unless matter is 
understood equivocally.
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est a materia; quia quod est, dicit ipsum 
suppositum habens esse; materia autem non
habet esse, sed compositum ex materia et 
forma; unde materia non est quod est, sed 
compositum. Unde in omnibus illis in 
quibus est compositio ex materia et forma, 
est etiam compositio ex quo est et quod est.
In compositis autem ex materia et forma 
quo est potest dici tripliciter. Potest enim 
dici quo est ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse
materiae. Potest etiam dici quo est ipse 
actus essendi, scilicet esse, sicut quo 
curritur, est actus currendi. Potest etiam 
dici quo est ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex 
conjunctione formae cum materia, ut 
humanitas; praecipue secundum ponentes 
quod forma, quae est totum, quae dicitur 
quidditas, non est forma partis, de quibus 
est Avicenna. Cum autem de ratione 
quidditatis, vel essentiae, non sit quod sit 
composita vel compositum; consequens 
poterit inveniri et intelligi aliqua quidditas 
simplex, non consequens compositionem 
formae et materiae. Si autem inveniamus 
aliquam quidditatem quae non sit 
composita ex materia et forma, illa 
quidditas aut est esse suum, aut non. Si illa 
quidditas sit esse suum, sic erit essentia 
ipsius Dei, quae est suum esse, et erit 
omnino simplex. Si vero non sit ipsum 
esse, oportet quod habeat esse acquisitum 
ab alio, sicut est omnis quidditas creata. Et 
quia haec quidditas posita est non 
subsistere in materia, non acquireretur sibi 
esse in altero, sicut quidditatibus 
compositis, immo acquiretur sibi esse in se;
et ita ipsa quidditas erit hoc quod est, et 
ipsum esse suum erit quo est. Et quia omne
quod non habet aliquid a se, est possibile 
respectu illius; hujusmodi quidditas cum 
habeat esse ab alio, erit possibilis respectu 
illius esse, et respectu ejus a quo esse 
habet, in quo nulla cadit potentia; et ita in 
tali quidditate invenietur potentia et actus, 
(II): Others say that the soul is composed 
from quo est and quod est. However, quod 
est differs from matter, because quod est 
names the supposit itself having existence; 
however, matter does not have existence, 
but the composition from matter and form 
[does]. Thus, matter is not quod est, but the
composite [is]. Therefore, in all those in 
which there is a composition of matter and 
form, there is a composition from quo est 
and quod est. However, in compositions 
from matter and form, quo est can be said 
in three ways. For quo est can name the 
form of the part (forma partis), which gives
being to matter. Quo est can also name the 
act of being (actus essendi), namely 
existence, just as that by which one is 
running (quo curritur) is the act of running 
(actus currendi). Finally, quo est can name 
the very nature that remains from the 
conjunction of form with matter, for 
instance, humanity. The latter is so, 
especially according to those who hold that
the form of the whole (forma, quae est 
totum), which is the quiddity, is not the 
form of the part (forma partis), among 
whom is Avicenna. Since, it is not of the 
ratio of quiddity that it is composite or 
composed, consequently a simple quiddity 
can be found and understood, but not 
consequent upon form and matter. 
However, if we find another quiddity that is
not a composite of form and matter, that 
quiddity is either its own existence or not. 
If that quiddity is its own existence, so it 
will be the essence of God Himself, Who is
His own existence, and it will be altogether
simple. If it is not its own existence, it is 
necessary that it have existence acquired 
from another, just as it is with all created 
quiddities. And because these quiddities are
taken not to subsist in matter, existence in 
another wouldn't be acquired by it, like 
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secundum quod ipsa quidditas est 
possibilis, et esse suum est actus ejus. Et 
hoc modo intelligo in Angelis 
compositionem potentiae et actus, et de quo
est et quod est, et similiter in anima. Unde 
Angelus vel anima potest dici quidditas vel 
natura vel forma simplex, inquantum 
eorum quidditas non componitur ex 
diversis; tamen advenit sibi compositio 
horum duorum, scilicet quidditatis et esse.
1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima 
non est composita ex aliquibus quae sint 
partes quidditatis ipsius, sicut nec quaelibet
alia forma; sed quia anima est forma 
absoluta, non dependens a materia, quod 
convenit sibi propter assimilationem et 
propinquitatem ad Deum, ipsa habet esse 
per se, quod non habent aliae formae 
corporales. Unde in anima invenitur 
compositio esse et quod est, et non in aliis 
formis: quia ipsum esse non est formarum 
corporalium absolute, sicut eorum quae 
sunt, sed compositi.
2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod anima 
sine dubio habet in se esse perfectum, 
quamvis hoc esse non resultet ex partibus 
componentibus quidditatem ipsius, nec per 
conjunctionem corporis efficitur ibi aliquod
composite quididites, but existence in itself
would be acquired by it. So the quiddity 
itself will be this quod est and its very 
existence itself will be quo est. Because 
everything that does not have something 
from itself is possible with respect to it. In 
this way, the quiddity, since it has existence
from another, will be possible with respect 
to that existence, and with respect to that 
by which (a quo) it has existence, in which 
no potency occurs. Therefore, in this sort of
quiddity there will be found potency and 
act, namely, according to which the 
quiddity is possible and its existence is its 
act. In this way, I understand the 
composition of potency and act and of quo 
est and quod est in the angels, and similarly
for the soul. Thus the angel or the soul can 
be called quiddity or nature or simple form,
insofar as their quiddities are not composed
from diverse things. Nevertheless, there 
occurs there a composition of these two, 
namely quiddity and existence.
REPLIES:
1. To the first objection it must be said that 
the soul is not a composition from certain 
things that are parts of its quiddity, just as 
is any other form. But because the soul is 
an absolute form (forma absoluta), it does 
not depend on matter, which belongs to it 
on account of its likeness and proximity to 
God, and it has existence through itself 
(esse per se), which other corporeal forms 
do not. Therefore, there is found a 
composition of existence and quod est in 
the soul, and not in other forms, because 
existence itself isn't of corporeal forms 
absolutely, like with things that exist, but to
the composite.
2. To the second objection, it must be said 
that without doubt the soul has perfect 
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aliud esse; immo hoc ipsum esse quod est 
animae per se, fit esse conjuncti: esse enim 
conjuncti non est nisi esse ipsius formae. 
Sed verum est quod aliae formae 
materiales, propter earum imperfectionem, 
non sunt per illud esse, sed sunt tantum 
principia essendi.
3. Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad tertium:
quia compositio quae advenit animae post 
esse completum, secundum modum 
intelligendi, non facit aliud esse, quia sine 
dubio illud esse esset accidentale, et ideo 
non sequitur quod homo sit ens per 
accidens.
4. Ad quartum dicendum, quod si Boetius 
loquitur de subjecto respectu 
quorumcumque accidentium, dictum est 
verum de forma quae est ita simplex quod 
etiam est suum esse, sicut est Deus: et talis 
simplicitas nec in anima nec in Angelo est. 
Si autem loquitur de subjecto respectu 
accidentium quae habent esse firmum in 
natura, et quae sunt accidentia individui; 
tunc est verum dictum suum etiam de 
forma simplici, cujus quidditas non 
componitur ex partibus. Sunt enim 
quaedam accidentia quae non habent esse 
vere, sed tantum sunt intentiones rerum 
naturalium; et hujusmodi sunt species 
rerum, quae sunt in anima, item 
accidentium habentium esse naturae 
quoniam consequuntur naturam individui, 
scilicet materiam, per quam natura 
individuatur, sicut album et nigrum in 
homine; unde etiam non consequuntur 
existence in itself (in se esse perfectum), 
although this existence does not result from
the component parts of its quiddity, nor is 
some other existence made through the 
conjunction with the body; rather this 
existence that is of the soul though itself 
(animae per se) becomes the existence of 
the conjunct. For the existence of the 
conjunct is nothing more than the existence
of the form itself. But it is true that other 
material forms, because of their 
imperfection, do not subsist through that 
existence, but are only principles of 
existence (principia essendi).
3. From this [reason given in the reply to 
the second objection] the solution to the 
third objection is clear: because the 
composition that comes to the soul after the
complete existence, according to the mode 
of understanding, does not make another 
existence, since that existence would 
without doubt be accidental, and so it does 
not follow that a human being is a being 
accidentially.
4. To the fourth objection it must be said 
that if Boethius is speaking about the 
subject with respect to any given accident, 
his saying is true of the form that is so 
simple that it is even its own existence, as 
is God: and such simplicity is neither in the
soul nor in the angel. If, however, he is 
speaking about the subject with respect to 
accidents that have firm existence in 
nature, and which are accidents of the 
individual, then his saying is true of the 
simple form, of whose quiddity is not 
composed from parts. For there are certain 
accidents that do not have true existence, 
but only the intentions of natural things 
(the species of things, which are in the 
soul, are of this mode). Of accidents having
esse of nature, some follow along the 
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totam speciem: et talibus accidentibus non 
potest subjici anima. Quaedam autem 
habent esse naturae, sed consequuntur ex 
principiis speciei, sicut sunt proprietates 
consequentes speciem; et talibus 
accidentibus potest forma simplex subjici, 
quae tamen non est suum esse ratione 
possibilitatis quae est in quidditate ejus, ut 
dictum est, in corp. art., et talia accidentia 
sunt potentiae animae; sic enim et punctus 
et unitas habent suas proprietates.
5. Ad quintum dicendum, quod omnis 
forma est aliqua similitudo primi principii, 
qui est actus purus: unde quanto forma 
magis accedit ad similitudinem ipsius, 
plures participat de perfectionibus ejus. 
Inter formas autem corporum magis 
appropinquat ad similitudinem Dei, anima 
rationalis; et ideo participat de nobilitatibus
Dei, scilicet quod intelligit, et quod potest 
movere, et, quod habet esse per se; et 
anima sensibilis minus, et vegetabilis 
adhuc minus et sic deinceps. Dico igitur, 
quod animae non convenit movere, vel 
habere esse absolutum, inquantum est 
forma; sed inquantum est similitudo Dei.
6. Ad sextum dicendum, quod, secundum 
praedicta, in anima non est aliquid quo ipsa
individuetur, et hoc intellexerunt qui 
negaverunt eam esse hoc aliquid, et non 
quod non habeat per se absolutum esse. Et 
dico quod non individuatur nisi ex corpore.
Unde impossibilis est error ponentium 
animas prius creatas, et postea 
incorporatas: quia non efficiuntur plures 
nisi secundum quod infunduntur pluribus 
corporibus. Sed quamvis individuatio 
animarum dependeat a corpore quantum ad
sui principium, non tamen quantum ad sui 
finem, ita scilicet quod cessantibus 
nature of the individual, namely, matter, 
through which the nature is individuated, 
just as white and black in a human being. 
Thus they do not follow the total species, 
and the soul cannot be subject to such 
accidents. Certain things have esse of 
nature, however, but follow from the 
principles of the species, just as the 
properties following from the species. 
Granting that it is not its own esse, the 
simple form can be subject to such 
accidents by reason of the possibility that it
is in its quiddity, as was said, and such 
accidents are the powers of the soul; for 
even a point and a unity themselves have 
properties in this manner.
5. To the fifth objection, it must be said that
every form is a certain likeness to the First 
Principle, Who is pure act. Thus, the extent 
to which a form more a approaches the 
likeness of Him, the more it partakes of His
perfections. Among corporeal forms, the 
rational soul more approaches toward 
likeness of God. And so it partakes of the 
God's nobility, namely that it understands, 
that it is able to move, and that it has 
existence through itself (esse per se); the 
sensible soul less, the vegetable soul even 
less, etc. I say, therefore, that moving or 
having absolute esse does not belong to the
soul inasmuch at it is form, but inasmuch 
as it is a likeness of God.
6. To the sixth objection, it must be said 
that, according to previous remarks, there 
isn't anything in the soul by which it is 
individuated, and those who understood 
this denied that the soul is a determinate 
particular (hoc aliquid) but not that it has 
absolute existence through itself (per se 
absolutum esse). I say that the soul is only 
individuated through body. Thus the error 
of those who hold that the soul is created 
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corporibus, cesset individuatio animarum. 
Cujus ratio est quod cum omnis perfectio 
infundatur materiae secundum capacitatem 
suam, natura animae ita infundetur diversis 
corporibus, non secundum eamdem 
nobilitatem et puritatem: unde in 
unoquoque corpore habebit esse 
terminatum secundum mensuram corporis. 
Hoc autem esse terminatum, quamvis 
acquiratur animae in corpore, non tamen ex
corpore, nec per dependentiam ad corpus. 
Unde, remotis corporibus, adhuc remanebit
unicuique animae esse suum terminatum 
secundum affectiones vel dispositiones 
quae consecutae sunt ipsam prout fuit 
perfectio talis corporis. Et haec est solutio 
Avicennae, et potest manifestari per 
exemplum sensibile. Si enim aliquid unum 
non retinens figuram distinguatur per 
diversa vasa, sicut aqua; quando vasa 
removebuntur, non remanebunt proprie 
figurae distinctae; sed remanebit una 
tantum aqua. Ita est de formis materialibus,
quae non retinent esse per se. Si autem sit 
aliquid retinens figuram quod distinguatur 
secundum diversas figuras per diversa 
instrumenta, etiam remotis illis, remanebit 
distinctio figurarum, ut patet in cera; et ita 
est de anima, quae retinet esse suum post 
corporis destructionem, quod etiam manet 
in ipsa esse individuatum et distinctum.
first and embodied later is impossible, 
because they are made many only because 
they are infused into many bodies. 
Although the individuation of souls 
depends on the body as to its beginning, 
but nevertheless not as to its end, there 
would certainly be individuation of souls 
after the cessation of bodies. The reason for
this is that since very perfection is infused 
in matter according to its own capacity, the 
nature of the soul is infused into diverse 
bodies, not according to the same 
perfection and purity. Thus in in any given 
body, a soul will have a determine 
existence according to the measure of that 
body. However, although this determinate 
existence is acquired for the soul in the 
body, nonetheless it is not acquired from 
the body or through dependency on the 
body. Thus, bodies having been removed, 
there will nonetheless remain for each soul 
its determine existence according to the 
affections or disposition that are 
consequent upon it inasmuch as it was the 
perfection of a certain body. And this is the 
solution of Avicenna, and can be manifest 
through a sensible example. For if 
something one not retaining figure, such as 
water, is distinguished through diverse 
vessels, when the vessels are removed, then
a properly distinct figure will not remain, 
but there will remain only one water. So it 
is concerning material forms that do not 
retain existence through itself. If, however, 
there is something retaining figure that is 
distinguished according to diverse figures 
through diverse instruments, when they are 
removed, then they will retain a distinct 
figure, as is clear with wax. And so it is 
concerning the soul, which retains its own 
existence after destruction of the body, 
which also remains an individuated and 
distinct existence. 
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